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INTRODUCTION
Richard Chisholm, B.A., LL.B., B.C.L.
Senior Lecturer in Law,
University of New South Wales
Occasionally, someone does more than identify and lament about problems
in the administration of justice. In August, 1979, the New South Wales Govern-
ment announced that it would establish “Community Justice Centres”, and three
were in operation by January, 1981. Though based on American models, they
are the first of their kind in Australia, and appropriately enough have been
established as an experimental project. Do they work? Do they solve the
problems they were intended to solve? Do they have unintended harmful
consequences? What are the implications—might we expect the growth of these
and other forms of mediation, perhaps in a way that displaces the use of the
courts in certain types of case? Would such a development be desirable?
These were some of the issues addressed in this seminar, and a lively and
instructive evening it proved to be. The audience included a range of people
interested in the issues for quite different reasons. (Legal practitioners seemed
to be a small minority. of those attending.)
The speakers were well equipped to tackle the issues. Some were involved
in implementing the project: Kevin Anderson, a stipendiary magistrate, chairs the
co-ordinating committee, and his paper very lucidly sets out the history, objectives
and experience of the centres to date. Wendy Faulkes is the Director of the
Surry Hills Centre, and contributed the perspective of those directly implementing
the project. Other speakers, not directly involved in the centres, brought to the
discussion a wide range of knowledge and experience. John Basten, who teaches
law at the University of New South Wales, was able to draw on his work at the
Redfern Legal Centre and his involvement in prisoners’ rights and other social
issues, as well as the understanding he has gained in teaching and writing in the
area of legal procedure and the delivery of legal services. Regina Graycar, also
at the Law School at the University of New South Wales, had worked with the
Legal Services Commission in South Australia and had worked as a mediator in
the course of studying in the United States. Roman Tomasic of the Department
of Legal Studies at the Kuring-gai C.A.E., has researched and published exten-
sively on matters relating to social justice and legal services. Michael Morahan
presented the perspective of an experienced chamber magistrate: A very important
one, for of all people, chamber magistrates are perhaps most often presented with
the practical problems and frustrations of people trying to resolve disputes through
the lower courts.
Although by the end of the seminar there seemed considerable agreement,
the battle lines appeared initially to be fairly clear cut. On one side were people
in favour of the centres; most of them were directly involved in the work, and I
will label them “the practitioners”. Those who opposed the centres, or at least
had serious reservations about them, tended to draw on theoretical material and
overseas research: with even-handed inaccuracy, I will call them “the academics".
The practitioners, notably Kevin Anderson and Wendy Faulkes, provided informa-
tion, statistics and anecdotes about the successes of the centres and the failures
of the court system. They were supported by most comments from the ﬂoor:
many speakers had had good experiences of mediating disputes or having their
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own disputes mediated, and spoke feclingly about them. There was at times a
hint of evangelism about all this, but the arguments of the academics, if they
did not entirely carry the day, at least ensured that the .lnstitute of Criminology
did not become the centre for a religious revival.
The arguments of the academics were, as is proper, numerous and complex.
But perhaps three themes stood out. Tomasic, Basten and Graycar all expressed
concern that C.J.C’s may in practice be coercive. This could happen, for example,
if a person resorts to a C.J.C. as an alternative to something worse, e.g., defending
a criminal charge. To the extent that people are coerced to go to a C.J.C., it is
fair to speak of an. extension of “state control" (Tomasic). such an extension
might be criticized because of the procedural informality of the system (Basten),
or because the area of state control may have been unduly and invisibly widened
(Graycar).
Second, it was argued that C.J.C’s, and mediation generally, may be un—
suitable for disputes where there is a great disparity of power between the parties,
such as disputes between landlord and tenant, or parent and child; or, perhaps
more controversially, between husband and wife. In such cases, mediation may
provide a spurious “solution”: what is needed may be collective action, or
enforcement of legal rights, by the weaker group.
Third, it was argued that it is misleading to describe C.J.C’s as “community”
bodies: such a description is based on a false analogy with mediation models as
they exist in village societies. John Basten took comfort in the talent and
enthusiasm of the existing mediators, but worried that before long we would see
self-interested claims to expertise and professional status. Ironically, Charles Foley
later proceeded to argue that mediation was indeed a specialized ﬁeld, and we
should establish an Australian Association of Conﬂict Management, together with
university courses in mediation and associated techniques. The development of
the role of mediators, with the competing identiﬁcations with the community on
one hand and with specialized expertise on the other, will be fascinating.
These proceedings record contributions of a very high order, both from the
platform and the ﬂoor. They will be a valuable resource for those who wish
to work with, or think about, Community Justice Centres and mediation in
general. Perhaps the direction for further work is set by Regina Graycar’s nicely
balanced conclusion:
. . . the criticisms which have for so long been directed at courts, and
which have partially spawned this genuine attempt to ﬁnd alternatives
to a system which does not work in the interests of all participants,
are as valid now as they ever have been. But community justice centres
are not, and cannot be perceived as, a panacea for an ailing court
system . . . Alternative mechanisms must take a complementary position
within the justice system. Hopefully, they can supplement that system
without proving counter-productive to other access to justice efforts.
Rather than endorsing their existence overwhelmingly and uncritically,
members of the legal services community should welcome them as a
limited alternative forum which might be an appropriate place to
which clearly deﬁned cases might be referred.
The parameters within which community justice centres should operate,
if they survive the statutory sunset, should be clearly delineated. Com-
munity Justice Centres, if conﬁned to dealing with disputes between
  
ll
parties equal in bargaining power who are not being subjected to a
greater degree of social control than they might otherwise be in their
dealings with the formal justice system, and who voluntarily choose to
take their grievances to a centre, could provide a genuinely promising
(if somewhat limited) alternative to adjudication. t
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COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTRES IN N.S.W.
Kevin Anderson,
Deputy C.S.M.
Introductory .
The New South Wales Government in August, 1979, approved, as a pilot
project of the Department of the Attorney General and of Justice, the establish-
ment of three Community Justice Centres, to be located in the Bankstown,
Redfern and Wollongong areas. The Attorney General appointed a Co-ordinating
Committee with responsibility for implementation of the pilot scheme. During
l980, the committee was active in promoting the project, in public discussion,
selection of directors for the centres, selection and training of mediators, securing
premises and ﬁtting them out, and assisting in the drafting of legislation.
The Community Justice Centres (Pilot Project) Act, 1980, was enacted
late in 1980. The Act has a “sunset" provision which ensures that it will remain
in force no later than December, 1983. The three centres have been operating
in accordance with the legislation since January, 198].
The project is experimental. After March, 1982, when the centres will
have operated for ﬁfteen months, a research report on the project will be con—
sidered by the Government. The relevant research work is being carried out
by staﬁ members of the Law Foundation of N.S.W., an independently funded
statutory body.
Aim
The centres are designed to deal with disputes, such as those between
members of a family or neighbours, where there is a continuing relationship
between the people in conﬂict.
'The aim of the centres is not to make authoritative decisions for thefdisput-
ing parties, but to help them to research their own mutually acceptable resolution
of the dispute; this process is called media/ion.
Theory
It is important to distinguish mediation from other common forms of dis- .
pute resolution. In negotiation the parties try to persuade one another; they
are the decision makers; no third party is involved. In arbitration the parties
consent to the intervention of a third party whose judgment they agree to accept
beforehand. In adjudication, a third party has authority to intervene in a dispute.
to render a decision and to enforce compliance. In mediation, a third party
intervenes in- the dispute, by consent of both parties, to aid the principals in
reaching agreement.
Why does the project address itself to disputes between people in "on-
going" relationships? The underlying theory has been summarized (Nader and
Todd, The Disputing Process, l978, New York, Columbia University Press)
thus:
1. Relationship between disputants
determines
Procedural form of attempts at settlement
and hence determines
Outcome of the dispute.
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2. Disputants in multiplex or continuing relationships
will rely on
Negotiation or mediation in settlement attempts
which will lead to
Compromise outcomes.
3. Disputants in simplex relationships
will rely on
Adjudication or arbitration in settlement attempts
which will lead to
Win-or-lose decisions.
Need
The proposal for Community Justice Centres springs from a recognition that
the conventional justice system (adjudication) is not equipped to provide a last-
ing resolution of disputes between people in continuing relationships.
A court is required to give a judgment only with regard to the particular
issue before it. That may be only a single incident in a continuing conﬂict. The
procedural rules are designed to exclude from consideration any concerns not
immediately relevant to the isolated issue being litigated. The parties very often
in the course of a hearing will be struggling to discuss the whole conﬂict. Their
efforts are frustrated by the court. This is for a good conventional justice system
reason — relevance.
Adjudication typically is concerned with questions of right and wrong,
winner and loser, guilt and innocence. The conventional justice system rarely
even claims to be dealing with the underlying continuing tensions and conﬂict.
Magistrates recognize from experience the inappropriateness of conventional legal
procedures in these disputes. They invariably address the parties to this effect:
“Why don’t you go outside the court and try to settle this matter?" Of course,
by “settle” the magistrate usually means “get it out of my list". But what real
prospect is there of settlement? The parties have come to court at arm‘s length.
They receive little or no help towards settlement. It is likely that only the narrow
issue being litigated will be addressed. It is highly unlikely that a lasting resolu-
tion of the continuing conﬂict will be achieved.
The courts shrink from hearing “backyard“ and “domestic" disputes. This
involves a recognition within the courts of the inadequacy of conventional proce-
dures in these disputes. Delay in these cases is likely to be greater than in cases
more amenable to adjudication. The court has very restricted options as to
disposition of cases. For instance, in criminal proceedings for, say, assault, there
are few sentence options. Most of them are outcomes which entail the stigma
of conviction of a party who may be otherwise of impeccable character and
reputation. It may be that both parties to an incident were.legally culpable
but one became the defendant because the other was the one who called the
police. It is highly likely that at least one, and probably both parties will leave
court dissatisﬁed, smarting from a sense of injustice, of not having been allowed
a full say, embittered, burdened with costs, determined to retaliate in some way.
A frequent experience is that what ﬁrst came to court as a minor matter
returns as a serious charge—even homicide.
,i_______‘l
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Staff
Each centre has three full-time employees: a director (appointed March,
1980), a co-ordinator and a typist/receptionist (both appointed at the end of
1980).
Mediation services are provided by lay mediators who have successfully
completed a special—purpose training course designed and taught by the N.S.W.
Department of Technical and Further Education (T.A.F.E.).
Premises and Catchment
All three centres are located in comfortable ﬁrst- or second-storey ofﬁce
accommodation, readily accessible by public transport. Difﬁculties in securing
space in Redfern proper led to the Redfern centre being located close to Central
Railway Station, at the northern extremity of the Redfern district, so that it is
often called the Surry Hills Community Justice Centre. That centre has tended
to serve the inner-city and all adjacent suburbs, as well as South Sydney—
Redfern—Newtown—Marrickville area originally envisaged. No particular
catchment areas have been designated for the centres. Some disputes from the
North Shore, for instance, have been handled at Redfern, whilst disputes from
comparatively distant areas such as Mt Druitt have gone to the Bankstown
centre.
The bulk of the cases at each centre, however, comes from the area adjacent
to it, where the centres have built up working relationships with agencies and
have concentrated promotional effort.
The three pilot areas were chosen as providing an opportunity for testing
mediation in three relatively different environments. Redfern—Surry Hills—
Marrickville is adjacent to the inner city. Characteristics of the area include high
density housing, low income, high rate of unemployment, high proportion of
welfare beneﬁciaries, high proportion of unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers
and a high crime rate. One-third of the people of South Sydney and 45 per cent
of the people of Marrickville were born overseas. South Sydney also has a
relatively high aboriginal population.
Bankstown is a large municipality in the western suburbs, with some 160 000
residents. It is an area of low to medium socio-economic status, not particuarly
well served by community or welfare services. Three-quarters of the dwellings
are owned or are being purchased by their occupants; a signiﬁcant minority arc
Housing Commission tenants. The proportion of, persons born overseas is
slightly higher than the New South Wales overall ﬁgure of 19 per cent (1976).
Wollongong is an industrial city of 200 000 population just south of Sydney.
About'30 per cent of the population was born outside Australia. The city
occupies a narrow coastal strip. About one—third of the workforce is employed in
the manufacture of metal products and machinery. In average income per head
it is a middle-ranking L.G.A. (Local Government Area).
Legislation
The Community Justice Centres (Pilot Project) Act, 1980. was passed on
26th November. 1980. It is described as ‘An Act to provide for the establishment
of Community Justice Centres to provide mediation services in connection with
certain disputes".
~
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“Mediation" is deﬁned as including:
(a) the undertaking of any activity for the purpose of promoting the
discussion and settlement of a dispute by two or more parties to the
dispute;
(b) the bringing together of the parties to any such dispute for this
purpose; and
(c) the follow-up of any matter the subject of any such discussion or
settlement.
A Co-ordinating Committee is provided for in the Act. Its functions include:
(a) Co-ordination of the project. \
(b) Determination of policy.
(c) Reporting and making recommendations to the Minister.
(d) Facilitation of evaluation of the project.
(e) Making recommendations-to the Minister on the desirability of main-
taining, modifying or extending the operation of C.J.C’s after the pilot
period.
(f) To do such acts as necessary or expedient for the functioning,
establishment and operation of C.J.C’s.
Committee members are in the main nominated by the government depart-
ments or organizations speciﬁed in the Act. The members are drawn from the
magistracy, police force, N.C.O.S.S., Law Society, Ethnic Affairs Commission,
Department of Youth and Community Services, T.A.F.E., Department of Attorney
General and of Justice; in addition two members are appointed for special
interest or experience. The Directors, C.J.C’s and the Director, Magistrates
Courts Administration are also members.
The Act prohibits the use of the words “Community Justice Centre” or
the letters “C.J.C.” other than in respect of a Community Justice Centre estab-
lished under the Act, except with the Committee’s consent.
Conduct of Mediation Sessions
The Act provides:
(a) that mediation sessions shall be conducted with as little formality and
technicality, and with as much expedition, as possible;
(b) that the rules‘ of evidence do not apply: and
(c) mediation sessions shall be conducted in the absence of the public,
but that the director may permit persons other than parties to be
present or participate.
Attendance at and participation in mediation sessions are voluntary. A
party may withdraw from a mediation session at any time.
Notwithstanding any rule of law or equity, any agreement reached at70r
drawn up pursuant to a mediation session is not enforceable in any court or
tribunal. . '
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Except as expressly provided in the Act, nothing in the Act affects any rights
or remedies thatla party to a dispute has apart from the ‘Act:
An agent may not represent a party unless:
(a) it appears to the director that an agent should be permitted to
facilitate mediation, and that the agent has sufﬁcient knowledge of the
issue in dispute to enable him to represent the party effectively, and
(b) the director approves.
Any approval may be subject to conditions to ensure that the other party
is not substantially disadvantaged by the agent appearing.
Evaluation. The Minister shall cause or arrange for evaluation at such times
and in respect of such periods as he thinks ﬁt, of C.J.C.’s and their operation and
activities.
Exoneration from liability. Section 27 (2) of the Act states:
27. (2) A member of the police force, or any other oﬂicer or person.
is not liable to be proceeded against in respect of—
(a) the failure to charge a person with a crime or offence, or to
initiate or proceed with proceedings for a crime or offence. or
for any similar failure; or
(b) the arrest of a person followed by such a failure,
if he satisﬁes the court that the failure was reasonable—
(c)' by reason of the references of the dispute to which the alleged
crime or offence relates for mediation under this Act: and
(d) in all the circumstances of the case.
Privilege. The like privilege with respect to defamation exists with respect
to mediation sessions as-exists with respect to judicial proceedings.
Evidence of anything said or of any admission made in a mediation session
is not admissible in any proceedings before any court, tribunal or body.
No document prepared for the purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant
to. a mediation session, or any copy thereof, is admissible in evidence in any
proceedings before any court. tribunal or body.
Such evidence and documents are admissible by consent of the parties to
the mediation session, and also in proceedings in connection with which a dis-
closure of conﬁdential information has been made where thought necessary to
prevent or minimize the danger of injury to any person or damage to property.
. Misprision of felony. Certain C.J.C. persons and parties to a mediation
session are not liable for misprision in respect of information obtained in con-
nection with the administration or execution of the Act.
Secrecy. Mediators must take an oath or make an afﬁrmation of secrecy.
Disclosure of information may be made:
(a) by consent of the'person from whom the information was obtained;
(in) in connection with administration or execution of the Act;
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(c) where there are reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure is
necessary to prevent or minimize the danger of injury to any person
or damage to any property;
((1) where disclosure is reasonably required in referral to other agencies,
for the purpose of dispute resolution or assisting the parties in any ,
other manner;
(e) for research and evaluation;
(f) under a statutory requirement.
Sunset. The Act expires on 1st December, 1982, or such later day (not
later than lst December, 1983), as proclaimed.
Statistics to December 1981
Numbers of Cases and Clients. Each of the Community Justice Centres has
kept records on the cases and clients it has dealt with. The records of the
Centres show that some 1 597 cases were completed during the twelve months
period January to December, 1981. The Bankstown Centre handled 635,
Redfern 572 and Wollongong 390 of these completed cases. Some 37 per cent
of the cases were completed in the ﬁrst half of the year and 63 per cent in the
second.
“Case" has been deﬁned quite narrowly, as a matter apparently suitable
for mediation and in which the party ﬁrst approaching the C.J.C. (“Party A” in
C.J.C. terminology) initially decides to use the services of a C.J.C. Considerable
C.J.C. staff time has also been spent during the project on other matters which
have come to their notice in one way or another, but which do not fall within
the centres‘ terms of reference or which represented preliminary enquiries,
requests for information, etc.
Just over half of the centres’ cases were classiﬁed as involving one party
in dispute with one other; most of the remainder involved either one party in
dispute with two others, or two parties on each side. The majority of C.J.C.
cases have involved disputes between neighbours (see page 18), and it is fair
to say that the commonest situation dealt with by the C.J.C’s in fact involves one
household in dispute with another.
Referrals to the C.J.C’s. Disputes have come to the Community Justice
Centres in a variety of ways. Figures to 3lst October, 1981, indicate that 30
per cent of clients approaching the centres had come on their own initiative.
About one-quarter had come as a result of a referral by a chamber magistrate
or clerk of petty sessions, a further 10 per cent as the result of a police referral,
and about 8 per cent had been referred to the C.J.C. by a legal aid agency or
community law centre. Smaller proportions came at the suggestion of members
of the private legal profession, local councils, the lower courts, and a variety of
other State government, Federal government and voluntary bodies.
This pattern has varied to some extent from one centre to another. Court
referrals, for example, made up about 6 per cent of the Redfern cases but
scarcely any cases in Wollongong. Self-referrals were highest in Bankstown (37
per cent) and lowest in Redfern (23 per cent). Referrals by Members of
Parliament made up about 4 per cent of the Bankstown cases but were virtually
non-existent at Redfern and Wollongong. The Wollongong Centre had relatively
more local government referrals than either of the others, and Wollongong also
had the highest proportion of police referrals (about 13 per cent of its cases).
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Table A
REFERRALS
Total
Redfern Bankstown Wollongong
No. per cent
Chamber magistrate . . . . 128 l 19 72 319 24.9
Police . . . . . . . . 47 39 40 126 9.8
Legal aid . . . . . . . . 48 25 27 100 7.7
Private practitioner . . . . 18 20 19 57 4.5
Other Government agency . . 40 S3 34 127 9.9
Non-government agency . . 30 9 15 54 4.2
Bench . . . . .. .. 27 17 2 46 3.6
Other‘ .. .. .. .. 15 41 25 81 6.3
No agency involved . . . . 104 188 82 374 29.1
Total . . . . . . 457 511 316 l 284 100.0    
 
*lncludes local council, members of Parliament, etc.
Relationship between the Parties. The Community Justice Centres are
speciﬁcally set up to deal with disputes which occur between people who have
some kind of ongoing relationship. So far, easily the most common relationship
involved in C.J.C. cases has been that of neighbours. These have accounted for
some 70 per cent of all cases. Approximately 20 per cent of cases involved
some kind of family relationship. Other relevant relationships have included
friends or acquaintances, customer—and—merchant and landlord-and-tenant.
Staff at the centres feel that the predominance of neighbour disputes in their
work so far may partly reﬂect the emphasis given by the media in early coverage
of the project, and greater efforts have been made in recent months to publicize
the availability of the centres to deal with a variety of other kinds of work.
Nature of Disputes. The largest proportion of disputes handled by the three
centres (about one-third of the total) have been disputes between neighbours
over some specific problem or nuisance. The commonest have been disputes
about a dividing fence, but issues relating to noise, the behaviour of children, pets,
overhanging trees, drainage and the like have also been common. The next
largest category (nearly 30 per cent) have been cases involving what we might
call a general breakdown in the relationship between neighbours: a series of
grievances (usually on both sides), abuse, arguments and harassment. but falling
short of physical assault. About 8 per cent of cases, however, have centred on
an assault of some kind, usually between neighbours.
Disputes involving family relationships range over quite a variety of matters.
These have included for example questions about the continuation or termination
of a particular relationship, arguments, abuse. assault, disagreements about pro-
perty, and treatment of or access to children.
Relatively small numbers of the C.J.C. cases have involved disputes
between private individuals about money or property, or have been concerned
with property-related matters of a more “commercial" nature, such as those
arising between a landlord and a tenant.
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Table B
TYPES OF DISPUTE
 
 
. Total
Redfern Bankstown Wollongong ’
. No. per cent
Neighbour Disputes— ‘
.Fencing and boundary dis- '
putes .. 3| ' 46 42 H9 9.3
2. General breakdown of re-
lationship . . 132 166 70 368 28.7
3. Speciﬁc grievances or nuis-
ances l 10 133 66 309 24.0
4. Disputes culminating in as-
sault . . . . 50 34 21 105 8.2
5. Family disputes 77 81 74 232 l8.l
6. Other .. . 57 51 43 151 11.8
Total 457 51] 316 1 284- l00.0      
U
The Bankstown Centre has listed the subject matter in a sample of the
disputes it has handled:
children’s behaviour;
abuse and harassment;
defamation;
nuisance phone calls;
fruit nuisance;
noise;
smoke nuisance;
racial insults;
fence dispute;
dogs;
leaf nuisance;
tree damage to drains;
savage dogs; ‘
foul language;
parking dispute;
neighbour trying to- seduce wife;
disposal of canine excreta;
rental bond money and rent;
workers and supervisor in
dispute;
delay by solicitor in
property transfer.
completing
barking dogs;
dangerous behaviour;
debts;
tree nuisance;
cultural discord;
rubbish nuisance;
assault;
apprehended violence;
drainage problems;
swimming pool nuisance;
visitor’s behaviour;
fowl nuisance;
goat nuisance;
harassment by landlady;
ownership of dog;
stone throwing;
body corporate dispute;
malicious damage;
faulty workmanship;
disputed property ownership;
serious affront;
ethnic community complaining
about government authority;
At Bankstown, the subject matter in family disputes has included:
0 disputes between parents and children, between married couples and
in-laws, between migrant parents and Australian-born children, between
parents and “delinquent" children;
0 disputes over responsibility for care of aged parents;
0 foster children‘s desire to have contact with siblings;
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0 debt repayment within family;
0 wife’s family harassing de facto husband;
0 grandparents‘ access to grandchildren;
0 separation issues between de iure and de facto couples involving
~ custody, access, distribution of property, debt settlement, maintenance
' agreements;
0 future conduct and relationships between couples involving both separa-
tion and reconciliation;
0 harassment and abuse of former partner.
Legal Proceedings. People who came to the Community Justice Centres
were asked whether current or recent legal proceedings were involved in the
relevant disputes. This question was answered “yes” in some 15 per cent of
cases.
Clients were also asked what other agencies, if any (apart from a referrer),
had previously been involved in the matter. At least one other agency was
mentioned in about half the cases, the commonest being the police and the local
Council. Chamber magistrates, legal aid agencies and various State Government
health and welfare agencies were also quite frequently mentioned.
Outcome of Cases
1. Where mediation arranged—A mediation session was arranged in about 30 per
cent of cases. Some 25 per cent of all cases handled by the centres showed
an apparently positive outcome after mediation; that is, agreement was
reached or the parties were conﬁdent of reaching their own resolution now
that better communication and understanding had been established. There
was a failure to agree after mediation in 3 per cent of cases. (Of cases sent
to mediation, 85 per cent showed an apparently positive outcome, 12 per
cent showed a failure to agree, and in the rest one or other party failed to
attend.)
ll. Where no mediation session arranged—In about 70 per cent of cases no
mediation session was arranged. Party B declined mediation in just over a
quarter of all cases. In another 10 per cent of cases Party B could not be
contacted. About 2 per cent of cases were found to fall outside the centres‘
guidelines, although initially accepted as cases. In about 10 per cent of
cases Party A discontinued after having agreed to mediation. In a signiﬁcant
number of cases (over 20 per cent) there was an apparently successful
outcome without mediation. In these cases, after C.J.C. contact with the
parties, the problem had diminished or had been resolved.
lll. Outcome, overall—In just under half of all cases there was an apparently
successful outcome.
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Table C
OUTCOMES
Total
Redfern Bankstown Wollongong
No. per cent
No response from B . . . . 42 42 35 119 9.3
B declines . . . . . . 114 164 84 362 28.2
A discontinues . . . . 54 36 4| 131 10.2
Settled, but not mediated . . 108 101 70 279 21.7
Settled through mediation . . 97 143 68 308 24.0
Mediated, but not settled . . 21 14 9 44 3.4
A and/or B failed to attend medi-
ation . . . . . 9 6 4 19 1.5
Outside guidelines . . . . 12 5 5 22 1.7
Total .. .. .. 457 511 316 l 284 100.0     
 
In the sort of work being done by the 0.1.05, “success” and “failure" are
not as clearly deﬁned as, say, in a court decision to acquit or convict an accused
person. A C.J.C. agreement, which is not legally enforceable, may or may not
“stic’ It is possible however that the availability of the OJ.C. will prove
helpful to clients even if no obvious settlement of their problems occurs at the
time of contact.
Both the C.J.S.’s themselves and the Law Foundation researchers have
followed up groups of cases and clients, and the preliminary results of survey
work they have done provide some relevant information on these matters. For
example, clients in “successful” cases were contacted four to six months after
their cases were completed. Where a speciﬁc agreement or arrangement between
the parties was made through the C.J.C., a little over half the clients interviewed
said the agreement had been kept very well, and a further 20 per cent said it
had been partly kept. About 20 per cent said the terms of the agreement had
not been kept. Over half said the general relationship between the disputing
parties had improved, though about 12 per cent said it had got worse. Four
out of ﬁve of these clients said they would use the C.J.C. again if they had a
relevant problem.
Samples of clients were also interviewed in cases which had not been
' resolved to the centres’ knowledge. About 30 per cent of these felt that some-
thing had been achieved through their contact with the C.J.C., and around 8
per cent thought the “a 10" had been achieved. A large majority of these
clients expressed the opinion that the C.J.C. system was a useful one, and more
than 4 out of 5 of them said that they would use it again if a relevant case arose.
Time taken to complete cares. Whether a case was mediated or not, all
three centres usually processed the matter quite quickly. A small number of
mediated cases were completed on the same day as they came to the centre.
(Typically, these were cases where both parties were present at court and were
referred directly to a C.J.C.)
‘
—
-m
.1
..
..
._
.v
..
_
.
.,
.
_
..
..
.-
..
..
-
.
_.
..
w
e
»
..
n
.
.
.
—
-
 
22
 
Some 20 per cent of mediated cases were completed within a week of
coming to a C.J.C., another 30 per cent within two weeks and another 20 per
cent within three weeks. Some 10 per cent took between three weeks and a
month to complete, and the remainder between one and two months. Only two
cases took longer than two months, with the longest period recorded being 85
days. 4
The mean period from initial contact to concluded mediation was 17 days.
Table D
TIME ELAPSED TO MEDIATION
 
 
Total
Redfern Bankstown Wollongong
No. per cent
Same day . . . . .. 4 3 2 9 2.5
1—7 days . . .. .. 25 34 11 70 19.8
8—14 days .. .. .. 26 55 31 112 31.7
, 15—21 days .. .. .. 19 29 19 67 19.0
22—28 days . . ' . . . . 14 14 5 33 9.4
29 days—2 months . . . . 31 21 8 60 17.0
More than 2 months . . . . — 1 ‘ l 2 0.6
Total .. .. .. 119 157 ' 77 353 100.0
Mean (days) .. .. ' 20. 15 15 « 17     
 
Where ﬁles were closed without any mediation session being held, the time
taken to process the case followed a quite similar pattern.
Community Justice Centre Clients. The parties interviewed by the C.J.C’s
have included people of all ages, and approximately equal numbers of men and
women.
One of the most striking facts has been the high proportion of overseas-
born people who have made use of the centres. The following ﬁgures illustrate
the point. '
Per cent
Overseas-born residents of N.S.W. (1976) . . . . l9
Overseas-born residents Bankstown L.G.A. (1976) .. 21
Overseas-born residents Marrickville L.G.A. (1976) . . 43
Overseas-born residents Wollongong L.G.A. (1976) . . 29
Overseas-born Party A Bankstown . . . . . . . . 47
Overseas-born Party A Redfern . . . . . . . . 56
Overseas-born Party A Wollongong . . . . . . 47
Overseas-born Party B Bankstown . . . . . . . . 37
Overseas-born Party B Redfern . . . . . . . 59
Overseas-born Party B Wollongong . . . . . . 44
Overall, at the three centres, about half the Party A’s and 55 per cent of
Party B’s were in Australia, with a further 10 per cent of both born in the United
KingdomyNew Zealand or North America. -
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The three centres have made considerable efforts to provide an adequate
service for people who are not ﬂuent in English. For example, in about a third
of the mediation sessions held by the C.J.C’s, a language other than English has
been used. In these cases, the usual arrangement was either that a professional
interpreter was involved, or else that the relevant centre called on the services of
at least one mediator who was ﬂuent in the language required.
Cost. On the basis of budget ﬁgures for the pilot programme supplied by
the Department of the Attorney General and of Justice, the following tentative
cost ﬁgures have been calculated (ﬁnal case and client ﬁgures were not available
at the time of writing this paper):
Cost of the pilot project‘—
$ $
Per client interviewed . . . . . . 80 (60)
Per case handled . . . . . . 150 (115)
Per case mediated . . . . . . 550 (430)
Per “successful” outcome . . . . 330 (260)
Per "successful” outcome as conﬁrmed
in whole or part on follow-up . . 440 (330)
* Because the number of cases increased steadily during the year the costs taken
on the second six months would be substantially reduced and are shown in parenthesis.
Similarly, then-e would be corresponding reductions to these ﬁgures if the last three
months only were taken.
Whether ﬁgures of this order are acceptable is a moot point. Each client
and case receives a great deal of care and attention. The resolution of complex
personal and community issues not readily capable of resolution by any other
mechanism may be cheap at these prices. The resolution in its early stages of a
dispute which may be escalated may in the long term be invaluable to society.
It must be remembered that these are the costs of a pilot project and include
“starting up" costs such as rent, electricity, cleaning, staff development seminars,
publicity, etc.
A great deal of the Directors’ effort has been spent on publicizing the project,
talking to community groups, training mediators, developing training courses,
conducting in-service courses for mediators, keeping detailed statistics for evalu-
ation, etc., etc—duties which are largely attributable to the pilot nature of the
project.
The case loads have increased over the year and the cost per case is
decreasing. The high costs and low beneﬁts of the conventional justice system
should also be borne in mind. The cost to the parties themselves are very low.
There are no fees, there is no cost for representation and there is ﬂexibility in
scheduling the mediation sessions. They can be arranged outside normal working
hours, e.g., at night and at weekends, so there is very little loss of work for
parties using C.J.C's.
The cost to the parties themselves are very low. There are no fees, there is
no cost for representation and there is ﬂexibility in scheduling the mediation
sessions. They can be arranged outside normal working hours, e.g., at night and at
weekends, so there is very little loss of work for parties using C.J.C’s.
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Alternative Systems
The framework used for the pilot project could of course be varied in a
number of ways. The Co-ordinating Committee gave a great deal of thought
to the way in which the centres should work during the project, and there are
good reasons for the system under which the pilot C.J.C's have operated. If,
however, the Government decides to continue with a mediation programme of
some kind, there are a number of other possibilities that could be considered.
.The mediation service could be more closely integrated with the
magistrates courts.
0 The mediation service could be more closely linked with some other
agency—for example with community-based legal centres such as that
operating at Redfern.
0 Rather than automatically offering mediation in all disputes brought
to the C.J.C’s, settlement by other means (such as negotiation or con-
ciliation using members of staff) could be given greater emphasis.
0 CJ.C. agreements could be made more formal, and legal force could be
attached to them.
0 If more centres are opened one director could be responsible for a
group of centres.
‘ Fees could be charged. ' ,
The Committee, of course, does not necessarily favour all or any of these
changes. It is frequently suggested, both by clients and representatives of other
organizations that attendance at a C.J.C. could be made compulsory once staff
were satisﬁed'a genuine complaint had been made. Such a change would be
strongly opposed by the Co-ordinating Committee.
Conclusion
Community Justice Centres appear to be attaining their primary objective—
the establishment of a non-coercive lay mediation service for the resolution of
disputes betwoen parties in on-going relationships. as an alternative to existing
conventional means of dispute resolution.
Additionally, the centres are being used for resolution of disputes which
may never have gone to the conventional systems. such as the courts, but which
if left unresolved, could have resulted in friction and tension in families and
communities.
The centres have provided a ready service and speedy resolution of disputes.
The centres have gone to considerable pains to ensure that they are equipped
to provide an effective service for persons not born in Australia, and have been
well patronized by that section of the community.
The centres have in the ﬁrst year achieved a high degree of visibility and
credibility among members of the public and social and legal agencies and
institutions.
The project is being conducted in accordance with the legislation authorizing
it, is genuinely experimental in nature and since its inception has been observed
closely by an independent research team which will report to the Attorney
General in April, I982.
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Alternative “A" COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTRE Alternatiyes "B"
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Kevin Anderson,
Deputy C.S.M.
I would like to comment on some of the matters that have been raised by
John Basten and Roman Tomasic. John has criticized the use of the word
“community". I concede that Community Justice Centres are not really com-
munity based. There is no community control and there is no community
advisory body. However, there is some community involvement in that the
mediators, who are drawn from the community, do participate to a large extent
in formulating policies and in day to day activities, and the mediators are ordinary
people from the local community with a wide range of backgrounds. The word
“community” in the title is at least as valid as in Community Health Centres or
Community Legal Centres. The use of the word “justice” in the title has also
been mentioned. I feel that given the process that is used it is likely that
agreements reached at Community Justice Centres will be “fair”—that is, satisfac-
tory to the parties—and “just” in that sense. Parties are not likely to agree to
what is not in their best interest. Community Justice Centres are “just” in the
sense that greater ﬁnancial resources of a party do not buy delay nor do they buy
inequality through obtaining legal representation or better legal representation.
If one thinks about it, what else would you call these centres? It has been
mooted that they might be called “Mediation Centres” but the Committee found
that there is confusion in the public mind between “mediation“, “meditation“,
and “medication".
Dr Tomasic has said a great deal in respect of Community Justice Centres
and mediation centres in general. I will deal with some of the points he makes
in the letter he wrote to the Herald in December, 1980, which he has reproduced
in his paper on page 61. He says that we do not know what are the existing
informal dispute handling mechanisms. That may be so, but surely whatever do
exist are obviously not working—one only has to look at the sheer volume of
matters coming to chamber magistrates and to the courts and the case loads of
Community Justice Centres including self-referrals. More than 25 per cent of
the people who come to Community Justice Centres, in effect, walk in off the
street. He has also mentioned the subject of domestic assault. The right to have
recourse to the law, of course, still exists. Statistics do not support any con-
tention that police are pushing battered wives into Community Justice Centres.
Dr Tomasic concedes that authoritative intervention by courts may be temporary
in its effect. Those experienced in the conventional system know that rarely
does it provide a permanent solution in these cases. It is my belief that Com-
munity Justice Centres offer more chance of long term dispute resolution than
does the conventional system.
Dr Tomasic states that Community Justice Centres assume a consensus
model of society and assume that people will happily live together if only they
can explain their own needs to each other. I do not believe it is a true consensus
model, but it is an obvious fact that people who have an interest in getting along
with each other may be able to do so if, through Community Justice Centres.
they are given the means of exploring ways of doing so.
Contrary to Dr Tomasic‘s statement (page 64) Community Justice Centres
do not ignore the complexity of personal communication, etc. The usefulness of
conﬂict is recognized in the mediation process. In both John Basten‘s and Roman
Tomasic‘s papers there are comments about “second class justice". Reference to
“second'class justice" in respect of Community Justice Cegtres assumes that there
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is some ﬁrst class justice for these kinds of. cases. I wonder just where is this
fantastic deal that people are missing out on. In 35 years in magistrates. courts
administration I'have not seen many examples of ﬁrst class justice in magistrates
courts in the types of cases that are brought to Community Justice Centres.
In his letter to the Herald, Dr Tomasic went on to say that it is ironic
that the government should be championing this initiative rather than concentrat-
ing on better access to courts and a more responsive police force. I would
concede that there is a need for better access to justice and a more responsive
police force in some matters, but obviously these are matters of priority for the
government and do not necessarily involve a cutting down 'of Community Justice
Centres. He refers to the American experience where programmes have wound
down and have been “discredited” (page 59). I do not think it is correct to
infer that mediation has been discredited. The Canadian Bar Association has
recently embarked on a programme in Ontario. The concept still strikes a
responsive 'chord with most people who hear of it. I do not think that the decline
in the United States in the mediation centre movement means that the basic
concept is faulty, but rather indicates that there have been faults in the implemen—
tation of the concept. It is evident that there have been mistaken attempts in the
United States to mediate things like bad cheques or consumer claims, which are
' not really suitable for mediation and would. not be accepted for mediation in
N.S.W. Community Justice Centres. Another factor in the decline of the American
programmes has been dwindling ﬁnancial support following increased political
conservatism in that country in recent years.
The ability and dedication of the Directors, the staff and the mediators
have been a major factor in the success of the N.S.W. project. The ﬁnal research
report has not yet been received by the Co—ordinating Committee nor has the
Committee yet formulated its report or recommendations to the Minister, but I
should hope for the continuation of the existing centres and, in due course, the
establishment of somewhat similar centres in other areas of the State.
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COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTRES: A COMNIENT
John Bustcn, LL.B., B.C.L..
Senior Lecturer in Law.
Faculty of Law.
University of New South Wales
Commenting on Mr Kevin Anderson‘s paper is a pleasant task. There is
little that I could add.to this lucid description of the pilot project now operating
in New South Wales, nor do I wish to criticize the present operations. Instead,
I would like to query some of the premises on which the project appears to have
been based.
Community Justice Centres constitute a curious kind of institution; a kind
of “social mule". They are a hybrid between the state welfare system, which
attempts to provide money and services to individuals in need of assistance, and
the state justice system which provides the coercive power of the state to control
individuals or to resolve disputes. Whether such an offspring can survive will
remain to be seen. It will need all the proverbial obstinacy of the real mule
if it is to live through current government ﬁnancial stringency.
The Problem
A new institution would, one assumes, only be set up to deal with a particu-
lar social problem, or set of related problems. What are they? Mr Kevin
Anderson describes the aim of C.J.C’s as being “to deal with disputes, such as
those between. members of a family or neighbours, where there is a continuing
relationship between the people in conﬂict” (para. 5 p. 12). The earliest
available ﬁgures suggest that the illustrations used to exemplify the aim to con-
stitute the major classes of disputants. Some 88 per cent of disputants using
the centres are apparently neighbours or family members. Mr Anderson notes
that some 70 per cent of disputes are between neighbours and 20 per cent
involve some family relationship (para. 1 p. 18). That much interpersonal
conﬂict occurs between friends and relations and within the home is well-known.
Some disputes end in tragedy, many more are far from trivial—at least to the
participants. Can there be any harm in the state providing machinery to help
the disputants solve their difﬁculties themselves? Why is mediation not an
excellent way of providing such help? (By wording the questions negatively
l deliberately suggest a sceptical response.)
Mediation for Whom?
My scepticism is immediately aroused by the geographical location of the
New South Wales centres—not in Chatswood, Pymble, Double Bay or Vaucluse,
but in the disadvantaged/ working class suburbs of Redfern and Bankstown and
in the industrial city of Wollongong. Did the government’s project planners
assume that people in Pymble have less disputes, can afford to buy mediation
services or their equivalent, or are just more “capable” of resolving their own
problems? My view is that all these assumptions could validly be made, thereby
justifying the locations chosen, but at the same time casting doubt on the validity
of the concept behind the institutions. No doubt Pymblites do have less disputes:
they are thinner on the ground. It is far easier to ignore your neighbour’s
stereo (or dog) across a quarter acre block than through a party-wall or two
thicknesses of ﬁbro. No doubt in general they are better able to afford appro—
priate services when needed. And if education. access to cultural facilities and
L;
 
 29
leisure-time assist; if overseas trips and a yacht on the harbour can relieve the
underlying boredom, frustration or whatever causes the problem, perhaps they
are better able to solve their own disputes. (Whether or not they are more
“capable” in any non-material sense at personal problem-solving may be question-
able.) ‘The location of C.J.C‘s in basically working class areas suggests to me
that the problem, as perceived by the planners, is poverty and powerlessness,
or at least a function thereof. In what sense, then can C.J.C’s begin to alleviate
these disadvantages?
“Community” Justice Centres
My second ground for scepticism arises from the use of the word “com-
munity" in the title. “Community" has been described as “the aerosol word
of the 1970’s because of the hopeful way it is sprayed over deteriorating institu-
tions"*. It is redolent of nostalgia for the values of an idealized pre-industrial
village community, with shared values, low crime rates and social harmony.
These values are not made explicit; nor is the accuracy of this historical model
examined. Indeed, I believe there is a strong element of hypocrisy in this
implicit appeal to a state of bliss which never existed and certainly cannot be
legislatively recreated. There is, however, more than hypocrisy in the use of
the term, “community". The fact that it carries with it the notion of shared
values is signiﬁcant for a person for a system of mediation. It is hard to imagine
disputants voluntarily resolving a. conﬂict growing out of different basic values
through the intervention of an, external mediator who, by deﬁnition, cannot have
authority within both cultures and in fact probably has it in neither.
I also fear that mediation encourages atomization which the term “com-
munity” is intended to belie. As Regina Graycar notes in her comment on
Roman Tomasic’s paper (page 74), C.J.C’s are not structured to identify and
handle “class” complaints, like that of a number of debtors paying exorbitant
interest to a finance company or that of the tenants in a block of flats facing
a single unreasonable landlord; or that of. all tenants lacking legal protection for
basic rights. To mediate individual cases in such situations is to plaster over
pressing social needs.
Of course, that may also be a valid criticism of the traditional legal system
in this country. But that system does allow the use of partisan legal advocates
who can, when they operate from appropriate structures such as independent
legal centres, identify broader social problems and take up the cause on behalf
of groups of similarly disadvantaged people. Mediators are most unlikely to
think of acting in such a way; indeed, it would be quite inconsistent with their
role.
Nor is there anything in Kevin Anderson’s description of C.J.C’s which
suggests that they are intended to de—privatize problems. The primary need of
many people in potentially destructive social disputes is support. That may mean
somewhere to go, someone to share child-care with, or an ally who can take
up your interests. Often reliance on outsiders for such support indicates the
absence of just that sense of “community” to which the title of the centres
appeals. I think it is up to the proponents of the scheme to explain why the
available funds should not rather be spent on more and better refuges, crisis
centres or legal services. (In practice, of course, the money may be available
only for C.J.C’s and may not politically be transferable. But the point is still
relevant to the questions being asked by the evaluators.)
* See Bryson and Mowbray, ‘7 ‘Community’: The Spray—on Solution”, (1981) Aust.
J. 0/ Sac. Issues, Vol. 16, No. 4, 255, quoting M. A. Jones.
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No doubt one answer to this problem is to refuse to mediate where there
is a power differential between the parties. I am not sure that this is happening
now and it would be a difﬁcult policy to impose. I will return to some of the
difficulties in a moment.
Procedural Informality
My third basis for concern grows out of the lack of procedural formality
built into the system. Why do we have legal procedures built into our court
system? How can mediation work satisfactorily in the absence of such safe-
guards? If traditional legal procedures are worthless, let us discard them and
improve the court system. But formality is of value—not just as a make-work
for lawyers—and informality is dangerous. Two illustrations may be useful.
I recall asking a number of prisoners why they disliked a particular magis—
trate who was acting as a visiting justice in their gaol. (He was not, I can
assure you, the very distinguished and proper Deputy Chief Stipendiary Magis-
trate on whose paper I am purporting to comment!)
“He tries to be Mr Nice Guy,“ was the response.
“We’d rather have someone who plays it straight down the. line. Then
we know where we stand and we can put our side properly.“
Take as a second example the history of children's courts in the U.S.A.
Before 1966, a paternalistic system of state children‘s courts had been developed
on the basis that they were “helping" children, not “punishing“ them and that
therefore basic procedural safeguards were inapplicable. In Re Gault“ the US.
Supreme Court called a halt to such hypocrisy and insisted that basic constitu-
tional rights be accorded to children who were in danger of being sent to
“homes“ for their own‘ good. Such basic rights included notice of the complaint,
an opportunity to answer it, legal representation and so on.
The purpose of the procedural safeguards is to give unequal parties at least
the appearance of equality before an impartial tribunal. To take away procedural
rights may be merely to unmask reality, but it does also leave the weaker party
with less of a chance. Of course this would not be a matter for concern if the
parties were equal, but that will rarely be the case.
I do not wish for a moment to suggest that the adversary system of litigation
is always the best method of dispute resolution. Indeed, as Mr Anderson points
out (para. 5 p. l3), often it fails even to identify the dispute properly.
My point is that procedural informality is likely to be dangerous where there are
power differentials between the parties.
Power in the Home
Domestic violence is a problematical area in which it is often suggested
C.J.C’s could be useful. The reluctance of the police to intervene in “domestics",
the ineffectiveness of. existing legal remedies and the reluctance of magistrates to
adjudicate such cases are all notorious facts referred to by Mr Anderson (para.
6 p. 13). Nevertheless, it is clearly wrong to assume that parties to a
marriage are equal: there is a power differential which circumscribes the boun-
daries of the dispute and renders mediation a process which cannot give any
.vigapons or protection to the victim of violence. It cannot solve economic
dependence, it is unlikely to wreak great changes in ingrained social attitudes and
* 387 US. I (1966).
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it is unlikely to either build or break emotional ties. Perhaps it is not a bad thing
that a fairly low number of cases (probably not more than 10 per cent) relate
to domestic violence. However, the example of trivial domestic quarrels develop—
ing into violence (possibly of a fatal kind) is often used to illustrate the ways
C.J.C’s can help. In truth, C.J.C‘s can. never be a substitute for adequate social
support schemes, including refuges and child-care facilities.
0
It is worth noting also, that the. inequality of the participants in the
process renders their opinions of dubious value for assessing the success of the
process. Even if their vieWs are not relied on, their conduct is not necessarily
a good indicator either. Most evaluators seem to consider the absence of con-
tinued conﬂict as an indicator of success, an attitude which may suggest more
about the assumptions of the evaluators than the success of C.J.C's. Since the
New South Wales project is presently the subject of quite extensive evaluation
I should'perhaps note brieﬂy my concerns on that score. ‘
Success or Failure?
While the intention to evaluate an avowedly experimental scheme is admir-
able, unfortunately I doubt that we will ever be able to answer the question,
-“success or failure?”, deﬁnitively on the basis of practical experience. Or perhaps
I should say that, with sincere respect to the current evaluators I doubt if their
evidence will persuade me.
First, there is the criterion of “success" itself. What is a “good” dispute
settlement rate? If the process is truly voluntary, the participants must be moti—
vated to try to reach agreement. Is even a 5 per cent failure rate poor? Then,
how do you judge which dispute is settled? Is it an immediate agreement? An
agreement which has not been “breached” 3, 6 or 12 months later? Or do you
just adopt a test of how |ong.the relationship continued? If a battered wife is
talked out of the last vestige of desire to stick up for herself—is that successful
mediation?
I also fear that successful resolution is being measured without a Control
group. What percentage of disputes would have been resolved without the inter-
vention of a mediator? How does one establish a causal connection between the
mediation and the resolution of the dispute?
Further, any attempt to deﬁne success -will inevitably lead to analysis
of the “failures”. The American literature reveals this process and the disquieting
trend of identifying personal inadequacies in the failed cases. “That man/woman
was not in a fit state to reach a rational agreement. She should see a therapist.“
I have no evidence to suggest that this is happening in New South Wales, but I
can foresee a danger that C..l.C’s may become psychiatric referral agencies for
“diﬂicult” cases.
In other words, once the “inappropriate“ case has been identiﬁed one or both
parties will be referred to a psychiatric institution. Presumably persuasion rather
than coercion would be used, but it is interesting to note that suggestions of
“compulsory attendance" at C.J.C’s are now being discussed (para. 8 p. 24).
Back to “the Goal”
Two themes run through Kevin .Anderson’s paper—and indeed through
much of the literature on community justice centres. One is that of “the pro-
cess": it is concerned to provide through mediation non-coercive resolution of
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social disputes. The other theme is the target clientele: people in on-going
relationships but in dispute. The goal is dispute resolution—the mediator is a
facilitator; the parties really solve their own dispute; the process is private, it
deals with individuals and it requires compromise.
This description contains a number of value judgments which should be
analyzed. First there is the element of compromise. Counsellors and advocates
learn quickly that there are many sides to disputes: right and wrong depend on
perceptions and are only partially relevant concepts. ,In determining which
disputes are appropriate for mediation, it is useful to distinguish between those
involving conflicts of interest and those involving conﬂicts of rights. The latter
are theoretically susceptible to adjudication, while the former are not. Where
a disputant alleges a breach of a legal right, any compromise will mean the
abandonment in part of a legitimate claim. That would be a matter of concern
where:
(a) the claimant was less than an equal of the other party;
(b) there were no other interests in conﬂict with enforcement of the right;
and
(c) the right could be properly enforced.
There can be conﬂicts of interest. with which an adjudicatory system is
simply unable to cope. That system requires a given set of facts, a set of relevant
norms and available sanctions in order to operate judicially. Courts determine
the issues by applying potentially relevant norms to the facts. Where two people
wish (for whatever reason) to continue a relationship, the emphasis will need
to be on establishing the norms to be followed in the future, rather than
identifying and applying sanctions for past breaches. Family and industrial
disputes provide classic illustrations of conﬂicts of interests being. in this sense.
more important than conﬂicts of rights.
My concern is that (TJ.C‘s take their clientele from two elassses. First.
there are those disputants who are diverted from the existing legal system.
If that is happening, I want to know who beneﬁts and whose legal rights are
being compromised. And if the answer is. ”Well, in theory people may lose out.
but in practice they wouldn't be able to enforce their rights," then I want to
know why we are promoting machinery which accepts that poor people have
rights they can’t enforce. In other words. l would be critical if mediation were
used in place of effective enforcement of identiﬁable legal rights by weaker parties
who did not have other interests which conllietcd with enforcement.
The second possible source of clients involves disputants whose cases do not
now fall within the scope of the legal system. in those cases, are we not witness-
ing an extension of state intervention into the domestic lives of individuals?
Where the courts and police have failed as agents of social control are we now
trying to send in a more effective force? Are mediators to be a substitute for the
parish priest? Is that desirable?
The concept of self-help is presumably promoted to show that mediation.
unlike other welfare institutions, does not create dependence but rather encour-
ages self-reliance and directly attacks the sense of individual powerlessness. This
is only partly true, because C.].C’s themselves use specially trained mediators.
As years go by we will no doubt see pressure to improve the training of the
mediators, then to require licences and ﬁnally we will create a new professional
group which will assiduously promote its own interests for, of course, “the public
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good”. If the present mediators are really people with close ties to parts of
Redfern, Bankstown. and Wollongong, the next generation, you can be sure, will
be university trained.
Conclusion
I applaud state legislation and administrative action which will assist the
powerless members of society in their conﬂicts with those who hold power.
Consumer protection legislation and expanded legal aid are steps in that direction,
as would be controls to ensure safer and healthier work conditions.
I have argued, in effect, that community justice centres can only be justiﬁed
as a mechanism to help resolve intra-class disputes. Formal procedures should
not be abandoned where their function is, at least in part, to put unequal parties
on a. more equal footing.
l have also suggested that even intra—class disputes may involve signiﬁcant
power differentials between the parties (for example between men and women),
but that the present scheme does not appear to be sensitive to the dangers of
mediating disputes between such unequal parties.
I am suspicious of the advent of institutionalized mediation in working-class
areas just after a decade or so of legislative and administrative reform designed
to give greater access to disadvantaged people through the traditional formal
court system. »
I must confess that my fears are assuaged, at least in the short-term, by the
,extraordinarily high calibre of the people operating the present pilot scheme.
Good people may well make the scheme work and establish a healthy tradition.
If that happens, and I believe it is happening, I doubt that any but the most
paranoid (and perhaps I teeter on the brink of that class) would see any harm
flowing from this new and apparently unexceptionable institution.
Nevertheless, I would like to .think that the Co-ordinating Committee would
try to devise policies that may answer the concerns outlined above. I would
support an extension of the pilot project beyond the present expiry date, but I
would suggest that the government combine with its commitment to this project
a thorough review of court structures and procedures in this state. The establish-
ment of C.J.C‘s is but one of a number of imaginative attempts to cope with
the weaknesses of our traditional legal institutions. An independent overview
of the whole creaking structure is long overdue.
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PRESENTATION OF COMNIENTARY
John Basten
Several of the themes that I intended to develop in the comment are much -
more authoritatively and coherently developed in both Roman Tomasic’s paper
and Regina Graycar’s commentary, so I should refer you to those.
I wish to make one or two comments on some of the matters raised by
Kevin Anderson. Firstly, the question which he posed just a moment ago:
“Where is this ﬁrst class justice?" It is not my thesis that there is ﬁrst class
justice for people who go through the magistrates’ courts or, as he would no
doubt agree, wisely manage to avoid them. But it seems to me that the question
should be, “Why isn‘t there ﬁrst class justice for those people and why is the
elTort going into providing them with an alternative instead of improving the
traditional court system?" I am not saying that that question is rhetorical or
that it has any clear cut answer, but I do say that it is one that we need to ask,
and'l am worried that we are not asking it suﬂiciently clearly.
For example, if the intention of the Community Justice Centres is to assist
in some way with the workload of the present system, then I need to be convinced
that the proper way to deal with that workload is to take people out of the
system. It has been said on numerous occasions by people, whom I think mean
the comment critically, that the introduction of legal aid in this country and
this State has resulted in considerable increase in the delay in hearing cases
in our present courts. I think that that is absolutely true, and I would add that if
legal aid had not resulted in some delay through the increase of attention and time
spent upon cases of those people who could not afford otherwise to pay for it,
then, we might as well abolish legal aid to-morrow. I believe that there are
faults which have come about through the system not being adjusted to cope
with necessary reforms, legal aid being one of them.
I do not want to dwell on the problem of the courts which these centres
intended to assist in solving, but I would like to comment on one or two of the
other aspects of their role. For example. it is suggested that these centres are
designed to cope with dispute resolution at an inter-personal level to deal with
the problems of individuals in the community. I am sure that is right and
I do not doubt that they have a role to play in doing that, but what concerns
me is that we do not ﬁnd what we are asking. “Why do we need these centres?"
Is it the collapse of institutions with local authority which is causing the need
for the State, the central authority, to step in and try and replace these local
authorities? Is it the collapse of organizations like the Church which had some
inﬂuence in dispute solving at a local level? If that is right then we might
ask why they have collapsed, and we might look fairly carefully at. the kind of
authority which was held by the traditional assistors with dispute settlement, and
see if our mediators have a similar form of authority.
Secondly, of course, we may say that the need for the centres is the increased
levels of tensions and lesser levels of social cohesion caused largely by economic
factors of industrial society. The fact that these mediation centres have grown
and ﬂourished ﬁrst in America, perhaps the most highly aggressive and com-
petitive of our economic neighbours. is some evidence to support such a thesis,
and, ifs'o, we should be careful about providing palliatives to those who suffer
from the economic disruption of modern day industrial society. I do not think it
is helpful for “conﬂict managers” such as Charles Foley (see page 85) to
suggest to us that by 1988, Community Justice Centres may have made Australia
a place‘nicknamed the “Continent of Peace”. God help us if it has that elfect!
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However, I do think Charles Foley is right when he states that US.
and Canadian experience shows that the need for neutral third party mechanisms
among the populace is especially true in times of economic adjustment, and I
'think we should recognize that is one of the factors which has given rise to this
demand for mediation. But take careful note of what the effect of mediation
is, and I suggest it has two quite deleterious effects in terms of the interests of
those people who use it.
Firstly, it seems to me that it has a defusing effect on some of the most
important issues which confront people, especially in the working class areas,
who are powerless in terms of use of the present system. It prevents them getting
together and co—operating to provide some sort of group action which might
actually have some effect on the problems which face them. It actually promotes
the atomization of society, the loss of community, which I mention in my paper
(page 29) and as an example of which Regina Graycar cites in her paper
Redfern Legal Centres experience with credit problems (page 74)—people are
being charged 160 per cent on their credit and a Community Justice Centre
may be able to mediate a solution which resulted in only an 80 per cent credit rate.
Isn’t it much better when some organizations can get people together who
have these problems and draw them to the attention of the public and the
authorities?
Secondly, it seems to me that at a personal level the Community Justice
Centres will not be effective in promoting the self help which to some extent they
are designed to encourage between the disputants. It seems to me that self help
is presumably promoted to show that mediation, unlike other welfare institutions,
does not create dependence but encourages self reliance and directly attacks the
sense of powerlessness. In my view, this is only partly true because the centres
themselves use specially trained mediators, and as the years go by we will no
doubt see increased pressure to improve the training of these mediators, then
to require licences for mediators, and ﬁnally we will create a new professional
group which will assiduously promote its own interests for the “public good”.
If the present mediators are really people with close ties to sections of the
Redfern, Bankstown, and Wollongong population the next generation you can
be sure will be university trained. I did not need to wait a few years—within
days of writing my paper Charles Foley in his paper is asking for the establish-
ment of university courses to be conducted in conjunction with conﬂict centres,
the establishment of a national academy of conﬂict settlement, the establishment
of an Australian Association of Conﬂict Management, and so on and so forth
(see page 84). I am concerned about those developments.
Finally, might I refer brieﬂy to the question of the evaluation of these
Centres, because a lot of attention seems to be paid to the evaluation and I
have serious doubts about it? My ﬁrst comment is why evaluate mediation
centres? The answer is, I suppose, “What an excellent idea—here is a social
experiment we should know what changes it is bringing about”. That may be true.
On the other hand what would we do if we applied a cost/beneﬁt analysis to
the present operations of the Supreme Court, or, if you do not want to investigate
the operation of the existing tribunals, examine the newer tribunals such as the
Equal Opportunity Tribunal, or the Family Court, the Land and Environment
Court, Consumer Claims Tribunals, or the Boxing Tribunal? Why do not we
give them sunset clauses and make them prove their worth within two or three
years and see if they can do it?
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I think that if Community Justice Centres are going to be effective they
will be so by becoming an institution in the same way that chamber magistrates
are seen as institutions, and they will become known around the neighbourhoods
in which they operate, and for that reason people will go to them.
Secondly, I note that we are evaluating mediation only in these new centres.
There is plenty of mediation around at the moment in existing institutions—the
Children’s Court exists on mediation, there are mediation facilities in the Family
Court, and so on, but we are not particularly looking at those institutions.
Finally, I note in my comment that there are tremendous problems with
determining what is eﬂ’ective resolution of a dispute. Is it effective because the
battered wife stops complaining? What is the evidence which establishes what is
effective, and, anyway, what is a “good” rate of settlement.
I know we are not a representative audience but I think it is useful for
us to ask ourselves would we ever go to a Community Justice Centre, and, if so,
in what type of case would we consider going to a Community Justice Centre?
If we say we would not go, why not? My answer is quite frankly that I would
think very hard about going to a Community Justice Centre, and if I analysed
that thought even superﬁcially I think it is because I believe I am perfectly
capable of manipulating the system well enough not to need these mediators.
I wonder how many other people who come from a professional middle class
background have a similar sort of approach to these institutions. ‘
In summary, I believe that there are two dangers about the present system
as it has been established. Firstly, that it diffuses the possibility of collective
group power for those who are presently powerless in our community and it is-
not thereby attacking the real problems which affect those people. Secondly, and
this is a theme which I have developed further in my paper, as the system is
presently operating it is insensitive to the inequalities between the disputants.
To say that neighbours and people in domestic situations should come to these
centres is, in my view, very dangerous because there are tremendous power
differentials even if only on a sex basis between the sorts of people who are
apparently coming to seek mediation. Finally, because of my earlier comments
about the need for mediation to be thoroughly tested I would hope the govern-
ment would ignore the sunset clause in the present legislation, and allow these
Centres to continue for long enough to see if they really are a desirable feature
of our justice system.
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MEDIATORS AND MEDIATION
Wendy F0ques,
Director, Community Justice Centre,
Surry Hills. N.S.W.
The core of the Community Justice Centre is its panel of mediators.
Mediators are the “ordinary people” whose task it is to convince disputants
that a resolution to their conﬂict is possible and desirable. They help disputants
to recognize areas of common interest and points on which they may agree. The
mediators do not decide who is right or wrong and do not act as arbitrators.
It is the panel of mediators selected from the community served by the
Community Justice Centre that links the centre to its community. It provides
an anchor—hopefully to ensure that Community Justice Centres will not sail off
into the clouds and become just another institution remote from the people it was.
designed to serve.
Selection of Mediators
A sincere effort was made at each centre to select a group of mediators that
would be representative of the community. Advertisements for people wishing to
train as mediators were placed in metropolitan dailies, relevant suburban and
regional papers and fourteen ethnic newspapers. The response was somewhat
overwhelming with over 600 enquiries in all being received.
The method of selection of potential mediators differed at each centre. At
Wollongong, the Director actively sought personnel from institutions such as
the police force, court house, Department of Consumer Affairs, and local govern-
ment to train as mediators. It was felt that involving representatives from
likely referral sources would ensure effective promotion of and support for the
protect.
At Bankstown and Redfern, the mechanics of selection differed but the basic
criteria were similar—tolerance, ﬂexibility, conﬁdence, assertiveness and verbal
expression. At Bankstown, all applicants were interviewed and assessed by the
Director, and some emphasis was placed on added personal qualities. At Redfern,
perhaps greater emphasis was placed on the motivation of applicants, and those
seeking to learn-and develop interesting and challenging skills, were more likely
to be selected.
The selection panels included representatives from Redfem Legal Centre,
Anti-Discrimination Board, and Sydney Technical College, as well as members 'of
the Co-ordinating Committee. Each applicant had a face-to-face interview which
assessed such factors as availability, motivation and expectations, and collected
some information on relevant experience, level of education, languages, age, etc.
As with the other two centres, there were no academic requirements, but it was
the intention to include people with a variety of educational levels.
Applicants then participated in a discussion group, with about nine or ten
others. Each group included two observers from the selection panel. The groups
were given a short “story", a “moral dilemma", to discuss. This gave the
assessors a chance to observe how the applicants related to other people, how
they coped with differing viewpoints, and frequently, challenge to their own
values. Conﬁdence, assertiveness, tolerance, rigidity and verbal expression. quickly
became apparent in most cases. After each group session, the observers assessed
each participant on all dimensions possible from their observations. Using this
-.
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process, 200 people were assessed over two Saturdays. In all, fourteen. people
assisted with the selection, and the process achieved a high degree of standardiza-
tion and accountability.
The ﬁnal make up of the training group was based on. these assessments,
having regard to cultural differences, and speciﬁc difﬁculties of language, etc.
A diverse group as to age, sex, educational background, occupation and ethnicity
was ﬁnally selected, all of whom achieved, acceptable ratings in all dimensions
through the selection process.
Some particulars of those selected at Redfern will illustrate the composition
of this ﬁrst training group. At least eighteen of the forty-ﬁve selected had an
ethnic background and were ﬂuent in at least one language other than English.
There were Spanish, Chinese, Yugoslav, Italian, Greek, Turkish, Lebanese, Viet-
namese, Portuguese, Egyptian and Russian trainees. Ages ranged from twenty to
sixty-four. Occupations included boiler attendant, clerk, interpreter, psychologist,
housewife, policeman, company director, solicitor, truck driver, teacher, and
many more. There were about equal numbers of men and women. Proﬁles of
training groups at Bankstown and Wollongong show a similar diversity of
occupation and ethnicity.
A second group, trained in 1981, ﬁlled many of the “gaps” in our panel.
By 1981, also we had learned that we had a signiﬁcant demand for mediators
during normal working hours, so efforts were made to recruit people who were
available during the day.
Training
The training was provided by Technical and Further Education, through its
Social Sciences Division. Mr Clive Graham, Head of Social Sciences, visited
projects in the U.S.A., looking speciﬁcally at training methods used there. It was
decided that the training course should concentrate principally on “skills develop-
ment", rather than aiming at more formal or academic qualiﬁcations.
As the mediators were to be drawn from the community, the training had
to be accessible to people of varied levels of educational achievement, and
including people for whom English is not their ﬁrst language. The training
included some communicative skills and much practice, through role-plays, in
applying the mediation process, without imposing solutions or moral judgments.
The Mediation Process
The mediation process adopted by the pilot project has been adapted and
developed from the process used in the USA. It gives each party a chance to
tell his or her side of the dispute without interruption—the mediators will sum-
marize both stories then help the disputants determine what the mediatable issues
are. Then, taking an issue at a time, the mediators will help the parties to
communicate on each issue. This is a very directive and controlled process, aimed
at getting the parties talking to one another, and not to the mediators, in a
constructive and 'open manner.
As parties are encouraged to express their feelings and frequently make
many accusations during this part of the process, the dispute at this stage could
often be described as “volcanic“. After the “eruption", which may go on for
some time, the mediation usually settles down to steadily working on each issue—a
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degree of trading often goes on, and the mediators will start to draw together
threads of an agreement. Mediators may have a private conference or caucus
with each party, in the absence of the other party. ‘
It is important that the mediators help the disp-utants to find a solution
that they both feel they\can live with—it comes from the parties themselves,
and is not imposed by the mediators. Agreements are usually written in the
ordinary language of the disputants, and not in legalese, and each party gets a
copy. The mediators try to ensure the “liveability” of an agreement, that is,
making sure that proposed arrangements can be kept. It is recognized that
sometimes a written agreement would be inappropriate. Some mediations develop
an aura of goodwill, and the original complaints are seen for what they are——
petty grievances which were expressions of conﬂict that have not been resolved.
Continuing Development
Some adaptations have been discussed and tried at the various centres.
Continuing in-service training of mediators at all centres has been directed
towards improving the quality of mediation provided to the public. At. this
stage, this has two streams—-maintaining and improving mediators’ skills, and
adapting and improving the mediation process to be appropriate to local
communities.
The Wollongong mediators have looked closely at the effectiveness of a
technique of regular summaries throughout the mediation to encourage parties to
use suggestions they have made themselves; this way the solutions come from the
disputants, not the mediators. At Redfern, an extra deﬁned stage in the mediation .
—that of helping the disputants determine what the mediatable issues are—what
is open to negotiation and what is not, immediately after the mediators summary
has been discussed and tried, with some effectiveness. Mediators have also
worked constructively on establishing and practising criteria for effective agree-
ments as well as continuing practice on speciﬁc parts of the process, and
improving communication skills.
A major effort at the Redfern centre has been directed towards developing
open and effective feedback skills, which makes possible consistent control on
the quality 'of mediation. After each mediation, mediators participate in a “de—
brieﬁng” session, with a staff member. During this session the focus is on the
mediation process—what worked, what failed—and on how the mediators applied
the process, and how effectively they worked together.
A format has been devised that encourages mediators to look closely at
their 'own and their partner’s performance, and by mutual feedback, improve
their mediation‘skills. This development of self-critical awareness has two im-
portant functions. Firstly, it ensures an ever improving standard—our aim is for
a standard of excellence that will be continually up-graded. Secondly, it provides
greater levels of “job-satisfaction" for the mediators.
Mediators are paid at a sessional rate of $7.50 per hour, with a minimum
payment of 2 hours. These rates are hardly a great inducement for mediators to
put in the time required to maintain and improve their skills. The pay-off, then
becomes the satisfaction of doing a difﬁcult and challenging job really well.
I can conﬁdently say that participation in continuing training and the development
of, an effective de—brieﬁng format has built on the skills provided by the initial
training, to a degree where our own improving standards will quickly leave
behind any mediators who lack the time or commitment to be fully involved.
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 Disputes
'|"he major criteria for acceptance of a dispute for mediation is that the
dispulants have. or have had. some form of continuing relationship.
In the ﬁrst six months of operation, 75 per cent of disputes handled at the
three centres were between neighbours. A further 15 per cent were family
disputes, and the remaining IO per cent a mixture of disputes involving such
relationships as—former friends, workmatcs, house sharing arrangements and
business relationships, and some group disputes.
It should not be assumed that these percentages represent the relative
frequency of these types of disputes in the community. Rather, the case load
reflects the publicity surrounding the establishment of the centres, and the
acceptance of mediation as an alternative to court action in various referring
agencies. Changes in the case load over the ﬁrst six months are closely linked to
promotional activities, and publicity in the mass media.
An analysis of. the ﬁrst 500 disputes handled at the Redfern centre provides
the following information regarding types of disputes:
Disputes between neighbours . . . . . . 352
Family Disputes—
Couples living together . . . . . . . . l2
Couples no longer living together . . . . 44
Parent and child . . . . . . . . . . 17
Adult siblings . . . . . . . . . . 4
Other family members . . . . . . . . 12 89
Other Disputes—-
Friends or housemates ,, . . . . . . . l6
Landlord/tenant . . |2
Residents of boarding houses 9
Workmates . . 6
Neighbouring businesses 5
Customer/ merchant 3
Business partners 3
Members of same club 3
Group disputes 2
59
Total: 500
Neighbour disputes
Disputes between neighbours tend to involve many' facets—it is rarely that a
dispute presents as “just a fence“, “just noise“. Towards the end of the year
there appeared to be a slight increase in disputes coming to the centre before
they escalated to more complex and major proportions.
Typically, a dispute would have started a couple of years ago—probably
over a relatively minor matter—noise. general nuisance (dogs, kids, etc.) One
party (Party A) “asked” the other to stop the nuisance. This approach may
have been perceived by the other party as hostile. or unfriendly, and Party B
. responded with denial and abuse. Next, Party A reported the matter to an
authority (police, Council, etc.) This escalated the dispute further—more
hostility, more retaliation. The dispute festcrcd for over a year—with com-
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plaints, insults, harassment, exaggeration of the original nuisance (“Just to show
him"), abuse—~ﬁnally to threats, minor property damage (broken windows.
damaged plants, etc.), and perhaps violence.
It is this ﬁnal build-up which normally brings the dispute to the Community
Justice Centre—often via police, chamber magistrate, or court; even though
this ﬁnal incident is far from the “cause" of the dispute. About 17 per cent
of disputes at the Redfern Centre involved serious threats or violence. Over
half of the neighbour disputes involved minor property damage. At the Redfern
centre, over 45 per cent of disputes had had police involvement at some stage—
about 11 per cent referred by police.
Famiiy Disputes"
In the disputes between couples now separated or divorced, arrangements
regarding access to children was the major issue in 66 per cent of cases. In this
group of disputes—(access) the “resolution by mediation” rate was 55 per cent—
just twice the rate for the case load as a whole. However, it is also signiﬁcant
that all but two of these cases were referred by the court, and that none were
classiﬁed as “resolved without mediation”. In the case load as a whole, about >
23 per cent achieved some degree of resolution without mediation following
intervention by the Community Justice Centre.
The disputants involved in disputes about access usually wanted to sort out
quite detailed and ﬁrm access arrangements. The mediation process allows them
to express all the hostility they feel about previous arrangements and how they
have broken down. Frequently they will want assurances from the other parent
that they will stop alienating the child from them, or put a stop to other family
members turning the child against them with stories and so on. Some of these
disputes were over children of previous de facto relationships, where the person
seeking access was not the natural parent. There are also two cases listed
amongst the “other family” disputes where a grandparent was seeking custody
of. a grandchild. Where appropriate, the child or children were asked to 'partici-
pate in part or all of the mediation session. Where possible, any new “spouses”
who would be involved in the keeping of the agreement were also asked to
participate.
Disputants seemed to ﬁnd the informality of the mediation session helpful,
and the acceptability of writing perhaps “ﬁnicky” arrangements into an agree-
ment quite a relief. At the end of a successful mediation, both disputants
usually seem quite clear about what was expected of them, and what they could
expect in return. It is not unusual for an agreement to cover access arrange-
ments, and perhaps some details about property division, and for the parties
to agree also to go back to court for settlement of substantial joint property——
in effect agreeing to accept an arbitrator for the major division of property.
Some agreements regarding property settlement have, however, involved quite
substantial amounts. As agreements made at a Community Justice Centre are
not legally enforceable, disputants sometimes agree to have a separate document
drawn up by a solicitor, incorporating the points they have agreed upon.
The Redfern C.J.C. is less likely to accept for mediation a marital dispute
where the parties are still living together, than where they have separated. We
would regard as unsuitable for mediation the majority of disputes where the
"‘ From analysis of ﬁrst 500 disputes handled at the Redfern Centre.
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parties don’t know yet whether they want to stay together or not. We would
normally refer these for counselling; where parties refuse such a'referral we are
prepared to try mediation.
There were ﬁfteen disputes between parent/s and adult or adolescent
children. A major factor in ﬁve of these was the child leaving home (or not
leaving). In live cases. the parent had been assaulted by the child, sometimes
quite seriously. In two cases of parent/child disputes, the dispute was over
custody of a grandchild. Property or debt was a factor in only four of these
disputes. However, in the remaining sixteen “family disputes”, property or
debt was a factor in all but two cases. In most cases, it was the only issue raised.
Other Disputes"
Most of the disputes between friends or housemates were over money,
property or debts. They are in fact not unlike property disputes between separat-
ing couples. During the course of the pilot project it was recognized that
mediation was inappropriate for disputes between landlord and tenant where
occupancy was the subject of the dispute. Consequently, a decision was made not
to accept such disputes for mediation, but to refer them back to the legal system.
Disputes between residents in boarding houses have their own particular
aspects and are peculiar to the Redfern centre, obviously because of the area
served. They are mostly concerned with noise, privacy and use of communal
facilities, and at this stage do not appear to be easily resolved through Community
Justice Centre intervention.
Disputes between workmates tend, on the other hand, to respond particularly
well to mediation. These disputes have'invariably caused great distress to both
parties, and are the cause of much tension in the workplace. It is not unreasonable
to assume that such dissention at work reduces productivity and contributes to
unsafe working conditions.
Disputes between neighbouring businesses are somewhat ditlerent from
general “neighbour” disputes, and most of them involved complaints of unfair
competition. None have yet been successfully mediated.
Migrants and Mediation
One aspect of the project which is of particular interest is the level of
acceptance in and use by the ethnic community. At the Redfern centre 52 per
cent of disputants in the ﬁrst ten months were of non-English speaking origin.
It is unwise at this stage to make any assumptions about the reasons for this.
It may be that our promotion was quite successful, or it may be.that some
referring agencies are more willing to refer on people who are not ﬂuent in
English. '
From the inception of the project, particular effort was directed towards
making Community Justice Centres acceptable and accessible to migrants. The
Ethnic Affairs Commission was represented on the Co-ordinating Committee.
Advertisements for mediators were placed in the ethnic press, and translated press
releases were provided. Almost half of all mediators were of ethnic background.
Training included experience in using interpreters. During the training pro-
grammes, ethnic trainees share their knowledge of other cultures, contributing to
a very rich experience for all.
* From analysis of ﬁrst 500 disputes handled at the Redfern Ccntre.  
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The Community Justice Centre brochure was translated into twenty-three
different languages, and over 30 000 of these have been distributed by the
Redfern centre alone. All promotion in the ethnic media and to organizations
providing a service to migrants emphasized the centre’s willingness to provide
interpreters and bi-lingual mediators.
Every effort is made to provide mediators with a similar cultural background
to the disputants. We have found this facilitates the mediation and is appreciated
by the disputants, even though it occasionally leads to some difﬁculties. Mediations
have been conducted in Greek, Turkish, Spanish, Arabic and Italian, where this
has been the ﬁrst language of disputants. Interpreters have been used for the
following languages:
Russian, Tongan, Rumanian, Hungarian, Turkish, Arabic, Portuguese, Greek,
Spanish, Italian, Chinese, Yugoslav, Vietnamese, Maltese.
Workload
A mediation session is likely to take between one and three hours. Forty
per cent of mediations in the first ten months were concluded in less than two
hours. Eighteen and one-half per cent took over four hours. Most mediations
are concluded in one session, but about 8 per cent have had two or three sessions.
At Redfern we ﬁnd that it is the family disputes that are more likely to have
more than one session. Mostly this is to “try out" an agreement, particularly
where access arrangements are the major part of the agreement. A second
session is often arranged for two to four weeks ahead, so that any minor
difﬁculties can be ironed ’out. This has provided a valuable breathing space to
the disputants, and often unrealistic expectations are seen in a more realistic
light.
When a mediation session is arranged, the centre makes every effort to
“match” the mediators to disputants. We believe that it facilitates the mediation
for each disputant to feel they are “understood” by at least one of the mediators.
The “matching” may be by ethnicity, age, sex, s‘ocio-economic factors, or a
combination of these. We have a policy of always using one male and one
female mediator where the dispute is a male/female dispute. Where one dis-
putant is very young, we try to use a mediator who would not be seen as “just
like my parents”. Clearly, some mediators are allocated mediations more fre-
.quently than others—but at Redfern the most frequently used mediator would
rarely do more than one mediation per week.
We regard it as important for mediators to mediate with some regularity,
and probably one or two mediations per week would be ideal. However, our
workload has not yet reached the point where this is possible, and to. sub-
stantially reduce the number of mediators on our panel would also restrict our
ability to select mediators appropriate to the dispute. As all mediators have other
interests, and most have full-time jobs, the availability of the mediators we want
when we need them is a serious problem we have yet to solve.
Conclusions
I believe that this twelve months of operation of the Community Justice
Centres has shown that:
0 mediation is an appropriate and useful way of resolving some disputes;
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'0 disputants lind mediation much less intimidating than‘court, and do
take responsibility for making decisions and keeping their agreement;
0 disputants are willing to try mediation before resorting to legal action
if it is presented in a positive way by the referrer;
0 mediation can resolve quite serious, or potentially serious disputes.
All centres have mediated in disputes where there has been, or is the
immediate likelihood, of serious violence;
0 successful resolution appears to depend less upon the nature of'the
dispute than on the degree of compromise possible;
0 the nature of the disputes handled and probably to some extent the
degree of successful outcome is tied closely to the referral sources:
and
0 mediation gives people involved in these types of personal and often
very bitter disputes a chance to salvage their pride, their self respect
and their dignity. At the same time mediation can promote some
understanding of the forces that create, escalate and continue the
disputes.
 
 PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Wendy Faulkes
When I was growing up in a small country town, the local brass band had
in it one musician who was always the only one in step! [ feel a bit like that
discussing a non-legal alternative for the settlement of certain kinds of disputes
("my kind of music), and, I believe, of those presenting papers I am the only one
who is not a lawyer. So, I put before you my non-lawyer’s view of mediators and
mediation, and how this non-coercive and non-authoritarian method of dispute
resolution is appropriate at this time, in this community.
My paper deals with an overall view of mediators and mediation across the
New South Wales project, but with speciﬁc details related to the Redfern centre.
Most of the ﬁgures in the latter sections of my paper relate to the ﬁrst 500
disputes dealt with at the Redfern centre—effectively the case load to about
mid-October.
I would like to emphasize some points made in my paper and make some
brief comment on some of the concerns expressed in other papers.
The core of the Community Justice Centre is its panel of mediators.
Mediators are the “ordinary people“ whose task it is to convince
disputants that a resolution to their conﬂict is possible and desirable.
They help disputants to recognize areas of common interest and points
on which they may agree. The mediators do not decide who is right
or wrong and do not act as arbitrators. (p. 37.)
I note Mr Basten's comment on the use of “community” in the title and
must agree with some of his cynicism regarding this “aerosol" word. But,
without getting into semantics, I believe the Community Justice Centre has as
good a claim to the word as any, and better than many. It is the panel of
mediators selected from the community served by the Community Justice Centres
that links the centre to its community. It provides an anchor—hopefully to
ensurcv that Community Justice Centres will not sail oﬂ’ into the clouds and
become just another institution remote from the people it was designed to serve.
Selection
A sincere effort was made at each centre to select a group of mediators
that would be representative of the community. I should also say here that my
view of the community we serve encompasses all the people who live and work
in and around the area—and this does not mean they are all low~income, working
class people on social security beneﬁts. I doubt, for example that the Alexandria
Rotary Club would see itself in that light, but would consider itself very much
part of the community—no matter how one deﬁnes “community”. The ﬁnal
group of mediators selected for the Redfern centre reﬂects this—the group
included students and retired people, professional and business people, blue- and
white-collar workers, housewives, people on low incomes and people with high
incomes.
The selection process at each centre was determined by the Director, and
in my paper 1 detail the process adopted at Redfern. To consider again the
validity of "community", at Redfern some community groups were invited to
participate in the selection of mediators—a task that would have an important
and lasting effect on the development of the project. Our mediators participated
in the selection of the second group of trainees—and before I am drowned in
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accusations of allowing inbreeding, or ‘cloning", let me hasten to assure you that
we are well aware of this danger and it is certainly not our intention to allow
this to happen.
I will not go into any further detail here about the selection process (see
page 37). I would like to say, however that the selection process at all 3
centres represented, in their own way, an exercise in “afﬁrmative action". Other-
wise “disadvantaged" groups—people who may not stand much chance in the
normal competition for jobs (because they were too old, too young, not sufﬁciently
‘waspish”)——had the scales tipped in their favour. One result is that all centres
can claim a substantial range of ethnic groups represented in their mediator
panels. .
Training ‘
The training, provided by TAFE in a special course, was directed towards
developing mediation skills, rather than aiming at more formal or academic
» qualiﬁcations.
Much of the training was through the use of role-plays. As we were starting
from scratch, and had no actual cases on which to base these role-plays, the
teachers and the Directors found themselves writing stories to rival “Cop Shop".
They were based on our own experiences, stories we'd been told, and our varied
fantasies—only the names were changed to protect our reputations! Often, we
thought we’d been a bit too wild in our imagining. However, once mediation
actually started at the centres, it was a common occurrence for mediators to
say after a mediation “that was even worse than a role-play"-—-we thought you
had made them up!"
The Mediation Process
The mediation process has been adapted and developed from the process
used in the U.S.A.—but not, l'hasten to add, from the process using arbitration.
Very brieﬂy, the process goes like this:
Introduction—The mediators and parties introduce themselves, and the
mediators will explain how the session will proceed.
Story Telling—Each party hs invited to tell his or her side of the story.
While this is happening, the other party is asked not to interrupt-—
and this “rule" is enforced by the mediators.
Summaries—While the parties are telling their stories, one of the mediators
will take notes of what is being said, and at the completion of the
. story telling, will read back to both disputants a brief summary of
the main points they have each raised.
Agenda—The mediators will then help the disputants determine what
the mediatable issues are—what is open to negotiation and what is
not.
Transition-«During this part of the process. the mediators will help the
' disputants to communicate directly with each other. They take an
issue at a time, and explore the relevant factors. This is a very
directive and controlled process—it is not a matter of “anything
goes" and “let it all hang out“.
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Caucus—The mediators may have a private conference with each party, in
‘ the absence of the other party. This may help the mediators determine
whether or not an agreement is possible, or whether there is such an
imbalance to make mediation inappropriate.
Further Transition—Directed towards establishing what are the negotiable
terms, then the mediators will begin to draw together the threads
of an agreement.
Agreement—The agreement may be written—and if so will be in the
normal language of the disputants. Where both disputants and
mediators are using a, language other than English, the agreement
may be written in their ﬁrst language, or where necessary is translated
for the disputants. '
"Truce"—Early in the operating phase of the project we recognize the
value of a “truce”, where agreement was not possible at that stage.
That is, the disputants may never agree on the height of the fence,
but they undertake to stop harassing one another, or stop the threats,
etc.
Continuing Development
My paper deals at some length with the continuing development of mediators
——a part of the project that is of utmost importance. I cannot share Mr Basten’s
assumption that the “next generation of mediators will be university trained”,
or the inference that pressure to improve training, etc., is undesirable.
Lest I be accused in future of “promoting my own self interest (as a
mediator) for, of course, the public good", let me place on record now my
assertion that mediation is a very skilled job—and that it requires basic, but
adequate, training, followed by a great deal of stimulating and progressive con-
tinuing development. Mediation as a skill—in our terms—is in its infancy, and
we have much to learn. We must develop and improve these skills—not for
our own self interest—but because we are dealing with the public and the public
deserves a service of an acceptably high standard—whether our “public” is from
Redfern or Pymble! And because we are in our infancy we cannot set this
standard now, then adopt a “she’ll be right, Mate !” attitude. We have to con-
tinually up—grade our standards and push ourselves not to accept mediocrity.
I don’t believe'this means any sort of institutional training—even though
that may serve the self-interests of the academics amongst us. I do believe it
means allocation of realistic resources to enable the level of enthusiasm and
self-critical awareness to continue. My paper gives some details of the directions
taken so far in the continuing development of mediators. I can conﬁdently say
that participation in continuing development so far has built on the skills pro-
vided by the initial training, to a degree where our own improving standards
will quickly leave behind any mediators who lack the time and commitment to
be fully involved.
Disputes
The next section of my paper contains some details of the ﬁrst 500 disputes
dealt with at Redfern. It is not my intention to elaborate on the statistical data,
except to say that the case load reﬂects the media coverage and publicity—
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and may bear little relationship to the relative frequency of these types .of
disputes in the community. Quite clearly, the case load could change Signiﬁ-
cantly with greater (or less) referrals from a speeiﬁcal source. '
Neighbourhood disputes are rarely “just a fence” or “only about a tree".
A typical dispute has involved a variety of grievances over a period of years—
frequently both parties using whatever agencies available to “clobber” the other
—a sort of one—up-manship in the art of “dobbing-in”: Council, police ombuds-
man, Privacy Committee, Water Board, R.S.P.C.A. and so on (and you can
guess at what this costs the State!). The ﬁnal point where it gets into the legal
system may be threats, property damage or assault—or something much more
prosaic like the fence got blown over in the wind this week. We have in fact
made an important discovery—that the Great Australian Duelling weapon is a
garden hose—eat full pressure!
Disputes classiﬁed as “family disputes” are further subdivided and com-
mented on in my paper. Perhaps one advantage of mediation we have noted
in access disputes is that the disputants feel much more comfortable about deal-
ing with the “ﬁnicky details” at a Community Justice Centre, than in court—
and it is often these details that cause a more formal settlement to fall apart—
who washes the dirty clothes after a weekend with the other parent, for example
—-or what should happen when previously made arrangements just cannot be
kept
l
Disputes between workmates tend to respond particularly well to mediation
—not surprising perhaps, given the current employment situation—who can afford
to leave a job because you are not getting on with the person at the next desk?
The particular quirk of these disputes is that the ﬁnal confrontation typically
happens in the company car park. I think it is not unreasonable to assume that
such dissention in the workplace reduces productivity, “throws a spanner at
the workmate” as it were, and contributes to absenteeism and unsafe working
conditions.
Perhaps my legal colleagues would see Community Justice Centre involve-
ment in these disputes as “atomization”, and failing to deal with (or obscuring)
the problems or poor conditions, boredom, low status jobs and so on. Certainly,
Community Justice Centres do not attack these problems—which may or may
not be the cause of the dispute—but my experience in factories and oﬁices
tells me that when people are expending their emotional energy on conﬂict with
a fellow-worker they are most. unlikely to do much about the wider issues.
Worse, they will often shatter any solidarity of the workers by seeking support
and forcing others to take sides.
Migrants
One aspect of the project which is of particular interest is the level of
acceptance in and use by the ethnic communities. At the Redfern centre, for
example, 52 per cent of disputants in the ﬁrst ten months were of non-English
speaking origin. It is unwise at this stage to make any assumptions about the
reason for this—there has been no research on why people choose mediation
as an alternative. It may be that our promotion was quite successful, or it
may be that some referring agencies are more willing to refer-on people who
are not ﬂuent in English. Every effort is made to provide mediators with a
similar cultural background to the disputants. We have found that, while not
essential, it does facilitate the mediation and is appreciated by the disputants.
 Underlying Issues
Dr Tomasic makes a mention of the Community Justice Centres‘ claims
to deal with the underlying issues of disputes. and his doubt that Community
Justice Centres can in fact do so. This is, I think. a much misunderstood claim.
Perhaps it suits some people to assert that the “underlying issues“ referred to
are the “social structural bases of so much disputing in our society". We could
go a little further, and ponder the meaning of life, with about as much practical
usefulness. This claim that we can, and do, deal with the underlying issues,
has been the subject of debate at all centres, and I hope this debate will
continue.
Perhaps the “compromise position”, or “mediator position” will emerge as
something like this—and I quote from Felstiner and Williams paper “Mediation as
an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution: Ideology and Limitations":
Mediation confronts underlying causes only when they lie close to the
surface. If underlying causes are social in origin or are rooted in
patterns established by years of coping or reﬂect ingrained attitudes,
mediation will not address them. Inadequate housing, unemployment,
chronic violence, sexual inadequacy, and racial hostility for instance,
underlie many disputes referred to mediation, but nothing in the training
of mediators conditions them to deal with such issues, not even with
the disputant’s responses to such stresses. The kind of underlying cause
that mediators are able to confront is the cause which is a step 'or so
back in an escalating misunderstanding.
Conclusions
Finally, I would like to reiterate some of the conclusions I have reached:
0 mediation is an appropriate and useful way of resolving some disputes;
0 disputants ﬁnd mediation. much less intimidating than court, and do
take responsibility for making decisions and keeping their agreement;
and
0 mediation gives people involved in these types of personal and often
very bitter disputes a chance to salvage their pride, their self respect
and their dignity. At the same time mediation can promote some
understanding of the forces that create, escalate and continue the
disputes.
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MEDIATORS AND MEDIATION
A COMMENT
Michael Morahan,
Magistrates Courts Administration,
Presently on secondment to the Department
of Consumer Affairs
I feel that no one would dispute that there are many areas of the law where
the successful mediation 'of a dispute is more appropriate than the successful
litigation of a dispute. While many of the matters dealt with at Community
Justice Centres might be considered trivial by lawyers and courts, to an in-
dividual, the problem can be of major proportions.
The number of disputes handled by the Community Justice Centres to date
is not insigniﬁcant. The courts do not like dealing with minor domestic disputes
or neighbour problems and go out of their way to discourage litigation proceed-
ing, if in fact it gets that far.
Terms such as “no one wins but the lawyers” are familiar in this area.
The Community Justice Centres provide an informal and inexpensive alternative
to the court system. In the court room situation, the rules of evidence apply
equally to the short and simple matter as they do the long and complex one while
informality is the rule in mediation.
Chamber Magistrates in New South Wales conducted 171659 interviews
during 1980, the last full year for which ﬁgures are available. With such a large
amount of public contact, they provide many referrals to the Community Justice
Centres. While police and other agencies in the community do refer disputants
direct to the Community Justice Centres, it has long been traditional to rst
refer these persons to the local chamber magistrate. In some cases, litigation
may be more appropriate while in others it may be a Community Justice Centre
or perhaps a simple phone call will resolve the matter.
The “neighbour dispute” has always been difﬁcult to understand let alone
solve. There are as many versions of the “truth” as there are parties to the
action. Accurate and comprehensive statistics of such disputes are difﬁcult to
compile. Surely a more appropriate area for the Community Justice Centre than
the court.
Wendy Faulkes quotes the ﬁgure of 66 per cent of family‘disputes referred
are in relation to access. Access problems also constitute a large proportion of
chamber magistrate interviews. Where the matter is under the Family Law Act.
litigation can be brought to enforce the breakdown of access arrangements, but
many are reluctant to approach the courts. I feel that it is in the area of the
ex-nuptial child and ex-nuptial property settlement that the Community Justice
Centres can be of great assistance. To state that the law is inadequate in this
area is an understatement. Again, many disputants are reluctant to seek a
remedy in the Supreme Court due to procedural complexities and the cost factor.
Community Justice Centres must be careful not to assume roles that are more
appropriate for the courts to exercise.
Migrants as a class have a dread of the courts. More than the average
citizen, they consider the court system to be formal and cumbersome with many
technicalities. Some new Australians have a positive fear of all courts because
of the nature of courts in their homeland. Mediators have the time and patience
to compensate for the language and cultural difﬁculties and hopefully resolve
disputes in. a more genial atmosphere than applies to the court room.
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Violence is also an area where, large numbers of persons are interviewed by
chamber magistrates. Of litigation issued for such' matters, probably less than
10 per cent proceed to determination. The issuing of a summons for common
assault or apprehended violence and its subsequent cancellation prior to hearing
rarely solves the problem. The statistics available would indicate that the Com-
munity Justice Centres can achieve results in this area. The courts cannot claim
similar results.
In certain areas, I feel that the Community Justice Centres provide a viable
alternative to the courts and assist in supplementing the justice system available
to the citizens of New South Wales.
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PRESENTATION OF COMMENTARY
Michael Morahan
I wish to Speak at this seminar as a chamber magistrate. For many years,
I have been a chamber magistrate throughout the State. I have recently com-
menced a secondment to the Department of Consumer Affairs.
Kevin Anderson has given his View of Community Justice Centres, both as a
co—ordinator of the Community Justice Centre project and as a stipendiary
magistrate. As a chamber magistrate, I would look at Community Justice Centres
in a diﬂerent light. What alternative is there to court proceedings other than a
Community Justice Centre? I would say none.
Chamber magistrates in the Sydney area would interview between twenty
and forty people per day with legal problems. Prior to the introduction of the
Community Justice Centres, chamber magistrates had nowhere to refer people
other than- the court. In some areas, community agencies are available to help
but there were no agencim in a position to handle a dispute and otter a mediation
service as an alternative to court proceedings.
Chamber magistrates are a major referral source to Community Justice
Centres. Wendy Faulkes quotes the ﬁgure at roughly 25 per cent of those referred
as having been referred by a chamber magistrate. As many of you may know,
the chamber magistrates is also Registrar of the court and as such, he is the
issuing authority for court process. He is usually in a position to suggest to
people whether or not court proceedings are viable. While this is ‘only an opinion,
it is an opinion that is frequently sought.
The chamber magistrate service is very widely known, particularly in lower
socio-economic groups. In my paper, I refer to the 171 000 interviews conducted
by chamber magistrates in a twelve month period. Because of this volume of
referrals and the feedback supplied by the Community Justice Centres, I feel a
chamber magistrate is in a position to accurately assess the effectiveness of those
referrals.
As a chamber magistrate, I can appreciate the reluctance of people to go
to court. There are many factors. Cost of course, is a major one. The primitive
nature of a result in the court room situation is another. For instance, in a
case of domestic violence, the stipendiary magistratc’s options following conviction
are very limited. He can dismiss the matter, ﬁne the defendant or place the
defendant under a good behaviour bond. These results achieve very little in the
long term.
The Family Law Court can of course, make restraining orders but such
orders have serious limitations and are not of great assistance to the battered
wife in the long term. A bond may run for six months but what happens at
the end of that six month period? Must the wife commence fresh proceedings?
Another problem is the question of retaliation. Again, taking the example of
domestic violence, it does not have to be physical retaliation. Retaliation can be
psychological. The courts have no answers to such problems but Community
Justice Centres do.
A major factor in the success of the Community Justice Centres is the
sympathetic hearing people get when they present themselves for mediation.
Courts are not really in a position to give sympathetic hearings to all parties
in all matters that come before them. The rules of evidence apply to the court.
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A magistrate is bound to apply the rules of evidence and one of those
major rules is of course, that the evidence sought to be adduced must be relevant
to be admissible. Much of the background information that has led to the dispute
before the court is often inadmissible. People going to Community Justice
Centres have the opportunity to present this background information. From the
results quoted by Wendy Faulkes, it would appear obvious that once people can
-tell their side of the story their way, a ﬁnal result is more likely.
Lengthy court lists further hinder the ability of courts to dwell for lengthy
periods in cases popularly referred to as “backyarders”.
John Basten mentioned the mediation in children’s courts being similar to
the mediation in Community Justice Centres. People may not be aware that
mediation occurring in the children’s court occurs because the presiding magistrate
refers the parties to the Community Justice Centre at Surry Hills, and asks
them to return following that mediation. These courts are anxious to use Com-
munity Justice Centres to assist in the court process where that is possible. A
stipendiary magistrate at Bankstown has adopted a similar course in matters such
as assault where he feels that court proceedings would be fruitless to the parties
and the court.
The matters of compulsory attendances and binding agreements have been
mentioned. I do not agree with either of these proposals. I feel that if the
Community Justice Centre concept is to remain viable, compulsory attendance
should not apply. I feel that in the long term, binding agreements would detract
from the effectiveness of the mediation situation to disputants.
I feel that my attitudes and views must remain practical. Working in the
ﬁeld, 1 interview a large number of people daily who are often in most difﬁcult
circumstances.
The Community Justice Centre is a viable alternative to court proceedings
and is a centre to which I, as a chamber magistrate, can conﬁdently refer people
in the hope that a settlement may be reached between the parties. The courts
are not an ideal forum for the airing of many categories of disputes.
To make the courts a feasible alternative as Dr Tomasic is suggesting. would
create immense practical problems. To create a jurisdiction capable of dealing
with the various types of matter referred to Community Justice Centres would be
awesome in size and complexity.
I support the Community Justice Centre concept and I know that I speak
on behalf of many chamber magistrates, if not all, when I assure you that the
feedback received indicates Community Justice Centres are a most cﬁective
method of resolving disputes.
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FORMALIZED “INFORMAL” JUSTICE—A CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON MEDIATION CENTRES
Dr Roman Tomasic, M.A., LL.B., Ph.D.,
Solicitor, Supreme Court of N.S.W.,
Lecturer, Department of Legal Studies,
Kuring-gaj College of Advanced Education
The neighbourhood justice center model now in use does not really
reproduce either indigenous patterns of dispute settlement through
mediation or ideal images of community moots. It is rather a new
hybrid, forged and twisted by conﬂicting pressures of the need for
institutionalizations, funding, the need to justify a program in terms
of a limited set of values, and thus political pressures of right and
left. Despite its origins in compromise and accommodation, the present
model of the neighbourhood justice center is . . . by no means the
only possible model for community mediation . . , It is puzzling
that despite the burst of enthusiasm for neighbourhood justice centers,
there has been very little experimentation with alternative forms of
social context and deﬁnition of “community” . . . Perhaps the wide
appeal of community mediation is precisely that it purports to serve
so many different interests. Yet, unless we think more broadly about
what mediation can and cannot do in the American context, we risk
prematurely pronouncing it a failure.
Sally Engle Merry (1982)
Introduction
The state of the courts has been the object of attention and concern
from a variety of perspectives over the last century or so. These perspec-
tives have ranged from the literary to the reformist and have comprised feelings
as diverse as complacency, alarm, confusion and dismay. The general public
seems -to have been the most disturbed and dismayed by the practices of those
who work in our courts. Lawyers and judges on the other hand have tended
to be generally quite complacent about these practices so that for a long time
there have been little or any serious otlicial attention directed to the problems
of the courts. Where court reforms have occurred in recent years, this has
tended to take place in the upper courts in which most litigious lawyers tend
to be engaged. Thus we have seen the reconstitution of the Supreme Court
of New South Wales in 1970 with the fusion of the jurisdictions of law and
equity. At the federal level we have also seen the creation of the Federal Court
of Australia in I976 and the passing of new legislation regarding the High Court
in 1979. Whilst all of these have been upper court reforms the only signiﬁcant
reforms at the lower end of the judicial hcirarchy have seen the establishment of
the Family Court of Australia and of various administrative tribunals. Some of
the latter reforms have been quite problematic to say the least. Few substantial
reforms have occurred in the major existing lower courts, such as our courts of
petty sessions, although, as ofﬁcial statistics show us, these courts deal with the
vast majority of those who pass through the judicial process. Courts of petty
sessions have largely remained unchanged for many decades as a recent Victorian
study of the magistracy has, for example, again shown us. The problems that.
many have seen as existing in the lower courts have tended to be rediscovered
by each generation and yet little if any signiﬁcant change has occurred. The
kinds of criticisms made of the lower courts earlier this century by Roscoe
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Pound (I906) and empirically further identified by him in the 1920’s have once
again been discovered in a series of empirical studies in the United States,
Britain, Canada and even in Australia in recent years.
The failure to achieve major reforms in the lower courts cannot be explained
simply in terms of the failure of reformers to comprehend the managerial and
technological obstacles to systems change as Nimmer (1978) has sought to argue
in an important American study. A more plausible explanation for the failure
of reform in this area can be seen in terms of the essential idealogical functions
that the lower courts perform in society, as Doreen McBarnet (1981) has shown
in a recent British study. The lower courts are an essential idealogical instru-
ment of the modern industrial state so that they cannot be undermined or
radically changed without threatening the existing socio-political order. As
McBarnet and others have argued, as the courts with the largest direct impact
on individuals in society, the lower courts undertake an important social func-
tion of legitimating the legal order and hence ensuring the domination by the
state of the lower social stratum of society. Consequently, where lower court
reforms have occurred these have tended to be of the tinkering or “band-aid”
variety rather than ones directed at more basic problems. Thus we have seen
the building of new court houses, the introduction of drug and drink-driver
diversion programs and the greater use of social workers by the courts. Recently
we have also seen the expansion of legal aid facilities as well as attempts to
upgrade the legal skills of the magistracy through improved educational oppor-tunities. All of these kinds of reforms have by and large tended either to besomewhat superﬁcial or have tended not to beneﬁt the wider community as muchas they have beneﬁted those who administer the court system. It is no wonder
that public disenchantment with the lower courts is as great as it is and thatthis disenchantment all too often turns into dismay when a member of the
community has the misfortune to be compelled to pass through the lower court
process.
Experience with the lower courts has been found only to further aggravate
public opinions of them. Tinkering has occurred in an effort to bolster thecredibility of these courts as the community becomes more aware of their activi-
ties and practices. Reform has all too often, therefore, merely served a “window-
dressing” or legitimating function aimed at avoiding more serious or comprehen-
sive measures. Once again we seem to be entering an era of court reform inAustralia and it will be interesting to see what the consequences of this reform
activity will be. Much of the current reform effort is being led by the judiciaryitself as well as by various justice system officials, with little or no direct inputfrom the broader community. Despite the lack of any genuine communityinitiation and control of reform efforts in respect to the judicial process in
recent years, reformers have been all too ready to so package or label theirinitiatives so as to give the impression that their reforms do in fact reﬂect atrue “grass roots" community activity. The idea of community has therefore
increasingly been advanced as an ideological rather than a genuine response
to a problem. The “community based corrections" movement of the last decadeprovides a good illustration of the ideological uses by the state of the notion of
community. Of course, this strategy has also been a widespread approach
adopted by other agencies of the welfare state in recent years going beyond
merely the legal system, as a number of Australian social scientists have shown
recently (see e.g., Bryson and Mowbray, l98l). Instead of responding to agenuine community call for action regarding some social problems, the idea ofcontrol activities. This cynical and uncritical use of the concept of community
community has ironically been used by reformers to facilitate the expansion
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of state institutions into society and thereby seeking to further legitimize their
has increasingly occurred within the legal system. The emergence 01 Community
Justice Centres in New South Wales is yet a further illustration of this trend.
Legal reform movements have to date all too often been the product of the
ambitions of self-perpetuating elites advancing reforms that by and large can be
seen as largely self-serving. Attempts to improve the quality of justice in the
lower courts could well be seen in. these terms. Whilst most cases that pass
through the lower courts tend to be “minor" or “petty” ones, there has been
little incentive for legal reformers to soil their hands with these for, as McBamet
(1981) has shown, this would be contrary to the ethos of the dominant legal
culture which tends to characterize these cases as being legally quite simple
ones. As a consequence of the increasingly administrative nature of the work of
the lower courts, as Friedman and Percival (1976) and Lempert (1978) have
shown, there is increasing pressure to dispense with the use of legal rules in
handling the kinds of cases that ﬁnd their way into these courts. As a result,
we have seen an increasing resort in recent years to the use of techniques not
requiring legal skills, such as therapeutic counselling, educational and conciliatory
approaches to these kinds of cases. Diversion programmes and now mediation
based justice centres are further illustrations of this tendency. As the magistracy
seeks to increase its status within the judicial heirarchy such as by improving
its legal educational qualiﬁcations, as well as the number of lawyers drawn
into the lower courts increases, there has been a greater tendency to seek to
introduce the notion of legality which has previously in practice only been found
in the higher courts. The issuing of case reports for the lower courts is an
illustration of this phenomenon as is the greater number of more complex cases
being heard by them. As a consequence of this, there has been a strong incentive
for judicial administrators and reformers to seek to have “minor” cases dealt with
by other agencies outside the lower courts. The ideology of informality has been
useful here as it has helped legitimate the use of informal methods of social
control outside the lower courts, whilst at the same time allowing the magistracy
to at least adopt some of the trappings of formalism so as to enhance its own
position. However there are serious problems with the delegalization argument
as the leading American sociologist of law, Richard L. Abel (1978 and 1981)
has recently shown. We will return to look at some of these later. Thus, rather
than questioning the whole ideology of the need to process “minor” cases at
all, court reformers have sought to allow continued state control of these, but
in an annexe to the courts. The rise of community justice centres is an illustration
of this easy answer to a serious contradiction facing the lower courts. 1 will
now proceed to look at the background to this “experiment" more closely.
Background to the “Experiment”
The Community Justice Centre experiment in New South Wales seems to
have inspired almost boundless enthusiasm and acclaim amongst our justice
system ofﬁcials and their media associates. Politicians, magistrates, lawyers and
journalists have all to varying degress rhapsodized over the far from proven
positive advantages of mediation centres over the lower courts. Despite criticisms
that have been levelled at these centres from both ofﬁcial and academic com-
mentators in the United States and Britain, it has been extremely rare to ﬁnd
even the mildest criticism uttered in Australia. This may well be a commentary
upon the almost incestuous nature of legal reform networks in this country.
The justice centre idea was hastily adopted from the United States before it
had been fully evaluated and before the current reaction against them had become
more apparent.
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The passage through the New South Wales parliament of the Community
Justice Centres (Pilot Project) Bill in November, 1980, signalled the beginning
of a new phase of court reform in this State and provided the opportunity for a
chorus of eulogies concerning the potential of justice centres as alternative means
of handling disputes to those available in the lower courts. The parliamentary
debates themselves resound with claims so impressive that it is a wonder that no
one had thought of introducing this idea into this State sooner. lronicaUy,
it was probably the lack of readily-available information about the applicability
of this approach to disputing to societies such as our own that led to such
sweeping claims being made. Had the reformers taken only a little trouble to
investigate more thoroughly overseas learning and experiences with the use of
mediation schemes they would soon have had cause to have some serious doubts
about them. However, it should be acknowledged that superﬁcially the idea of
mediation as a. solution to intractible disputes was an attractive one and as a
result politicians and journalists might be forgiven for some of their extravagant
claims. Had the government’s advisors sought to investigate more fully the
enthusiastic claims made by advocates of mediation in the United States and had
they sought to examine sociologically some of the underlying assumptions that
mediation centres were based upon, they would have found considerable reason
to avoid the haste with which these centres were introduced into this country.
Unfortunately law reformers all too often tend to be wary of delving into the
kinds of sociological questions regarding justice centres that I have explored at
length elsewhere (Tomasic, 1980), although there are some notable exceptions
to this.
Having made the above observations let us look brieﬂy at some of i the
reactions that have occurred to the idea of- mediation centres in New South
Wales. In his second reading speech introducing Community Justice Centres
(Pilot Project) Bill, The Attorney General, Mr Frank Walker, Q.C., boldly
asserted that:
The introduction of community justice centres is the most promising
step taken this century to provide a system for the settlement of a
class of dispute which the adversary processes of our courts have never
been able to resolve satisfactorily.
(Hansard, 19th November, 1980, p. 3147.)
The Attorney General went on to assert that mediation “. . . centres of the
kind proposed have operated very successfully for many years in the United
States of America" (Hansard, 19th November, 1980, p. 3147). There was little
strong evidence upon which to base this kind of assertion which was repeated in
the Legislative Council when the government introduced its bill into that chamber
(Hansard, 26th November, 1980, p. 3585). Although the ﬁnal evaluation report
of the US. Justice Department’s Neighbourhood Justice Centers Field Test
(Cook, et a], 1980) had been completed earlier that year and had reached a
number of favourable conclusions, this was far from being a rigorous document
and in any case did itself have some reservations such as those in relation to
the cost and coerciveness of justice centres. Some well informed American
observers have pointed to this evaluation report and concluded that “. . . com-
munity mediation has failed since it does not appear to substantially reduce
judicial caseloads" (Merry, 1982). This makes one wonder what substantial
basis for Australian enthusiasm for justice centres there was at all.
More searching and rigorous evaluations such as those of Felstiner and
Williams (1979) of the Dorchester scheme or by Davis, et al (1979) of the
Brooklyn scheme were somewhat less optimistic than the government’s ofﬁcial
#__l
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evaluators. Davis was the lirst In use random assignment of cases to mediation
and this approach is increasingly being turned to. This is the only satisfactory
tllt'lllotl' by which ﬁrm conclusions concerning the alleged superiority 0/ justice
centres over court processings can be established. This method is essential as the
basic assumption justifying these centres requires that they be compared with
the courts and not examined in a meaningless vacuum. Interestingly, the N.S.W.
Law Foundation’s evaluation of justice centres has not employed this kind of
random assignment. Yet, the New South Wales Government assumed that it
was:
I
. the essence of the programme that resort to a community justice
centre is a real alternative to the court system.
(Hansard, 19th November, 1980, p. 3149).
This was because the government had adopted the “broad principle” that:
. a rigid adversary situation should be avoided and that the solution
reached (in disputes) should be one adopted by the parties as
mutually acceptable to them, rather than one imposed by an outside
authority.
(Hansard, 19th November, 1980, p. 3148, emphasis added.)
This key statement used to justify these centres was however based upon
two quite erroneous assumptions. Firstly, it'is absurd to suggest that the adversary
system of justice exists in reality in the lower courts, even though our ideal of
legality would assume that it does. A vast majority of defendants simply plead
guilty and an even larger number are convicted. Were there true adversariness
in the lower court process one would expect to lind a much lower conviction
rate. Yet, as a result of the expansion of legal aid in recent years, the rediscovery
of the lower courts by lawyers schooled in the ways of adversariness as found
in the higher courts, has led reformers to make assumptions about the lower
courts which are far from being warranted. It is a great pity that the authorities
did not seek to better understand or acknowledge the true nature of. the lower
courts before turning to justice centres as a response to a problem that did not
exist‘ in the terms that it was conceived. The problem of adversariness can
also be seen in terms of a programmatic view of what the lower courts should be
like. Thus, if the ideal of legality were to be strictly imposed upon lower court
proceedings for whatever reason—such as to improve the status of the magistracy,
it would soon be ‘apparent that the vast majority of defendants would escape
conviction. Justice centres therefore allow both for the upgrading of the lower
courts and for continuing control of disputants.
This brings me therefore to my second point concerning the “broad prin-
ciple" underlying the establishment of justice centres, namely the supposed lack
of outside authority or coercion in these justice centres. This has long been a
key justiﬁcation for the greater resort to mediation and yet it is completely
misconceived. Mediation has traditionally almost always been accompanied by
the presence of a potentially coercive outside authority, as numerous case studies
of village societies have shown. The traditional mediator has invariably been
an authority ﬁgure in the local community having coercive powers which the
disputants are quite aware of (see further Tomasic, 1980: l9—23). Moreover.
mediation centres themselves have been found to be far more coercive than
their proponents had originally suggested. Even the ofﬁcial evaluators of the
United States Government’s three neighbourhood justice centres reluctantly had
to admit that “. . . subtle coercion has been present on occasion within the
N.J.C. process“. Ominously, they went on to add that ". . . subtle forms of
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coercion . . . appear to be very important elements in building sizable cascloads,
and it is difﬁcult to envision a programme which receives referrals from the
justice system completely eschewing all forms of subtle coercion” (Cook. et nl,
1980: 102). The supposed “success of mediation centres all too often seems to
be judged by their capacity to relieve the lower courts of some of their burden
of cases so that the more “successful" the centre the more likely it is to receive
a considerable number of case referrals from the justice system and hence rely
upon various coercive strategies, such as mediators threatening to make recom—
mendations to the referring agency should the disputants not reach an agreement.
Consequently, when the New South Wales Government spoke of the “successes“
of American justice centres they unwittingly were endorsing what were in fact
coercive schemes in that the level of their success in fact depended upon their
degree of coerciveness. It is difﬁcult to see governments supporting justice
centres that do not have high caseloads. Unfortunately these can only be achieved
by closely tieing these centres to the receipt of justice system referrals. To this
extent, outside authorities occupy a not inconsiderable presence in the mediation
process which runs completely contrary to their consensual ideology. The close
ties with the justice system and other state agencies established by the New South
Wales justice centre legislation makes it inevitable that subtle coerciveness will
be a major feature of these schemes. In'view of these issues of adversarincss and
coerciveness, any full and adequate evaluation of justice centres needs to compare
them with the lower courts themselves.
Although the Opposition parties did have some minor caveats’ regarding the
community justice centre legislation, there were remarkably few criticisms,
perhaps due to the fact that the legislation was debated around midnight in both
chambers. However one opposition spokesman did express “. . . concernfwhether
the wide-ranging expectations of the Ministers will be realized" (Hansa’lrd, 26th
November, 1980, p. 3586). Somewhat more critically, another Opposition spokes-
man warned that it was necessary to ensure “ . that we do not just set up yet
another system of courts right across the country" as well as expressing concern
regarding “. . . the capacity of these community justice centres to: spread”
(Ham-ard, 26th November, 1980, p. 3694). This warning was quite an appro-
priate one due to the fears expressed in the United States that justice centres
were creating a form of second class justice for blacks, women and the poor.
In Australia, the high proportion of migrants being referred to these centres
raises similar fears of their being quietly excluded from the formal justice system.
The government seems to be unconcerned by this as it has gone to considerable
trouble to ensure that migrants are encouraged to use‘justice centres rather than
the courts. The debate over the justice centre legislation is indicative of the
low priority that the major political parties seem to give to discussing the
implications of proposed justice system reforms.
The nearest that this debate came to looking at the symbolic potential ,of
justice centres as well as the close relationship of this reform to the justice system
as a whole occurred when one opposition spokesman in the Legislative Assembly
debate pointed ”out that:
It is not good enough for the Attorney General and Minister of Justice
to say that justice must be available through community justice centres
and the like. He must accept responsibility for the delays, which are
unacceptable to the community, and the resultant injustice.
(Hansard, 26th November, 1980, p. 3692.)
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This was at least partial recognition of the fact that the justice system is
indeed ”an interdependent system, so that any reform of one part will have
consequences elsewhere in the system. Moreover, it is ludicrous to speak of only
one aspect of the reform of the judicial process without considering the problems
of court reform as a whole. This would seem to presuppose a far more thorough-
going understanding of the courts than government and Opposition parties seem
to possess at present. Curiously, however, the government deliberately went to the
trouble to point out that its sponsorship of justice centres was not intended to
suggest “. . . that they provide any sort of panacea for problems within the legal
system" (Hansard, 19th November, 1980, p. 3148). This admission makes one
wonder what the real purpose of these centres was therefore supposed to be, as
they Were initially proposed as an alternative or better way of dealing with disputes
presently being handled by the lower courts and the rest of the legal system.
Were justice centres therefore simply to be some elaborate public relations
exercise for the legal system?
In any event, the Community Justice Centre legislation passed through the
New South Wales Parliament without opposition, a rare show 'of unanimity
unmatched since the legislation setting up the Law Foundation of New South
Wales was passed. All this was clearly the product of a careful and well
orchestrated legislative and administrative eﬁort that can be traced back several
years (see e.g., Chart, 1979). If only the basic conception of mediation centres
had been as thoroughly researched as this. Nevertheless, the media and other
politicians seemed to be equally unconcerned with the broader ramiﬁcations of
the justice centre experiment. The Federal Attorney General, for example,
cnthusiastically‘endorsed.mediation programmes for the ﬂexibility that they might
be able to provide courts to allow them to function more efﬁciently (Sydney
Morning Herald, 14th October, 1980, p. 13). A host of journalists eagerly lept
upon the mediation centre bandwaggon, with little or no attempt to discover
criticisms of the ofﬁcial government position or what the objectives behind the
establishment of these centres could be made (see e.g., Arnold, 1981; Sandeman,
1981; Slee, 1980; and Richardson, 1981). The Sydney Morning Herald, for
example, in a leading article, on the 9th of December, 1980, uncritically repeated
much of the rhetoric about justice centres that ofﬁcial proponents of the schemes
have been advancing. The Herald thus asserted that:
What the community needs is more backde justice rather than more
police, more courts, more lawyers and more jails.
Yet there is little evidence that we are to have any less of these. In any
case, it is far from clear that it is time that we need less police, courts and lawyers
in society. We may well need more jails—but smaller, lower security ones than
we have now. We live in a highly structured society in which authority relations
are becoming more complex so that greater use of lawyers and the courts may
well be inevitable. Furthermore, there .is good evidence to suggest that existing
justice ofﬁcials such as police, lawyers and magistrates can be much more
responsive to community needs than they are at present. Setting up justice centres
will not deal with this problem. The Herald avoided making any broader observa»
tions about the consequences for further justice system reform of setting up
these centres and concluded rather simplistically that “Mediation, seriously yet
informally conducted, offers the possibility of resolving these important trivialities
that can sour neighbourhood relationships“ (emphasis added). Quite apart from
failing to understand the basic nature of mediation, this major Sydney daily
simply accepted the contradictory rhetoric of the lower courts that disputes can
be both important and trivial. This simply avoids going into the basic causes
1  
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of disputes at all. Treating the kinds of disputes dealt with by the lower courts
as trivial or minor is not only taking an elitist view-of these, it is probably the
greatest single obstacle facing reform in this area.
Virtually the only response to this was my own letter to the editor of the
15th of December, 1980, criticizing some of the assumptions upon which the
Herald’s editorial had been based. The remaining media had been so starved by
the government of critical information regarding these centres that I was beseiged
with radio and television inquiries following the appearance of this letter. Extracts
from it have also surfaced in a number of other pieces on the 0.1.0. experiment
(e.g., Nyman, 1981a) further illustrating the lack of a critical attitude to these
centres within the reform community. For those of you who may have missed it
I reproduce it below rather than again repeating its main points.*
Cautious Eye on Backyard Justice
SIR, The Herald has enthusiastically supported the establishment of pilot
community justice centres in NSW.
Whether enthusiasm for this idea is justiﬁed is not clear yet, even in the
United States, which is the source of this innovation.
I would take issuc with your assertion that “what the community needs
is more backyard justice." We do not know what informal mechanisms
already exist,in the community for handling disputes.
American research has sought to map the range of existing informal
community dispute processing mechanisms and found that there were
many more than most reformers believed to exist. The establishment of
justice centres to handle backyard disputes may therefore be premature.
In the United States, the disputes dealt with by these centres have tended
mainly to involve women, the poor, and blacks. These tend to be cases
that courts do not like handling as they are seen to be messy, and threaten
the orderly processing of cases in this male-dominated environment.
Yet the women who bring domestic assault cases to the lower courts
do so because they feel the authoritative court process gives them some
capacity temporarily to redress an uneasy domestic situation. Courts can’t
solve these problems, but then they are not being called upon to do this
but rather simply to provide an authoritative intervention, even if the
effects of this are temporary.
It is misleading to suggest that justice centres will be able to go “to the
heart of the matter."
You suggest that true and lasting resolution of disputes does not occur
in many cases going through the courts. But this can also be said of
justice centres. Justice centres do not provide long-term solutions with
any greater frequency than the courts, and may in fact provide fewer.
This is because, as the American experience has shown, many people
are unwilling to go to centres which appear to have no pOWer to deal
with their problems.
 
* Interestingly, soon after the publication of this letter I was chided informally by a
senior government ofﬁcial who suggested that I should publish my views in innocuous
periodicals, such as The Australian Law Journal, rather than in the mass circulation
daily press which might be read by the general public. Whilst this comment could
probably have been made partly in jest, it nevertheless seems to reﬂect the prevailing
ofﬁcial attitude to serious public debate of pet government law reform proposals.
Criticism all too often tends to be quite unwelcome.
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Justice centres assume a consensus model of society and that people will
happily live together if only they can explain their own needs to each
other. This is u patently naive view, for it ignores the complexity of
personal communications, the critical importance of power in society and
the inevitability (and perhaps usefulness) of conﬂict.
Given the US experience with mediation programs, it is no wonder that
these centres have been described as a form of second-class justice. It is
therefore ironic that a Labor Government should be championing this
initiative rather than concentrating on better access to courts and a more
responsive police force.
It is a pity that we have been so quick to pick up this idea in Australia,
in view of its fate in other parts of the world.
Dr Roman Tomasic.
Although the government has been committed to evaluating justice centres
before they are taken any further, this Law Foundation evaluation may well .
only be 'a formality, despite the fact that government spokesmen have declared
that this study would “ . . . to a large extent determine whether the project will
continue at the end of the pilot period . . (Hansard, 26th November, 1980, p.
3585). Nevertheless, the same spokesman enthusiastically had earlier exclaimed
that the “. .
endless .
. types of disputes which may be dealt with by mediation are virtually
." (Hansard, 26th November, 1980, p. 3585). The expansion of the
operation of justice centres certainly seems to be being enthusiastically advocated
by some government members (see Arnold, 1981), as well as those responsible
for the administration of existing centres (see Richardson, 1981). Whilst it is
far from self evident that mediation centres have been as sueccsful as some of
their advocates have hoped, this does not seem to have effected the future of these
centres. This would seem to suggest the futility of knowledge or research in the
judicial reform area. Where research has been commissioned this is all too often
the case. It will be interesting to see if this also proves to be an accurate con-
clusion in the unlikely event that the ofﬁcially sponsored evaluation proves to be
seriously critical of justice centres.
Meeting Impossible Expectations
1 would like to turn now to compare some of the aims of justice centres
as set up in New South Wales with their experiences to date. In a recent review
of the justice centre literature (Tomasic, 1980) I identiﬁed eighteen key, yet
highly problematic, assumptions upon which the justice centre movement has
been based. These were as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
t6)
a)
That mediation is able to deal with the roots of problems.
That mediation improves the communications capacities of disputants.
That mediators are not “strangers” but are “friends” of the disputants.
That unlike adjudication, mediation is non-coercive. .
That mediation is voluntaristic as it allows disputants to solve their
own problems themselves.
That mediation centres provide easier access to the legal system.
That disputants want to get away from the courts into mediation
centres. '
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(8) That there is such a thing as a sense of “community“.
(9) That unlike judges, mediators “represent” the community and share
its values.
(10) That the use of mediation is a means of reducing tension in the
community.
(11) That mediators are not professionalized and do not require long
periods of training.
(12) That mediation centres are non-bureaucratic and are ﬂexible and
responsive.
(13) That mediation is able to deal with a wide range of disputes.
(14) That mediation is speedier than adjudication.
(15) That mediation is less costly than adjudication.
(16) That mediation is fairer than adjudication.
( 17) That mediation can reduce court congestion and delay.
(18) That mediation is more effective than adjudication in dealing with
recidivism.
Each of the above assumptions have been discussed elsewhere (Tomasic,
1980) in relation to the American experience with justice centres. It is interesting
to note the extent to which ofﬁcial Australian justice centre rhetoric has paralleled
many of the above highly questionable assertions. Of course, this is not at all
surprising given the extremely derivative way in which justice centres have been
introduced in Australia. The above list of assumptions is by no means a deﬁnitive
one, although exponents of justice centres have been increasingly careful in
making their claims. One of their great problems has been that justice centres
have been oversold or overloaded with expectations about their capacity. This
of course is an old problem in the implementation of innovative reform pro~
grammes which all too often have inevitably led to a sense of under-achievement
and to their ultimate failure, as Eugene Bardach (1977: 85—90) has shown us.
The broad ranging expectations held of Australian justice centres can be seen in
the parliamentary debates, discussed above, as well as in a series of papers and
articles produced by those directly associated with this experiment. For example,
Chart (1979: 152) echoed American rhetoric when she argued that justice centres
would be able “...to grapple not with the isolated complaint but with the
underlying personal interactions which have produced it". There is simply no
.way that mediation can deal with the social structural bases of so much disputing
in our society. It is extremely doubtful whether it is possible to do any more than
to simply process disputes rather than to resolve them in some ﬁnal way. In
this respect mediation centres will be no more successful than courts. The fact
that there is no recurrence of a particular dispute does not mean that it is
resolved. To seek such a resolution is to adopt a highly problematic consensual
and static view of society and of the nature of disputing and personal interaction.
'One of the key points for distinguishing the kinds of cases dealt with by
mediation centres from those dealt with by the courts is that the former should
be limited to cases where the parties are in a continuing or multiplex relationship.
This is however a far from precise concept despite its key importance in justifying
the establishment of justice centres. Furthermore, it is far from clear that media-
tion is the only or even the best means of handling disputes based upon such
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relationships. As we see in regard to divorce or family law maters, courts play
an important role in regard to these types of continuing relationships. It would be
wrong to assume that continuing relationships do not involve justiciable legal
problems whilst all other, or simplex disputes, do involve these. Morever, to
suggest that negotiation and compromise occurs only in multiplex relationships
ignores the fact that these strategies also are quite appropriate in simplex relation-
ships. The problem with the artiﬁcial simplex-multiplex dichotomy is that it
misconstrues the nature of reality by seeing it is static and clearly deﬁnable ways.
In fact, these two types of relationships need to be seen as representing the
poles of a continuum so that there is no clear dividing line between them. Whilst
dichotomous logic is often superﬁcially quite attractive in the marketing of
ideas, as so much of the work of Marx and Engels, for example, obviously
attests, it falls far short of providing anymore than a very crude description of the
nature of disputes (see further Abel, 1974). As a consequence of this conceptual
cloudiness, arbitrary decisions have to be made as to what constitutes a multiplex
dispute that is suitable for processing through justice centres. Although, as
Macaulay (1963) has shown, businessmen frequently are in continuing relation-
ships few such disputants are induced to enter justice centres. Instead exhortations
concerning the superiority of informal methods such as mediation
. are directed disproportionately at the newcomers to our legal
system . . . who have only recently begun to assert legal claims. What
legalistic delegalizers are saying is that hitherto unrepresented,
oppressed and inchoate interests, by attempting to use the legal system
in the same way that business has been using it, are making it more
difﬁcult for business to use the system.
(Abel, 1978: 8—9.)
This nicely shows us once again that legitimate court reform should avoid
taking a piecemeal approach, and avoid, either deliberately or otherwise, dis-
criminating against a particular sector of the community by in effect depriving
them of access to the formal court system. Despite the numerous criticisms
that can be made of overly formal and legalistic court procedures, ultimately,
the liberal ideal of law or of legality nevertheless remains the single most
important guarantee for the attainment of social justice. We cannot dispense
with the ideal of legality without losing a very important part of our cultural
heritage, as the English historian Edward Thompson (1975) has also argued
It should be obvious that although we often hear of “the gldbal village” we do
not live in a village society as such a society is immensely different from our own
(see Felstiner, 1974). Whilst the concept of mediation. has been repackaged since
it was plucked from the traditional village context, there are real dangers
inherent in seeking to press it too far in our society. Moreover, it has tended to
be idealized in a somewhat exaggerated way by those who have sought to impose
it upon western-urbanized societies. Proponents of justice centres have relied too
heavily upon concepts drawu from studies such as those of Laura Nader and her
students (see Nader and Todd, 1978) in her so-called Berkeley village project
(see Anderson, 1981: 3). In fact, Nader has to some extent turned away from
arguing for the simple applicability of traditional village concepts to our own
mobile complex society by highlighting the importance of social structural factors
in the disputing process in Western societies (Nader, 1979 and 1980). Other
anthropologists such as Sally Merry (1982) argue, for example, that “the form
in which . . . (justice) centres are being implemented differs signiﬁcantly not only
from the ideas of the original proponents but also from the prototypes of media-
tion in societies where it serves as the predominant mode of settling disputes".
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She goes on to argue that this distortion in the use of mediation. can be attributed
to the fact that “community mediation has been asked to serve too many con-
ﬂicting and contradictory interests”.
One of the problems emerging from reading evaluations of government
programmes concerns the manner in which the “success" of the programme is to
be deﬁned or assessed. Merry (1982) has argued that the “success” of justice
centres has tended to be measured upon the basis of a number of quite narrow
standards which ignore issues concerned with such things as community develop-
ment or the quality of justice provided. It is therefore interesting to note that
when evaluators follow-up disputants who have used justice centres they tend only
to ask questions about the quality of the mediation experience and not about the
sense .of the justice done. One would of course need to- compare this with court
processing. This kind of comparison process needs also to be undertaken when
we look at statistics concerning the long term stability of mediation agreements.
The degree of satisfaction so often expressed by proponents of justice centres
needs therefore to be seen as a product of a somewhat distorted measurement
process. For example, quite apart from the question of the lack of a court
comparison group, it has been claimed in New South Wales that after the ﬁrst
six months of the justice centre experiment that there was an 86 per cent (158)
success rate for the 184 cases sent to mediation. This looks impressive, however
it accounts for only 27.1 per cent of all 583 disputes referred to the centres
during this period. So, less than a third of all disputes (31.5 per cent or 184)
were referred to mediation at all. We need therefore to know a lot more about
those that were not referred at all to mediation. In any case an overall rate 'of
48 per cent for all cases is far from being an overwhelming sign of “successful”
outcomes (see Anderson, 1981: 11). In any case, this ﬁgure is fairly meaningless
without a court comparison. Yet there seems to be a great reluctance even to
compare justice centres with the lower courts. This may well be due to the fact
that the ﬂaws of the courts are all too apparent so that it would prove disenchant-
ing if the comparison proved unfavourable. Such comparisons may well seem to
discredit the whole justice system of which justice centres are merely symbolic
extensions. Consequently, so much of the argument in this area tends to be
deliberately vague, ambiguous, inconsistent or evasive, as Abel (1981: 246ff)
shows in regard to issues such as lower cost, improved access, the achievement
of the ideal of formal justice and so on. Whilst it is not likely that the media
or political leaders will be seriously concerned about these kinds of problems it is
the responsibility of those seeking to provide an accurate understanding of the
nature of socio—lc-gal reform measures to deal with critical questions such as those
raised by writers such as Abel (l98l) and others concerning the limits 'of
informalism as a strategy for reform. Unless this is done there is good evidence
to suggest that little positive change will occur and that reforms, such as justice
centres can only be successful by becoming increasingly coercive and by projecting
state control into many more areas of social life than are presently dealt with by
the formal justice system.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr Roman Tomasic
- l have enjoyed listening to the speakers who have spoken before me and I
feel in many ways there is very little more that I can contribute at this stage,
particularly given the kinds of points that have already been made in the papers.
One of the ﬁrst questions I asked myself, however, is “Why am 1 here?".
“What is the purpose of my being asked to be here?”. Is it to provide some
kind of legitimation or to show that we really have considered the criticisms
that can be made of Justice Centres and alternatives of this kind? Why do we
have critics brought along to seminars of this nature? What is the use of
criticism ‘in the criminal justice reform process? Is it to really raise funda-
mental critical points? Is it really to ask questions which are likely tovfunda-
mentally change the kinds of reform proposals that we get every four or ﬁve
years or so of the type that we are now discussing here at this seminar?
Justice Centres, of course, are by no means an entirely new approach to the
problems of an overly formal justice system. Clearly, we have had a fascination
with informal methods for a long time. In fact, one can ﬁnd instances certainly
going back to the turn of the century and earlier, where people would say, “Of
course, we are distressed about the fact that formal legal systems can’t provide
the kinds of remedies which we feel that it ought to”. The usual response has
been, “Let’s try and ﬁnd some alternative”. In recent decades we have had
diversion programmes which involved things such as therapeutic programmes or
educational exercises. These have not been very successful and people became
increasingly disillusioned with them. Similarly, we already are seeing in the
United States people becoming disillusioned with Justice Centres.
When one looks historically at the progress of the use of alternatives, of
informal methods in the justice system, one ﬁnds that, unfortunately, they have
had very little real affect on the formal justice system as such. One of my own
prime concerns in looking at this area is with the relationship that reforms such
as Justice Centres, for example, bear to the overall project of court reform. I am
concerned by the fact that we all seem to somewhat uncritically be ready to
acknowledge that the formal courts system, certainly in the lower courts, is
not able to sustain any of its own ideals of legality. We constantly ﬁnd that the
lower courts are slow, that they are expensive, that they do not get to the heart
of problems in many ways. We ﬁnd many criticisms constantly being raised
about the lower courts so the usual response or answer to these real problems
is that we need to entirely turn to some other experts in the community, some
other approach to deal with the kinds of failures which we see occurring in the
formal legal system. We do not seek to change the lower courts as such.
Unfortunately, if at the same time we examine various historical studies which
have been undertaken on the lower courts, for example, such as the recent
La Trobe University study of magistrates’ courts in Victoria, we ﬁnd that, in
fact, reformers have produced very little change in the lower courts. It is
plausible, therefore, to see reforms of this nature as in many ways an attempt
to divert our attention from what I think are the glaring and intractable problems
that confront us within the lower courts as well as the resistance that exists to real
change in these courts. I think that this raises general problems which are evident
both within the lower courts and in the symbolic uses of the notion of informal
justice by reformers.
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I think there are some extremely glaring contradictions in the present reformmovement which call for some kind of analysis. Let us begin by talking aboutthe courts. Of course, it is fairly obvious to all of us that the courts are particu-larly prone to using, on the one hand, the ideal of legality to justify theirprocedures while denying this idea in actual practice. Of course, courts haveto have formal procedures, as the last speaker pointed out, and they are sup-posed to be clearly and consistently followed within these institutions. There issupposed to be no leeway for any kind of discretion or variation. However, ifwe look at the studies which we have of the lower courts, we ﬁnd the oppositeis the case. Legality is simply one of the broad justiﬁcations, the symbolicvirtues, that are constantly talked about in relation to the lower courts but arerarely, if ever, applied. The picture that we are presented with of the lowercourts, by those who would seek alternatives to them such as Justice Centres, isthe formal or ideal picture and not the reality. The lower courts are not in-capable of dealing with diSputes, and have continued to do so by balancing theideal of legality with the pragmatic needs of getting through their work load.This balancing act is far from being an ideal process and I do not want to betaken to be defending the lower courts as such. However, it is important toseek to understand the nature and functions of the lower court process beforewe begin to attempt to “reform" it. Despite the heavy involvement of themagistracy in the current reform process I would suggest that an extremelynarrow and perhaps naive view of these institutions has been advanced. Ratherthan seeking to resolve some of the glaring contradictions evident in the lowercourt process reformers have simply moved sideways and sought to perpetuatesimilar contradictions in a less troublesome context, namely, in Justice Centres.
It should also be pointed out that the notion of “resolving” disputes is anabsurdity. Disputes are never “resolved”, they are simply processed in one wayor another, and what we have in C.J.C’s is simply another means of processingdisputes. If we look at Justice Centres the contradictions within them are evenmore glaring than those in the lower courts. For example, we ﬁnd Centrespurportedly set up to be non~coercive institutions. Yet, if we look more closelyat them, there may not be overt coercion but it is generally acknowledged (evenby the ofﬁcial evaluators of the American Justice Centres as I point out in mypaper) that, of course, these Centres are quite coercive, as coercive, in fact andperhaps in a more subtle way, as other formal court systems themselves. More-over, Centres that are purportedly set up to provide “justice", like the lowercourts, can do little in this direction due to the complexities of so many disputesand so end up providing only a “good feeling”, which is a poor substitute as isillustrated by the high proportion of those referred to Justice Centres who declineto take advantage of their services.
John Basten very nicely pointed to another contradiction. that I think isevident within the notion of Community Justice Centres. They are supposedly“community” oriented, and yet the end result of them is a non-community effect.It becomes an attempt to break down a sense of community, to underminecommunity, or as he said to “atomize” members of the community. Another basiccontradiction within them is they are supposed to be non-bureaucratic, they aresupposed to be a retraction of the State from the control of the daily activities ofthe community, and yet, as seems to be generally acknowledged, the effect ofCommunity Justice Centres is that they begin dealing with many disputes whichwould previously never have been processed by State agencies. They servetherefore simply to extend the State apparatus further into the community.These are all fairly blatant contradictions and there are many more which I havementioned in terms of looking at the various assumptions that I discuss in my
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paper. In a recently published book on Neighbourhood Justice which I have
edited I analyse in some considerable detail some of these contradictions and
assumptions underlying the notion of Justice Centres.*
It is important in any discussion of Justice Centres to try and look at the
intellectual origins of this whole movement, as I think that out of this context
Justice Centres are a fairly trivial and irrelevant'notion. I, of course, have
great respect for those involved in the Justice Centres and their capacity to process
the problems that they see themselves as having to deal with, as well as for their
mastery of the techniques which they have acquired. Yet, taking a broader
perspective of Justice Centres, one can see these simply as adopting another
technique or fashionable strategy. Justice Centres, as Sally Merry points out in
the quote that I use at the beginning of my paper, are really affected by far too
many expectations and it would not be surprising if they were therefore to cease
to exist in the next four or ﬁve years time as some new technique of social control
emerges. We would then- ﬁnd the next trendy or fashionable notion being thrust
upon us as yet another means of legitimizing non-action on the subject of criminal
justice reform. This takes me back to the issue I began with, namely the problem
of the lower courts, which I think is the key focus that we should have. The fact
that many of us at this seminar are lawyers is an interesting one. Something
that is increasingly happening, mainly as the result of what has been described as
a “ﬁscal crisis" which currently affects our State, is that there is not enough
money for signiﬁcant change or, as the last speaker pointed Out, it would simply
be too expensive to introduce the kind of changes that I might regard as being
satisfactory. Consequently we are increasingly seeing a basic tradition in our
society, namely that of legality being cast aside rather than being revived. Is it a
tradition which is far more deeply embedded in our society than is the notion
of mediation, which we have conjured up in recent decades from tribal societies,
and it is the tradition of legality which needs to be revived with as much
enthusiasm and with as much commitment as has been this notion of mediation.
The ideal of legality is one that is inherently part of our society and needs to be
taken much more seriously within the courts. We have seen that partly as a
result perhaps of the grth of legal aid, it has become very complex, difﬁcult
and embarrassing for governments to have to provide legality, because it does
provide people with some degree of power—some capacity to actually inﬂuence
the structures of society.
The kind of issues that' present themselves to us with Justice Centres raise
questions of fundamental importance for any system of justice. If we decide to
entirely. dismiss or reject one aspect of that inevitable tension which exists in any
functioning justice system, namely the capacity for a justice system to include
both formal notions of legality and the capacity to bend in an informal way, we
fundamentally strike at the root of what is an important and basic good within a
society such as ours—a collective good, the removal of which would be an
enormous blow to the basis of our society. In other words, a justice system to be
a “justice“ system must be able to retain a continuing tension between legality
and informality. Once this tension is lost, the system will cease to be able to
deliver justice and will become inﬂexible, static and unable to adapt to changing
social circumstances. I do not believe that it is possible to maintain this kind
of tension within- Justicc Centres and I think the only place where that can
effectively be maintained is within the courts. Therefore the present reform effort
should be directed to the loWer courts and not outside them, as to go outside the
“Tomasic, R., and Fecley, M. M. Neighbourhood Justice—Assessment 0/ an
Emerging Idea. Lon-gman Cheshire. Available June. I982.
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courts is to ignore the problems which I think we all see in the lower courts and
excuse our lack of attention to these by the fact that they are too difficult to
deal with, in the mistaken belief that Justice Centres will be able to be more ‘
|uccessful in this regard. ' ‘
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“INFORMAL” JUSTICE AND LEGAL SERVICES: A COMMENT
Regina Graycar, LL.B., LL.M.
Lecturer in Law (Part-time), University of N.S.W.*
In March, 1980, the second annual conference of the National Association
of Independent Legal Services was held in Victoria. The theme was “Alternative
Dispute Settlement". T—Shirts were printed with those words on the back, and the
phrase “support Community Legal Centres” on the front. Discussion of the
Community Justice Centre (C.J.C.) proposal at that conference was based on an
assumption. that alternative, non-judicial dispute processing forums and legal
services shared common goals and aspirations. This comment will consider
C.J.C’s from the perspective of the legal services movement, and will examine
some aspects of alternatives to the judicial system and the effects they might have
on the clients of legal aid—the poor, the discriminated against, the powerless:
those who have only recently had any afﬁrmative access to courts. These are the
people for whom “community” justice was perceived as a refreshingly humane
alternative to an unresponsive court system. The assumption that C.J.C’s and
legal services share common objectives and are compatible organizations warrants
some attention in order that possible conﬂicts between their activities can be
avoided. It will be contended that this can only be achieved by determining
precisely what C.J.C’s are intended to accomplish and ensuring that they do
not extend their reach beyond their appropriate boundaries.
In his paper, Dr Tomasic has described at some length the statutory genesis
of the current pilot project and pointed out the fact that the Community Justice
Centres’ legislation was a rare example of parliamentary unanimity. From the
lack of any overt opposition. it might be assumed that the underlying motivations
fuelling proponents of such alternatives would be uniform and instantly apparent.
On the cbntrary, informal alternatives to the justice system, at least in the United
States where the alternatives movement has ﬂourished for some years past, have
been established as the results of pressures from the broadest and most disparate
range of sources. These span the present Chief Justice of the United States
(Burger, 1976, 1977), the American Bar Association (Sander, 1977), and con-
sumer and community activists (Nader, 1976). In 1964 Jean and Edgar Cahn,
who played a pioneering role in the developing of legal services for the poor, set
up a model for the establishment of “neighbourhood law ofﬁces” as a means of
asserting the rights of the poor (Cahn and Cahn, 1964); by 1966, they were
calling for the “creation, on a neighbourhood level of mechanisms for settling
disputes, dispensing remedies and enunciating norms of conduct” (Cahn and
Cahn, 1966). A recent visitor to Australia, Earl Johnson has travelled a similar
path (see Johnson, 1970, and Johnson, Kantor and Schwartz, 1977).
The US. legal services programme, established in 1965 as part of the
“War on Poverty” differed signiﬁcantly from other earlier liberal legal reforms,
such as the creation of small claims and conciliation courts. These and other
similar ventures were designed speciﬁcally to facilitate enhanced access to a legal
system, the substance of which was considered quite adequate, but whose major
defects Were perceived to be procedural injustices and the inaccessibility of its
institutions to the majority of the community (Smith, 1919: 13). By contrast, the
legal services programme set out deliberately to make systematic attacks on
inequities in the substantive law and to use the courts as (grudging) participants
in a strategic campaign for social reform.
* Formerly Rcseurch and Education Ofﬁcer, Legal Services Commission of SA.
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Signiﬁcant court victories in areas such as landlord and tenant law, consumer
law, and welfare law, to mention but a few, have had dramatic ramiﬁcations for
large numbers of people, and have often been inﬂuential in causing legislatures
to enact laws setting out, for example, minimum standards of habitability in
tenancy agreements or unwaivable statutory Warranties in. what appear to be clear
admissions that laissez faire notions of freedom of contract are mere ﬁctions in a
society where bargaining power is predicated upon the unequal distribution of
resources.
The legal services programme in the United States has greatly facilitated
access to the courts for a large number of people who would not otherwise have
been able to pursue remedies to which they were entitled, and this recent, though
limited, enfranchisement of previously unheard and unrepresented people has
not gone unnoticed by proponents of alternatives to the formal justice system.
At the 1976 Pound Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice, alternative, non-judicial dispute processing tech-
.niques were canvassed as a means 'of dealing with the “legal explosion" (Barton,
1975); the new American disease “Hyperlexis” (Manning, 1976), and it is
disturbing, though perhaps inevitable, to note that the overloading of the courts
has to some considerable degree been attributed to the participation of these
relative newcomers in the system. It was the view of one speaker at that con—
ference that the biggest growth area of civil litigation (and by implication, the
biggest threat to established court systems) was in the newly expanded statutory
causes of action, such as those under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and social
security claims (Sander, 1976: 114). These are both areas where there is a high
probability that claimants would be legally assisted and that without such
assistance, the likelihood 'of those claims being pursued would diminish
signiﬁcantly.
Similar comments have been made in this country. The expansion of legal
aid services in Australia has several times been suggested as a factor co-n-
tributing to increased courtloads and delay in both civil and criminal courts
(see for example, Rogers, 1981). Yet, with some signiﬁcant exceptions, legal
aid services in Australia have not followed the activist path so effective in the
United States (and it is precisely that activism which has caused them to be
subjected to strenuous attacks from (the Reagan Administration (see Graycar,
1981). Nor is it likely that future years will see an expansion of these services
in Australia, at least in the sense of more government money being made avail-
able for them. If legal aid services are to continue to play a substantial role in
enhancing the access of their clients to justice, then they must focus their
attentions and their limited resources on those strategies which have the most
potential for broad reaching and effective redress. This will require using a
variety of mechanisms, such as selective use of the courts, media campaigns to
effect law reforms and meaningful community legal education programmes. And
in all of these strategies, a crucial factor will be the ability of the agencies
to identify and to aggregate like claims, so that injustices can be remedied on a
broader scale than is contemplated by the dyadic nature of the dispute resolution
model.
It is here that the aims of C.J.C’s and legal services agencies diverge so
greatly, and their modes of operation threaten to become irreconcilable. Instead
of working through the legal system, using its procedures, rituals and formalities
to attempt to effect some beneﬁcial and lasting change, “community”, or “neigh-
bourhood" justice opts for informality, compromise and accommodation. No
longer is a statutory warranty unwaivable, nor can there be a minimum standard.
In terms of outcomes, all is “up for grabs”.
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Before proceeding to examine C.J.C's more closely, it must here be stated
that it would be unduly optimistic to suggest that legal aid in Australia has to
date been responsible for a range of reforms as far reaching as those which
have occurred in the U.S. There are several reasons for the limitations on what
can be achieved through courts in Australia, and it is beyond the scope of this
comment to discuss them here (for a cogent description of the limits of law in
effecting social change see Sackville, 1978). Even so, both government legal aid
organizations and community legal centres have undertaken important test cases
and other reform-oriented activities which have drawn attention to injustices in,
for example, the social security system, the prison system and the criminal justice
system (see, e.g., Green v. Daniels (1977) I3 A.L.R. 1 (High Court); Lambe v.
Director-General of Social Services (1981) 4 S.S.R. 43 (Federal Court); The
Queen v. Visting Justices at Yumla Labour Prison, ex parte Robinson (198])
95 L.SJ.S. 482 (Full Court, S.A.); MacPhers'on v. The Queen (198]) 55
A.L.J.R. 594 (High.Court).i
Community justice centres cannot aim in these directions. An informal
alternative, such as C.J.C., is precluded, by the nature of the agency, from
having an impact on the plight of the poor or otherwise disadvantaged in any
but the most benign fashion. This is because of the prerequisite of neutrality
which attaches to mediation, which is, after all, a third party role, notwith-
standing the fact that mediation differs markedly, as a process, from adjudica-
tion (see Black, 1981). While voluntariness is a crucial factor in a centre‘s
operation, it is inconceivable that a centre could, or could be seen to, take a
stance on behalf of one party or one group of parties. It is unlikely that case-
loads can be maintained without the utmost faith, on both sides, that the mediators
have no preconceived view of the fairness or equity of outcomes.
A legal centre, on the other hand, through the traditional advocacy role
which ﬂourishes under the adversary system, has no such impediment to adopting
a partisan stance and identifying closely with a party (its client) in attempting
to further that party’s case, whether that be in a court, or elsewhere.
_ Secondly, the individual treatment of each case as an interpersonal dispute
and the diffuse manner in which cases are processed by the centres may obfuscate
what might otherwise be a clear pattern of wrong doing for which collective
attempts at resolution might be the most appropriate form of redress.
For example, a debtor and a money lender" may come to mediate a
dispute where in the course of the session, it appears that an effective interest
rate of 160 per cent per annum has been charged on a (relatively) small cash loan.
The same may be true for several other local residents. The outcome of the particu-
lar mediation may be that the creditor allows a generous time to pay and settles for
a mere 80 per cent effective interest rate. Now insome jurisdictions, such as
Victoria, that would be illegal, and the credit provider might be subject to
prosecution or might forfeit the right to any credit charge (i.e., interest) under
the transaction. Various states in the USA. might in addition impose treble
damages (e.g., Massachusetts). But in New South Wales there appears to be
no regulation of the maximum effective interest rate and the best that the mediator
could do within the third party framework would be to facilitate the lessening
of the burden on the debtor. Neither the mediator, nor the centre would have
any role in pressing for change to the laws governing credit. Redfern Legal
Centre, on the other hand, has conducted a survey of credit providers which has
*This somewhat hypothetical example raises the question of how the centres
determine which cases are, and which are not, appropriate for mediation (see Com-
numity Justice Centres Act 1980, s. 22 (l), and s. 24 (1)).
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revealed marked variations in credit charges. in a media campaign it has publi-
cized these ﬁndings (a press conference was held on l8th January, 1982) and
has not only drawn attention to a large scale problem, and the need for reform
in the consumer credit area, but has also, through this publicity, provided indirect
assistance to many other individuals who would until now have been unaware
that any action could even be contemplated.
Alternatives to the lower criminal courts create additional problems.
Mediation has often been suggested as appropriate in criminal matters, particularly
as a response to the high incidence of assaults and other acts of violence occurring
between parties known to each other (Vera Institute 1977). But the criminal law
and its methods of enforcement are heavily predicated (at least in theory) on
the presumption of innocence, which has as a corollary the rule that the burden
of proof lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of any particular defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt. Only after such proof may a sanction be imposed.
Several commentators have observed the increased potential for state inter-
vention that attaches to such alternatives to the criminal justice system (Snyder,
1978; Hofrichter, 1977, 1982).
Particularly where diversion to community dispute centres occurs in the
early stages of the criminal process, without a trial to determine whether
the defendant has violated the law, there is at least the potential for
applying sanctions without proper concern for due process protection.
(Singer, 1979: 578.)
The threat of criminal prosecution, even in cases where there clearly would
be insuﬂicient evidence to sustain a conviction, might be the clearest possible (if
highly coercive) incentive for a person to accept diversion to a mediation centre.
And, as Dr Tomasic has pointed out in his paper, even the US. oﬁ‘icial evaluators
of the government sponsored neighbourhood justice centre project conceded
the important role played by coercion in maintaining caseloads for the centres.
Other, perhaps more problematic areas involve domestic disputes, whether
between spouses, or between parents and children. One American commentator
noted the tendency of centres to be involved in these latter disputes, and attributed
this to the recent removal of status oﬁencw from the statute books (Snyder
1978: 764). This potential “recriminalization” of juvenile behaviour is a further
example of the exercise of a degree of social control beyond that which the
legislature, if it chose to repeal such “offences”, might consider appropriate.
There are numerous other examples which could be given to demonstrate in-
appropriate, and in some cases, counter-productive uses for C.J.C’s. If any one
single thread is evident, it is that the centres ought to attempt to avoid facilitating
situations where inequality in bargaining power is being endorsed and perpetuated
(if only tacitly) through the mediation process.
An American anthropologist has made the following observation:
Mediated settlements apparently perpetuate rather than counteract
differences in social status . . . Both conﬂicts between equals and
between unequals fall under the rubric ‘on-going social relationships‘
and are considered appropriate for mediation. ‘Yet. this category includes
disputes between relative equals such as neighbours or local small
merchants as well as relative unequals such as a violent husband and an
abused wife or a large merchant and a regular consumer . . . Unless
mediation centres address this problem or decide to deal only with
disputes between equals, they risk serving the weaker parties poorly by
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accommodating their demands with inadequate compensation while in-
hibiting their appeal to courts where they could, at least in theory,
demand a legally just settlement.
(Merry, 1982.)
‘l'hc provision of lawyers for the poor was an attempt to bridge some of that
gap, to overcome a handicap, in order that notwithstanding substantive inequities,
both parties to a (legal) dispute start the race (if only notionally) at the same
time. But by facilitating the parties in formulating their own agreements, without
taking into account the relative positions of the parties, or the appropriateness
of the dispute to the mediation process, C.J.C‘s might be working, unwittingly,
against access to justice.
Several years ago legal aid for the poor was identiﬁed as only the ﬁrst step
in the battle towards access to justice. The second was to be the representation of
diffuse interests (through such devices as public interest law, class actions, etc),
while the third wave focuses “on the full panoply of institutions and devices,
personnel and procedures, used to process, and even prevent, disputes in societies".
It is designated the access to justice approach "because of its overall scope; its
method is not to abandon the techniques of the ﬁrst two waves of reform, but
rather to treat those reforms as but several of a number of possibilities for
improving access” (Cappelletti and Garth 1978: 49).
In 1974, Marc Galanter published an article called, “Why the ‘Haves‘
, Come Out Ahead; Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change”, in which he
described those who engaged in litigation as being positioned somewhere along-a
continuum of “one shotters“ and “repeat players". Very brieﬂy, an individual
poor person was at one extreme; a powerful corporation which frequently engaged
in litigation at the other. Clear advantages accrued to the repeat player by
systematic engagement in litigation; these include a reduction in transaction costs
and the ability to litigate with a view to elfecting changes in rules, rather than
one-olT outcomes etc. It was Galanter‘s View that the only hope for one shotters,
within that system, was to organize into groups in order that the aggregation of
claims could serve as a focus of political strategy and potential empowerment.
Collective action of this kind, even without, in Australia, a device for the bringing
of class action. suits may really assist low income clients within a “legal" context.
Yet at a time when the resources appear ready to be mustered, delegalization
has become a preferred mode. As Galanter has more recently pointed out:
[Llaw is turned to increasingly to solve problems just when faith in
law as an autonomous body of learning declines; judicial activism is
most intense as we move away from adjudication as a typical way of
doing business in courts; as there is increasing reliance on legal institu-
tions, distinctive legal modes of decision-making give way to discretion
and bargaining.
' (Galanter. 1980: 19.)
Conclusion
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that the C.J.C‘s programme he
immediately dismantled and that all disputes henceforth be channelled into the
nearest court. On the contrary. the criticisms which have for so long been
directed at courts, and which have partially spawned this genuine attempt to
ﬁnd alternatives to a system which does not work in the interests of all partici-
pants. are as valid now as they ever have been. But community justice centres
are not, and cannot be perceived as, a panacea for an ailing court system. If the
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third wave of the access to justice movement is to be effective, then alternative
mechanisms must take a complementary position Within the justice system.
Hopefully, they can supplement that system without proving counter-productive
to other access to justice efforts. Rather than endorsing their existence over-
whelmingly and uncritically, members of the legal services community should
welcome them as a limited alternative forum which might bean appropriate
place to which clearly deﬁned cases might be referred.
The parameters within which community justice centres should operate,
if they survive the statutory sunset, should be clearly delineated. Community
justice centres, if conﬁned to dealing with disputes between parties equal In
bargaining power who are not being subjected to a greater degree of social
control than they might otherwise be in their dealings with the formal justice
system, and who voluntarily choose to take their grievances to a centre, could
provide a genuinely promising (if somewhat limited) .alternative to adjudication.
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PRESENTATION OF COMMENTARY
Regina Gruycur
There appears to be some concern about the fact that many of us at this
seminar are academics and are commenting from that perspective, so I thought
I would explain how I came to make that somewhat cryptic reference to T-shirts
at the beginning of my comment.
My ﬁrst research activity after being asked to participate in this seminar
was not to go to a library, not to consult books, but instead to rummage through
one of my bottom drawers which contains various items like underwear and old
T-shirts, so that I could ﬁnd the T-shirt which had been printed for the purpose
of the conference that I referred to in my paper, the Second Annual Conference
of the National Association of Independent Legal Services, at which the theme
was “Alternative Dispute Settlement”. The T-shirt had “Support Community
Legal Centres” on the front and “Alternative Dispute Settlement” on the back.
Mr Anderson came to that conference and he talked to members of the legal
services community at some length about the proposal, and there was an over-
whelming amount of support for it from myself and from others who were there,
and from most of the people who were involved in the legal services community
-—a community that basically focuses its attention on those people whose interests
are not adequately served by the conventional justice system. When I was asked
to speak at this seminar, I wondered why it was that two years ago there had
been no criticism at all expressed at the conference. The possibility of incom-
patibility between the aims of people in the legal services community (if there
is such a community) and those who are proponents of alternative dispute
resolution or processing techniques such as Community Justice Centres had not,
as I recall it, been even suggested.
My paper is a discussion of various areas in which I feel there may be some
tension between the aspirations of legal services and the stated aims and opera-
tions of Community Justice Centres. Both of these innovations. if we perceive
them both as innovations, derive from the same problem, i.e.. the unresponsive-
ness of the traditional justice system. Yet they are very different methods. What
legal aid and the legal services community has been attempting to do for people
who could not otherwise afford the cost of legal services is to redress the balance
so as to get them into the process roughly at the same place where those who
can afferd such services start. In other words, it is like a handicap in a race.
The system is the same. In fact, the adversary system is predicated on the
notional equality of both parties and therefore assumes that resources, such as
lawyers are also equally available. At the very least, legal aid serves to prop
up one side of the dispute so as to make the ﬁght. from a procedural point of
view, more fair. The problem with the Community Justice Centre exercise when
one looks at it from that perspective, is that mediation as a process has no
partisan aspect at all. Nor can it perform a partisan function. It would not
be mediation if it did and I am not suggesting that it should, since the value of
mediation. as a process, is the fact that it is impartial. It is something that comes
from outside and is extraneous to a two person relationship. Where that relation-
ship is equal. mediation might well be an effective way of facilitating the airing
of grievances and of bringing about some kind of resolution to a dispute. While
it can provide a mechanism within which two (equal) parties deal with an inter-
personal grievance it cannot bolster one side of the ﬁght. And if it is accepted that
that adjustment in the relative resources of the parties is one of the most im-
portant roles played by the provision of lawyers for people who could not
'otherwise afford them there is a fairly striking incbmpatibility.
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So. what effect does that have on the Community Justice Centres experiment?There has been a fair degree of criticism of C.J.C’s at this seminar and I do
not feel any need to add to that debate. What I am concerned with is thatwhen the policy makers come to writethe legislation (if they do so after thestatutory sunset), the issues ought to be considered from a more dispassionateperspective than that of whether mediation provides a “sympathetic hearing”.I am not sure that a sympathetic hearing is really the most important thing to aperson who needs some kind of binding, formal and determinative ruling of an
institution such as a court which has, and is seen to have, the authority to affectthat person’s personal life. I endorse the comments made by Wendy Faulkes
in her presentation where, in the course of suggesting that workplace disputesmay appropriately be dealt with by mediation, she was very careful to point outthat those that she considered appropriate were those that involved purely .inter—personal disputes between fellow employees. She noted that were those particulardisputes not resolved they might impede the addressing of more fundamentalemployment issues such as those relating to workplace conditions, which requirecollective efforts and involve acute disparities in economic power. Those arethe types of matters that I think are totally inappropriate for mediation.
Mediation may have a good future so long as these issues are addressedcarefully and so long as decisions to invoke the process are made from a fullyinformed basis which subjects the relative bargaining power of the parties toscrupluous examination.
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DISCUSSION PAPER—l
MEDIATION: REVITALIZING AN ANCIENT ART
Charles Foley, B.A., M.S.
Conﬂict Management Psychologist and Mediator
As a psychologist specializing in conﬂict management I am constantly aware
of the educational differences between those trained in the legal sciences and
those who are bchaviourally orientated. The former have an almost religious
dedication to one particular hierarchial system of the management of disputes.
ln this system there has been an authoritarian law and order that has stressed
the adversarial jousting in a forum designed for and by those who are trained
for it. In some respects the proponants of this system of rubrics, rituals, formalities
and procedures are like the churches who believe that theirs is the only way.
Indeed the ideal of legality is promoted by the most outspoken opponents of
alternative forms of dispute resolution who insist that this particular ideal of
legality is an almost indispensable part of the dominant culture. Olde English
concepts of what constitutes Justice are defended with quotations and citations
while the skills of argumentation are employed to cast aspersions on all but the
sanctioned and sanctiﬁed way of hauling people before deciders.
Psychologists, sociologists, and other behavioural science graduates are con-
stantly trying their hardest to keep relationship types of disputes from going to
the adjudication process. When anthropologists stopped looking at ancient bones
and started looking at how real people in real life dealt with conﬂict they
discovered various methods of which law and order by adjudication was only
one of many. Indeed it is probably the most successful one for dealing with the
stranger and the terrible criminal and for the complex business dealings in an
enculturated society like ours but it isn‘t the only way for every dispute. When
attention was turned to how Americans resolved disputes, as a diverse culture,
the labor management collectively bargained agreement was carefully observed,
as was the mediated international agreement. As China opened its doors to
Western eyes and its thousands of years of mediated settlement was seen, many
,social scientists began to realize that dispute processing is an art that could be
utilized in interfamilial and intrafamilial disputes. The women's liberation move-
ment swept through the land and archaic divorce laws were overturned and made
more humane. Agreement on property and child decisions were encouraged and
the courts sought to take some aspects of sexual relationships out of the domain
of the judiciary. The American Bar Association sought to assist the movement to
the alternative forums in various ways. Family lawyers especially welcomed the use
of mediation and conciliation to their courts and are generally adapting to the
trend.
All this isn't to say that mediation doesn‘t have its difﬁculties. It is surely a
healthy sign that there are so many arguments pro and con in this ﬁeld as
evidenced by learned papers pointing out problem areas. How mediation is to be
institutionalized in the Australian society will have a great deal to do with how
open each side is to the opinions and criticisms of the opposing position. In a
sense the fate of mediation is being mediated by means of the interaction of
participants at a seminar such as this.
What then is mediation? Deﬁnitions abound and not one dictionary or
mediator agrees exactly with another on this question. It used to be very routinely
lumped with arbitration. Whatever the parties couldn’t mediate the arbitrator
arbitrated. Today it is almost as routinely seen as' a forum of conciliation. In
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reality it is a unique form that has the elements of both of these. Australians are
somewhat disadvantaged when it comes to the use of mediation as a conﬂict
resolution tool because it is so rarely publicly utilized in national industrial
disputes. Nevertheless it can be deﬁned as an extension of negotiation or bargain-
ing. Urban living has reduced the opportunities for interpersonal barter and
negotiation for most of us thanks to the one price system but most people do
get some practice in this skill to a greater or lesser degree. Not all those practicing
in the courts get a feel for negotiating but many do. For the negotiator who is
unable to effectively deal with the adversary there are three several general
dispute processing alternatives; (s)he can go to a decider, go to another non-
deciding party neutral, or, forget the whole thing and take the avoidance or
continued conﬂict paths of self help. Mediation is an extra curial, extra legal
process that is highly personalized as to the disputants and as to the mediator(s).
The same type of neutrality and lack of partial bias is expected from a mediator
as is expected from a judicial decider. Conciliators can be and quite often are
partial and biased. Mediators help the parties come to a formalized often written
statement of rules for their future interaction. Guilt or innocence in the past
is not as important to the disputants as is the cessation of the hostilities and the
mutual agreement in a self enforcing agreement. Contracts that are drawn up by
the parties in America are usually enforceable in the courts. Mediation is the
establishment of a social contract between the parties with the mediator acting
as a sort of paralegal convenor. All of this is usually conducted on neutral
territory by agreement of the parties and is most often done at a table. The
setting for this form of dispute resolution is not the same as for conciliation which
is far less formal by deﬁnition, whilst arbitration has more formality and is the
next logical step in the continuum.
The question that is usually asked whenever a dispute arises is how can this
particular disagreement be most effectively resolved. In a way it depends on the
variables of the conﬂict, the participants, and the options at hand. All too often
the work of justice personnel is to sort out what will be most cost effective in
the short run to a particular budget consideration. Decisions are based on a
variety of other factors. One particular factor that seems to get short shrift is the
social effectiveness. We are all aware that when an angry spouse lays a complaint
and then later refuses to see it through that there are some social effectiveness
considerations going on as well as perhaps some cost effective factors. Police
have decisions to make when deciding if a matter should be pushed through or
conciliated or ignored. Paperwork, promotions, prevailing judicial attitudes.
personal and departmental policy, and so on all affect the actions of the police
ofﬁcer. No system of dispute processing is perfect and this, of course, includes
the mediation method.
If mediation. is to remain as an option for disputes in Australia several who,
what, where, when, and how questions must be answered. Community Justice
Centres are one generic way. I think that the Attorney Generals office has acted
wisely in allowing each of the pilot Centres to develop individualized procedures.
I am not sure however that all future mediation programmes are best placed
within or close to the “justice” system. One Sydney suburb has had a mediation
centre operating for a similar period of time as the state programmes. It operates
on far less money as part of a municipal government centre. As far as I can see
from the Sydney University early evaluation and from an interview I conducted
with the administrative supervisors it has the approximate same statistical success
as those we are discussing here. If we are going to have lengthy arguments about
the word community or neighbourhood or whatever it strikes me that municipal
based programmes are the logical next step. San Francisco has a community
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boards programme that has attracted lots of private funding and much community
approbation and it prides itself on being a true alternative justice body in that it
maintains no ties with the courts or the system. Neighbourhoods plead with. this
type of Ghanaun moot adapted to the city to set up shop in their environs.
This model has its own newspaper which publicises the cases it hears in open
public forum and although I personally have strong reservations about its
workings there can be no doubt that it is a viable grass roots attempt at dispute
resolution. in San Jose, California, alone there are several different types of
mediation programmes operating. The. Bar Association operates a small claims
mediation» and arbitration project in conjunction with the court. The County
operates a Mediation and Conciliation Services programme that takes cases from
the District Attorney, Sheriff, local police. agencies and from any source. The
city of San Jose and many of its suburbs operate mediation and arbitration
landlord tenant dispute programmes. Some of these include fact ﬁnding (enquiry)
procedures as well. Each County Superior Court has a mediation component and
there are consumer mediation programmes operating at the university level for
students and town residents. Since mediation has become an accepted way of
conﬂict resolution in the parts of the US. with which I am most familiar the use
of private mediators, church connected conciliators and mediators, special
women’s paralegal mediatrix services and various other operations are springing
up everywhere. Mediation. organizations have been formed to network and share
information. Several universities are now offering interdisciplinary studies in
conﬂict theory, conﬂict management, dispute processing research, legal and
psychological joint studies, etc. A few universities at masters level are offering
professionals degrees in Conﬂict Resolution and some are maintaining conﬂict
centres to further aid students in this search for answers to the controversial
questions that the renewed applications of this ancient art brings to modern
society.
As a mediator, arbitrator, and conﬂict management consultant 1 would like
to offer several proposals. Let various types of academic disciplines including
Law, Psychiatry, Psychology, Criminology, Business, Sociology, Anthropology,
etc., form an, association dedicated to the proper application of all forms of
alternative dispute processing. Let this body hold monthly or quarterly dis-
cussions on the topics of comment and controversy that have been so ably raised
in this seminar and let those discussion meetings be transcribed and disseminated
for critical comment and scrutiny. Further, I propose that a university department
be set up that will train professional dispute resolvers at the masters level, with
this conﬂict management school destined to be a precursor of a National Academy
of Conﬂict Settlement. Let the university courses be conducted in conjunction
with conﬂict centres that solicit various disputes from the general populace and
from the Uni’s dormitories, staff, etc. Let negotiation, Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration be offered to be performed by student trainees and to be researched
by the interdisciplinary instructional staff. Let these and other conﬂict resolution
centres be evaluated by non legally trained people as well as by those with a
legal education. Let municipal councils, consumer affairs and others be assisted
also in the development and attainment of these objectives. It should be noted
that the Australian Association of Conﬂict Management is in its intentional stage
of formation. Enquiries and input as well as assistance with implementation are
encouraged and actively sought.
Lastly, the Australian tendency toward “Hyperconfrontus” in interpersonal
and intergroup disagreements has a possibility of lessening as a direct result of a
trickle effect as more and more conﬂict managers are trained and functioning.
The US. and Canadian experience has shown that there is a greater tolerance
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and a greater need for neutral third party mechanisms among the populace, and
this is especially true in times of economic adjustment. When the Australian
bi-centennial celebrations begin in 1988 it is possible that Australia could be
well and truly nicknamed the Continent of Peace due to the inevitable surge of
interest in mediation and other forms of agreement enhancement. My fondest
hope is that I may, as a newly arrived immigrant to these shores, help to serve
the. cause of peaceful dispute processing throughout Australia.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Charles Foley
As a non-lawyer, I think that the best that I can do is tell you a little bit
about my background. In 1976, I went to the Dorchester Urban Court Pro-
gramme in answer to an advertisement—an advertisement like the one that Wendy
Faulkes put in the paper asking for volunteer mediators. I became a volunteer
media-tor, got certiﬁcation and got trained. I think training is exceptionally
important and l allude to even university training in my paper.
Dr Tomasic's book has in it Professor William Felstincr’s and Lynne
Williams‘ evaluation of the Dorchester Urban Court Programme—I was one of
the research people acknowledged in the article. I have therefore evaluated
programmes. While I was there my cat got killed by my neighbour‘s dog, and
I brought this dispute to the mediators who didn‘t know me. So I participated
in my ﬁrst mediation as -a disputant. I don’t know how many of you at this
seminar have participated in a mediation but I have now participated in three
of them. I came out of there not getting any sort of justice at the courts. They
told memy dead cat was worth $5 if it had been sold for research which didn‘t
help me. My roommates wanted to poison the $500 dog, but it was mediated to
my satisfaction. Time payments were allowed, it was a bi-Iingual mediation and
it was cross cultural including somebody who came from a system of govern-
ment which did not believe in the adversarial system but believed in the inquisi-
torial system. This is one of the reasons why many people in our ethnic com-
munity 'are happy with mediation because they are used to judges asking questions
of people rather than having a mouthpiece ask the questions for them.
I went on to be asked to start up a mediation programme in California. I
did so and I set them all up over the western part of the United States. I have
been a Director of a mediation programme, both~a government one like these
types of systems here and a private one.
In the two other mediations that I was a disputant, one was between my
landlord and myself when they took away the laundry services. In San Jose,
California, they do have landlord mediation and it is amenable, especially if
it is combined with arbitration. Mediation, some of the newspapers say, cannot
be used in circumstances like that. My landlord was far more powerful than I
was. He said that he had every right to take away laundry services even though
it meant that [had to spend extra money and it was an increase in my rent
and its equivalent. Through mediation we came to a compromise and a settle-
ment. The last mediation I was involved in was a relationship breakup after
8 years of what we call a “living together arrangement" (L.T.A.). Not only
was my L.T.A. mate a mediator and an arbitrator like I was, which made it
difﬁcult, but all three of us, the two women mediators and myself. my mate.
we all wanted to make sure everything was real friendly and we video taped it
in the interests of history. It is too painful for us to look at.
I have experienced the legal process, also, and if you look at certain types of
disputes you look at “higher" and “lower" as we are always taught to look in
courts rather than looking “linear“—-—a|ong a continuum. You will see that some
disputes do not‘Iit well. Some disputes can be negotiated between me and the
other person, when that doesn’t work you bring in a coneiliator. when that
doesn’t. work you bring in a mediator, if that doesn’t work you ask for a fact
finder, and if that doesn’t work you keep moving along the continuum, not to
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something “higher” than mediation but something that is just as good as. Media-
tion' is not some new fangled idea—they have been doing it for thousands of
years in China.
There are probably more lawyers at this seminar than there are in all of
China with a billion people. We owe a lot to anthropology in the mediation
movement. It is also used very successfully in labour management even though
Regina Graycar might disagree with the use of collective bargaining in Australia.
She alludes in her paper to “Hyperlexis” in the United States—“hyperlexis”
means an excess of using law to resolve disputes. I coined a phrase in my
paper “hyperconfrontus” for Australia, “confrontus” means “striking behaviour”
' which I thought was aptly descriptive. ' '
. There are Federal mediation and conciliation services in the United States
and Canada. Mediation works at the industrial dispute level. It is part of the
continuum that goes up through arbitration into adjudication and then into
legislation and thence perhaps into revolution.
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MEDIATION: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS—RESEARCH ON WOMEN
IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION
‘ Linda Fisher, B.A., Dip.Ed.
Rosalind Cuthbert, B.Sc.(Arch), Dip.Ed.
Mediators, Surry Hills Community Justice Centre
One of the factors emerging from the pilot project is the acceptance of
mediation as a way of dispute resolution in which women play an active part.
As part of an unfunded research project that needs more time for its
investigations, we have been looking at women in a great range of disputes as
integral members of a community, rather than simply in their disputes with their
spouses in. a dependent relationship. In investigating the sex of the disputants in
mediation, it appears that at least half of the presenting parties and most active
disputants are women. These ﬁgures are not representative of the court of petty
sessions, where the disputants and decision makers are predominantly male. The
fact that women are choosing mediation as a means of dispute resolution indicates '
that they feel comfortable in taking part in resolving their own disputes. While
it is obvious that they don’t take part in court actions, they are not intimidated
by mediation, as they are by the court procedures.
It has been mentioned that mediators are matched to disputes and disputants.
One of the factors in this matching is that women mediators present a point of
identiﬁcation for women disputants; women are able to identify and feel com-
fortable with the system of resolution and more willing to participate in the
process. For example a dividing fence dispute that comes before the court is
normally contested by Mr X and Mr Y, whereas it seems from our research
that the most active disputant in a mediation is most often women. Further,
women are totally involved in formulating agreements which take account of
their needs: Agreements they can live by, and with.
In amediation we have a look at a number of issues and problems rather
than just a single presenting dispute. Many of these issues are ones which the
courts would never address and yet they are the sorts of things that many lie at
the core of the conﬂicts between people. Here, the dividing fence dispute between
Mr X and Mr Y turns out to be a much larger arena of conﬂict where both
women and men are motivated by class or racial differences, language or com—
munication diﬂicultics and misunderstandings, a hostile physical environment.
ﬁnancial hardships, loneliness and isolation as well as a range of very real "trivial"
complaints: About noise, trees, barking dogs, etc. All these ditferences may
need to be aired or settled before the fence dispute can be satisfactorily resolved
for both parties. '
Disputes between two wemen ﬁgure quite prominently in cases at all
centres—what happened to these disputes in the past? Are they fobbcd oll‘
at court level, or police level, or do they simply smoulder away? These again
may be disputes that the courts consider too trivial: Mediation has handled
disputes between women over the broad spectrum of issues which affect women‘s
daily lives from property ownership to diﬁﬁculties with children, isolation and the
problems of living in an urban environment. Commonly, these people have
approached a number of agencies including police and courts who have been
unable to resolve‘their problems.
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It appears that women are accepting mediation rather than the more
competitive adversary‘system of justice. It is more accessible to women and is a
more satisfactory way of meeting women‘s particular needs in many areas of
dispute. A model of conﬂict resolution by mediation, based on co-operative effort
and self-reliance or responsibility, will no doubt elicit a familiar response from
the male dominated traditional justice model. Accusations of Community Justice
Centres being an ineffective soft option or a second rate court will no doubt be
heard; the profession will deplore our methods as insufﬁciently rigorous, in-
suﬂiciently discriminatory and constituting a lowering of the male standards.
Preliminary research indicates that mediation is proving to be a viable alternative.
Perhaps it is one step towards alleviating the individual powerlessness of women.
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Clive Graham, M.A., M.Ed.Admin., Dip.Ed.
Head of Special Sciences,
N.S.W. Technical and. Further Education;
Member of N.S.W. Co—ordinating Committee
Dr Tomasic‘s paper details a number of aspects regarding the appropriate-
ness of justice centres in the settlement of disputes. He reprimands the advocates
of the N.S.W. C.J.C. pilot project for failing to account for these aspects and, in
consequence, for being optimistic about the C..l.C’s. Indeed, he challenges the
very concept of community justice centres in justice reform.
My concern centres upon the restricted nature of research on US. justice
centres available to Dr Tomasic and upon which he bases his arguments regarding
the demerits of justicecentnes generally. The constraint of relevant available
data is apparent when. one considers the possible variations of US justice centres
and their outcomes in relation to a summary about justice centres generally.
In short, 1 basically disagree with Dr Tomasic that the justice centre movement
has become suﬁicicntly institutionalized to dCl'lVC a consensus of assumptions
about justice centres for an overall examination of them based on selected studies
‘which focus upon limited types of US. justice centres. (See Tomasic, 1980,
p. [0.)
The variety of aims, methodologies, structures and outcomes among the
estimated 120 U.S. justice centres (McGillis) is acknowledged by many analysts.
(See McGillis, 1982, p. 5; Singer, 1979, pp. 10 and 12; Tomasic, 1980, p. 10,
for example.) Dr Daniel McGillis and the Centre for Criminal Justice, Harvard
University, proposes the foundations of a structure for the analysis of the varia-
tions in philosophies, goals and operations of US. justice centres according to
the following criteria: 1. The- types of disputes processed, 2. project sponsorship,
3. case referral sources, 4. dispute settlement techniques used, and 5. hearing
ofﬁcer characteristics (McGillis, 1982, p. 8), and to which I add 6. nature and
enforceability of agreement. If one accepts a minimum of three internal variables
for each of the above six categories of diversity (although McGillis identities
more), then the impact of any project is dependent upon up to 816 possible
combinations of characteristics. My point here is that of the 120 acknowledged
U.S. justice centres, no [we need be the same.
In his paper Dr Tomasic acknowledges a preference for the studies of
Felstiner and Williams and of Davis to the study of Cook er «1 regarding justice
centres. When one considers the background discussion to the “eighteen impossible
expectations" of section 3 of Dr Tomasic’s'paper as referred by him (Tomasic,
1980). it is apparent that Dr Tomasic’s arguments against justice centres generally
are founded heavily upon the Felstiner/ Williams and Davis studies.
But how appropriate are these studies to the conclusions that Dr Tomasic
draws? To which of the abovementioned hypothetical but possible 816 varieties
of justice‘centres do these studies focus upon? How appropriate are these studies
to an assessment of the N.S.W. C.J.C. Pilot Project?
The Felstiner/Williams evaluation of the Dorchester Centre focuses upon
a justice centre that is court based, that deals with a variety of criminal and
civil matters and the agreements of which are legally binding and may be in lieu
of a court sentence. The Davis evaluation assesses the Brooklyn Centre which
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deals with major criminal matters—including feloneous assault and rape, is a
court based system and where agreements, which are arbitrated fully or in part,
are legally binding.
The applicability, then, of these studies to the N.S.W. C.J.C. Pilot Project is
tenuous. The N.S.W. Community Justice Centres do not deal with criminal cases,
their major single case load appears to walk-in, arbitration is not employed, and
the agreements are not legally binding.
Dr Tomasic might well have derived a set of arguments disposed to the
establishment of justice centres in N.S.W. had he employed different U.S. studies
(viz., Cook, et al).
So with reference to my own selected documentation 1 shall brieﬂy redress
the imbalance posited by Dr Tomasic relevant to the operation of community
justice centres in N.S.W.
I propose that mediation, though derived from simpler societies, may be
applicable to modern industrial society as a dispute settlement procedure if we
experiment with suitable adaptions of the process. The work of Danzig and
Lowy advocate research on the mediation process as the critical variable in
modern day justice centres (Danzig and Lowy, 1975 p. 689). Legal analysts
to date appear reluctant to pursue this line of enquiry just as they refuse to
acknowledge the possibility of a broader, redeﬁned concept of community in
which the modern individual of industrial society operates. (See Dr Tomasic‘s
disposal of the global theory based on Felstiner 1974 and Merry 1982 on
pages 64 and 65, for example.)
With reference to the much repeated fear that justice centres create “a form
of second class justice for blacks, women and the poor", (Dr Tomasic’s paper
page 59, for example), Dr McGillis stated to the [979 US. Senate Hearing on
Access to Justice:
. . . Coram, New York, . . . is a suburban program and the people
who are the clientele span a very wide range of socio-economic back-
grounds. So I think that in a few cases projects have been used primarily
by poverty stricken people, but it’s not necessary that that be the case.
(US. Senate, p. 17.)
I note, too, that private centres exist in the US. where fees are charged
of clients who can afford to pay and who do not regard the mediation/arbitration
service as second class. ‘
With reference to the quality of justice associated with justice centres, I
propose that it is necessary to assess the particular mediation process in operation
at a particular centre in order to form an opinion about the inherent quality of
justice at that centre. What may operate at one centre cannot be generalized
to all centres. I reject Dr Tomasic’s assertion that mediation ignores the complexity
of personal communication (see p. 63) rather, the training process in N.S.W.
focuses upon it. I also argue that the power relationship between disputants
during mediation can be equalized when the mediators apply the skills learned
in the N.S.W. training. Perhaps Talbot D’Alemberte, the representative of the
American Bar Association to the US. Senate Hearing on Access to Justice, is
best quoted here. He said: '
You asked a moment ago whether there was a lower quality of justice
in alternative mechanisms, and I would respond by saying that I think
we really have to listen to the experts that run these programs—people
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who are willing to go out and talk about how good the quality really is.
Lanood Slayton, a young attorney running the Atlanta neighbourhood
justice center, is one such person. 1 earlier asked him the question you
asked a moment ago and he said, in terms of quality, when these
programs work they are better than the small claims courts or the
traditional court processes, because they provide a solution to many
problems that the courts just simply can’t provide.
(US. Senate p. 18.)
With reference to Dr Tomasic's connection between case load and coercion
in justice centres (see p. 58), if the justice centre is designed to be court based
-—as in Dorchester and Brooklyn—then the connection will naturally apply. 1
. note that walk-ins predominate at other U.S._ justice centres including the Venice
Mar Vista NJ.C. (Cook et a1.) ’ . ‘
My brief comments above serve to demonstrate a more optimistic perspective
of justice centres than Dr Tomasic provides in his paper, though elsewhere Dr
Tomasic states:
It is desirable that this mediation experimentation not be halted . . .
it seems that mediation will continue to play an important part in
dispute processing . . . Mediation should not therefore be dismissed
. . . but . . . should be looked at closely to assess the range of other
applications that it may have in the ﬁeld of dispute processing.
(Tomasic 1980 p. 60.)
Well, I believe that is what is being done in the N.S.W. C.J.C. Pilot Project
where the emphasis is on an extension of the N.S.W. justice system rather than
upon an alternative to the N.S.W. judicial system. It is a unique project stimulated
in part by optimistic data regarding some US. justice centres . . . data from
which the US. National Centre for State Courts concluded:
We appear to be moving inevitably in the direction of a drastically
revised system of dispute resolution—a justice system more than a
judicial system—and one in which non-judicial forums will occupy
an important place.
' (cited McGillis, 1982, pp. 34—5)
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DISCUSSION
Regina Graycar
Mr Foley mentioned that he was involved in the Dorchester Urban Court
programme in Boston, which is a programme with which I am familiar. One
of the people who undertook a preliminary evaluation of the Dorchester project
noted something of potential concern in view of comments made at this seminar
which indicate that children are being sent to Community Justice Centres from
the children’s courts in New South Wales. In Dorchester it was discovered that
children were being sent to Community Justice Centres at a time when status
offences had only recently been removed from the statute books, i.e., when the
law could no longer regulate young people by imposing upon them sanctions
based only on the fact of their status as young people. These matters, though
removed from the courts‘ jurisdiction, were once again subject to control, this
time by Justice Centres to whom the parent could refer them if they disapproved
of their children‘s behaviour. I think that that is another example of the
“re-legalization” of various activities that informal justice can bring about which
demonstrates a further intervention of State control into areas where the State
has, by its own legislative choice, removed its reach through delegalization or
decriminalization.
I also had personal experience of mediation in the United States, not as a
party to a mediation but as a mediator in a small claims court in Quincy.
Massachusetts. Quincy is a small town not far from Boston, and Massachusetts
has passed a statute giving all small claims litigants a right to, have their cases
mediated prior to hearing. This fact was announced by the Clerk of the Court
every Friday, which was “small claims" day in that court. There was always
a large number of people in the courtroom, though as is common in a small
claims jurisdiction, most cases were dealt with by default. After the majority
of cases had been disposed of in this fashion, those litigants who remained were
given a speech spoken so fast that nobody could understand a word of it, the
basic thrust of which was that they had a right to have their cases mediated.
They were sent off to discuss their claims with one of the mediators. Occasionally
people said to me that they didn’t want «to see a mediator but preferred their
case to go to hearing. This caused somewhat of a problem because no judges
had showed up in court that day! And that brings me to my second point, which
is that Mr Anderson pointed out earlier that there was always a right to have a
case heard before a court since mediation was just an option. I hope that in
New South Wales if legislation is introduced to formalize mediation, the option
to bring a case before the court will remain, because small claims judges in
Quincy, Massachusetts, didn‘t feel that there was any need for them to go to
court ever.
Kevin Anderson
Let me correct what I think is a misapprehension by Regina. Graycar about
Community Justice Centres and Children’s Courts. When that was mentioned
earlier Children’s Courts were being spoken of in the context of the family law
case, i.e., custody of or access to children, not juvenile offenders.
Paul Stein, President, Anti-Discrimination Board, New South Wales
I speak as a person that has observed the development of the Community
Justice Centre project since its inception in this State through to the present
time, so to that extent I have been involved as an observer rather than as a
participant. I must say that in reading the papers and commentaries presented
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to this seminar I am somewhat surprised that in this country of ours whatever
the issue, whatever initiative is raised, however it is done, we become a nation
of “knockers". (Keith Dunstan wrote a book called Knoekers which it is always
worthwhile rereading.)
This particular project is not something that has been foisted on us through-
out the State, at enormous expense to taxpayers, without any thought, by faceless
bureaucrats; quite the reverse, it has been a carefully prepared and structured
pilot project with a Co—ordinating Committee that is as representative as you
could get of the various sectors of the community who might become involved.
It has small staffs of expert people who have had a life with community contact.
I am not particularly interested in discussing the semantics of the word “com-
munity“—l think it is irrelevant to this seminar. It does not matter what you call
it, we know what the Justice Centres are attempting to do. Some of the criticism
that has been made has been less than constructive. In fact. 1 think that much
of the criticism comes from a misapprehension of what Community Justice
Centres are about and what they are actually doing or trying to do. Let me just
consider some of the points that have been mentioned in the papers very brieﬂy.
Firstly. there is a suggestion that we have just “done it again”—gone and
copied what they have got in the US, and look, we are falling on our faces!
That is a lot of tommy-rot. It is impossible to copy what they have done in the
US. because they have done all sorts of dil’ferent things in justice centre
situations. There are enormous variations in the types of justice centres there.
We have. not done that at all in New South Wales. We have had the beneﬁt of
looking at what has been going on in the US, of their successes and their
failures. We have devised as a pilot project only, as an experiment, centres that
it is thought by the Committee are suitable for New South Wales and that, of
course, will vary between suburbs, between the country and the city. We have
set up'three pilot centres which are dill‘erent in their nature and somewhat
dill‘crent in the way they have gone about things. And then we have my friend.
John. Basten, saying that he rejects the idea of an independent evaluation by the
Law Foundation for no other reason than other institutions such as the Supreme
Court and the Equal Opportunity Tribunal are not similarly evaluated. I notice
he did not include the Redfcrn- Legal Centre and the University of New South
Wales in those institutions.
Secondly, we have Dr Tomasic, and to a lesser extent John Basten, telling
us that the C.J.C’s are some very devious government invention, a diversionary
tactic, that are foisted upon us so that we will ignore all that is wrong with the
lower courts, and will legitimize non-action on reform of the criminal courts.
If he really thinks that, he has, it seems to me, an extraordinary idea of the
processes of government in this State. If he had any knowledge at all of how
governments work he would know that that is a lot of nonsense.
The next argument is that it is a sort of “secret police", e.g., “Oh, this
creeping [apparatus of mediators—they are coming into our homes, they are
going to extend the State apparatus into the community like tentacles that are
going to get inside our heads“. That we know is a lot of nonsense.
Then. there is the “second class justice“ argument. I think that Kevin
Anderson and Michael Morahan really answered that. Anybody who has been
around Petty Session Courts knows that they can't solve “backyarders”. It does
not matter what resources are thrown into them, how much legal aid on each
side (and sometimes there are more than two sides). such cases take an
inordinate amount of time to hear and are always conﬁned to a particular
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assault or incident when one knows there has been a background history.
They cannot be solved by conventional legal systems in the lower courts, so we
are told to “ﬁx up” the lower courts. I would like somebody to tell us how we
do it to effectively deal with “backyarders”. So far nobody has come up with
any alternative proposal, and let me suggest that, if there is one, it will throw
aside the adversary system that we are told is to be preserved in these situations
so that there can be an equality of bargaining power between unequal disputants.
But let me also warn you that if a suitable way of doing it can be achieved, then
it is going to cost an absolute fortune and certainly far more than it costs on
the ﬁgures shown for the disputes before the C.J.C’s.
It has never been suggested the C.J.C’s are an alternative to Community
Legal Centres. In fact, Community Legal Centres seem to work side by side
with them and refer lots of clients to them. Again, some of the speakers assume
a very poor quality of mediator who cannot adjust an inequality between the
disputants.
Community Justice Centres were never designed to attack the inequalities
in our society, nor can they, nor can they be seen as counter-productive to such
issues.
In his paper Dr Tomasic was critical that many immigrants go to C.J.C’s
and that it is a terrible thing that the government is actually encouraging
immigrants to go to these centres. The fact that immigrants are going in large
numbers and participating in these centres, and often in cross cultural disputes, is
to be welcomed, certainly not criticized.
Lastly, from Regina Graycar’s paper: she said Community Justice Centres
should not be seen as a panacea for an alternative justice system. With that I
completely agree. It was never intended to be.
David Brown, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of N.S.W.
I would just like to make two points of a general nature, and reply to
Paul Stein.
The standard charge of critics that you are just a “bunch of knockers" is not
very helpful. Nor is it very helpful to restate arguments that people have deﬁned
in detail in their papers and then declare simply that they are a “load of nonsense.”
I do not ﬁnd that a very constructive form of debate.
My two main points are ﬁrstly, that I would applaud Kevin Anderson‘s
statement: “In thirty-ﬁve years on the Bench in this State I have not seen many
examples of ﬁrst-class justice in cases of this sort”. I think that it is unfortunate
the way critics have attempted to formulate what are important and legitimate
criticisms, in terms of. the slogan “Access to Justice", which reifys the role
of the courts as providers or “dispensers" of “justice”. I suggest that by and
large the role of the court is not to "provide justice" but, as Roman Tomasic
suggests in his paper, to back up, administer and superintend class rule in a
society predicated not only, as Regina Graycar says, on the unequal distribution
of wealth but also on the unequal production and generation of wealth inherent
in the capitalist social order. '
My second point is that the basic principle of evaluation in relation to the
Community Justice Centres, I suggest, should be the extent to which they
empower both the individual disputants and the sexual, racial or class strata from
which they come. That is the extent to which there is an actual increase in
self reliance and self help; the extent to which the Centres could possibly become
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agents of a'dual power alternative to and challenging of ofﬁcial and State appar-
atuses; as against the extent to which C.J.Cs become‘ yet another institution in the
increasingly sophisticated and differentiated network of social control, an increas-
ingly ﬁne mesh that is added to the web of State intervention and interference.
Despite the structural criticisms that Roman Tomasic, John Basten, and
Regina Graycar have mentioned (which I think are very strong), at this stage
my suggestion would be that it is not clear that Community Justice Centres are
inherently merely additions to the State coercive apparatus. I suggest that it is
still an empirical question. It is still open to struggle. Certainly the notion of
mediation within a capitalist social framework tends to atomize, to conﬁne
disputes to the immediate parties. It does have a defusing effect. But 1 suggest
that currently it is still contradictory. It is still an area of struggle and 1 hope
that at least certain of the C.J.C‘s could break out of these narrow shackles of
mediation and extend their role to that of community activists struggling against
the powerful—against the local landlords, against the employers, against councils.
against the patriarchy in general, against advertisers, against statutory authorities.
against the State apparatus in its manifold forms, against governments. and
against the class system itself.
Susan Armstrong, Ombudsman‘s Ofﬁce
I think we have a few too many lawyers here, because it seems to me that
underneath all the adversarial rhetoric there is actually a fair amount of unanimity
on what Community Justice Centres can and should do. If you expect that they
can reduce inﬂation, solve unemployment and eliminate inequality, the answer
is that, of course, they can’t and it is very dangerous to let them try. But 1 think
it is very unfair of Roman Tomasic to erect a whole stable of straw horses, based
on activities which the Community Justice Centre movement has never endea-
voured to do, and then proceed to knock them over. 'I do accept that there was a
certain'amount of loose talk among politicians as to what you might expect of
Community Justice Centres. There is always a certain amount of loose talk among
politicians. But I think that the goals that have been set by the people working the
Centres are very clear, and they relate to a very defined group of problems which
Paul Stein has called “backyarders”.
After four years‘of working in legal aid, I can say that one of the greatest
frustrations that we faced was the fact that we simply could not help an enormous
number of the people who came to our offices. These were people with problems
with their neighbours—arguments over why the next door neighbour’s tree leaves
were falling on to their driveway, whether or not the fence was of an appropriate
standard and went around the turnip patch properly, whether the neighbour‘s
children were committing unwarranted dcpredations and were excessively noisy;
whether or not the $300 chest of drawers belonging to one person had been
loaned or sold to the other person, whether or not somebody‘s daughter ought
to be allowed to paint her room black, and so on. Now, those are not trivial
disputes. They can make the lives of the people who are caught up in them
absolutely miserable. But on the other hand, it is obvious that no legal system can
cope with that kind of dispute in a court. It is.ridiculous to expect that legal
aid could be extended to them. If more money is available for legal aid, then
it would be spent on matters which were of far more signiﬁcance in overall
terms and where the results to be gained were far more rewarding. The overworked
staff of legal aid agencies simply have neither the time nor the skills to devote
the time that is necessary to sit down with those people, to give them a hearing,
to listen to their problems and try and sort something out.
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I would support Regina Graycar‘s view that it is necessary to really sit down
and deﬁne what Community Justice Centres are endeavouring to achieve, and
how they ﬁt in with the justice system generally. But in relation to that class of
disputes there is a desperate need for the Centres. 1 think it is very important
that they be given a chance to prove whether or not they can be effective.
Don. Weatherburn, Lecturer, Justice Administration, Mitchell College of Advanced
Education
There is an accusation been put up that I have heard so often that always
frightens me that I am forestalling the coming revolution, and that was the one
by Jehn Basten that, in fact, by supporting Community Justice Centres we are
doing a “band aid” job on structural inequities in society. I just wonder what
sort of evidence he can draw on to support that allegation, that, in fact, Com-
munity Justice Centres are acting in a very special way to forestall peoples‘
grievances which are of a general social kind that might otherwise lead to the
revolution we all happily look forward to.
Harry Hall, Mediator, Redfern C.J.C.
There have been some very provocative remarks at this seminar, and I
choose to believe that they are in the spirit of debate. I am impressed with the
depth of thought expended in preparing the papers and I feel that it is very
easy from an academic point of view to either oversimplify or build in com-
plexities. However, if we as a community only accept idealistic systems when
dealing with each other and our problems then I think that we would do nothing.
1‘ I choose to see mediation as a practical self help programme fulﬁlling a
need in our community. I think that it has got a bright future providing it
can survive the type of formalizing pressures which have been suggested at
this seminar.
Dr Sheila Metcalf, Child Psychiatrist
I would like to ask Wendy Faulkes to expand a little on the information
given about the use of mediation in access cases which normally would go to
the Family Law Court and proceed in a very acrimonius way where the poWer
struggle is often very unequal indeed between the parties. I would like particu-
larly to know if mediation achieves a fairly speedy resolution of this situation
and how often that resolution sticks. I understand there has been no work done
with custody cases but only with access.
Wendy Fmil/(ex
At the Redfern Centre most of the access disputes that we have dealt with
have been referred from the Metropolitan Children’s Court, and these are
disputes between former dc facro relationships which would not normally go to
the Family Court. In normal circumstances we would arrange mediation within
a matter of days because both parties are referred at the same time from the
court and they will both turn up on our doorstep within a day. On occasions,
mediation has been arranged within 24 hours. As to (the resolution of these
types of disputes we ﬁnd that mediation is not always appropriate, but for a
certain number of people it is a reasonable option to try mediation. Maybe
even only as a stop gap measure, but it is something that will give them a chance
to sort out the practical details when the dispute is very bitter, and in some
I
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instances the children have'becn used to punish the other partner. When it is
feasible we also involve the children for part of the mediation so that they know
what is going on and, where it is appropriate, include the new spouses of each
partner, because it is often these people who have part of the responsibility for
maintaining that particular agreement
1 have not the ﬁgures in front of me for the way in which these agreements
are holding, but would certainly be happy to make whatever information available
to you if you contacted us.
As an example, I would like to give a comment from a disputant following
a mediation. In this case the couple had been married and had been through
the Family Court. Things were not working out, they declined to go back to
the Family Court and chose mediation instead. The agreement involved property
division and access arrangements for the children. The response from the ex-
husband was that the property had in fact been divided according to the agree-
ment, but the access arrangements had to some extent broken down, so, in effect.
he was the loser and had come out of it not as well as he might have. _His
comment was that, in his view, they had achieved more in ﬁve hours‘ mediation
than in six days in the Family Court. That is an illustration as to the suitability
of some of these disputes for mediation, but it is up to the disputants to choose
whether they want to try mediation and take responsibility for keeping arrange-
ments because we are not going to enforce it. They will have to. Or alternatively,
whether they want to go to a more formalized system of the courts even with
the agreement they have made or the arrangement they have come to and seek
the help of the court in enforcing it. I think that we can work in conjunction
with the courts in this manner.
Peter Lemon, Research Officer, State Privacy Committee
One of the favourite activities of government institutions it seems to me
is this practice of referral (also known as the “Chiﬂey Square Dance”), and
one of the problems that we confront as a Privacy Committee is that privacy is
a funny sort of animal that can be divided in all sorts of ways. You can divide
it for instance between information privacy which concerns computers, data
banks, credit bureaus, criminal records ofﬁcers, and this other vague area called
“intrusions privacy” where neighbours are staring at each other over the fences
or they are throwing things at each other, watching each other, damaging each
others cars, and so on, which people can sometimes interpret as an invasion
of their privacy. We are not particularly well equipped to mediate in that sort
of situation and it is very helpful to have somewhere to refer those cases. Where
you can say to the person, “Look, I don‘t think we can be a lot of help to you
but if you can just get around a table with a neutral mediator in the middle
maybe you can sort the thing out".
Sergeant 0. Taylor, Police Department. N.S.W.
I have 30 years‘ police experience, and I have spent 25 years in Courts of
Petty Sessions. I believe I speak on behalf of my police colleagues when I say
that the litigants in Courts of Petty Sessions are as frustrated as are the police-
men and the magistrates operating under the existing system of trying to resolve
backyard disputes. There is a distinct need to introduce a better system and
it is refreshing to see that we are on the verge of it.
I was recently a witness in a consumer affairs complaint and it was delight-
ful to see the humane way in which it was carried out, to see the dispensation
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of the ridiculous rules and regulations that bind litigants in Courts of Petty
Sessions. The matter was beautifully resolved, everybody went away happy. I
can only say that commonsense and an idealistic energy has persuaded this
government to introduce this scheme. I am sure that if all police officers could
see the energies that have gone into it to effect a better judicial system then
they too would be very pleased with its inception.
Glenn Bartley, Barrister-at-Law
I would like to ask Dr Tomasic to outline what speciﬁc reforms of the lower
courts he would suggest, and why those reforms would eliminate or reduce the
need for Community Justice Centres?
Dr Roman Tomasic
This is a subject that has preoccupied people in the so-called “access to
justice" "movement for a long (time. You need only to look at the three or four
thousand pages that Mauro Capelletti and his colleagues have put together on
this subject and you will ﬁnd dozens of reforms being talked about there in
terms of new procedures. such as giving court clerks further powers and so on.
I do not want to suggest particular reforms at this stage although I would argue
that suitable reforms would be best located within the court structure rather
than outside it. I think that this whole issue is something which needs to be
looked into much more deeply and could perhaps be the subject of another
seminar. Seriously, debate of these kinds of alternatives faces enormous resistance
from those administering the lower courts as it threatens their own area of
inﬂuence.
I have suggested in my comments that as a general principle it is desirable
to try to make greater use of the ideal of legality, and I do not accept the
imputation Miss Armstrong has made that I am suggesting legal aid should
become a universal right, and therefore that all should seek adversary means
of gaining whatever rights they might feel they are entitled to. That, of course,
is a practical absurdity. Yet it is possible to use mediation, for example, within
the court system, rather than merely dumping cases out of the court system
into C.J.C‘s because we do not like to deal with those types of complaints because
they are seen as intractable.
It is clear that there is a well established psychological need that many
people do enjoy their day in court. I think that this is based on an important
symbolic need for authoritative answers in our society as well as upon the hope
that it is possible to obtain access to the justice system even though most cases
may never be ﬁnally resolved. This does not mean that the formal justice
system has failed‘ or, in fact, needs to be replaced. One could argue, as people
such as Donald Black have done, that it is of considerable importance in dealing
with disputes that the role of access to authority in our kind of society he
better understood. Courts have authority, and hence power, of a kind that media—
tion centres cannot match.
One of the main characteristics of Justices Centres is that they do not
provide any kind of particularly authoritative response to disputes. In contrast,
I am not suggesting that what we need is a full blown adversary trial for every
dispute of a backyard nature. Many backyard disputes of their very nature are
just not resolvable and a large number of personal disputes simply are not
resolved. Courts and dispute processing should not be seen as primarily serving
the function of resolving disputes. It is to provide some temporary but authorita-
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tivc relief. Also, one could criticize Justice Centres and similar agencies like
those previding diversion programmes because they are, in a sense, a self fulﬁlling
prophecy. Many of the kinds of people who go to those centres are usually likely
to be able to resolve their problems without any outside intervention. I think that
it is also interesting to point to the large proportion of people who simply do not
go to Justice Centres in the ﬁrst place as well as those who, whilst they do go
to the Centres, simply, decide not to participate in mediation. If we look at the
American data which is much more extensive than is that available in Australia
(the Law Foundation unfortunately has not made available its statistical analysis
despite spending over $150,000 on its evaluation of C.J.C’s in New South Wales)
it is obvious that there is a major inhibition in society with regard to Justice
Centres in terms of the community perception of them. It has been pointed out
by Paul Stein and, to some degree, by Susan Armstrong that “We have thought
about this very closely and we know what is good for the community, we have
deﬁned what the need is”. Who has gone out and asked “the community"
what they need? Who has gone out to actually see whether people feel that
the Justice Centre model, once they have fully understood what it entails, is,
in fact, the approach which might be the most appropriate means of providing
the kinds of redress that they would regard as meaningful? People criticize
academic responses but there is evidently a “bureaucratic blinker" at work in
that reformers tell us that we all clearly perceive what is needed in the com-
munity. This allows them to then impose their rather narrow bureaucratic
perceptions. Increasingly what we see here with reforms of this nature is an
imposition of a narrow politically-loaded perception, of a strategy, which is by
no means one that is going to be democratically sought, or is being sought by
the community at large.
As to the original question of alternatives, I simply refer you to a large
number of proposals that Capalletti and his colleagues have made. They are
proposals which really have not begun to be talked about within the context of
the lower courts in Australia to any degree and I think there are inherent reasons
why they would probably never will be. I suggest that. some reasons for this
can be found in a book by Doreen McBarnet‘ which has recently been published
which essentially suggests that the lower courts are inherently unlikely, given
their current structure and priorities, to be able to provide any real justice
in a broad ranging way in society. There is a fundamental opposition, argues
McBarnet, or incapacity within the lower courts to provide any kind of legality.
Therefore one of the criticisms that one needs then to raise is the extent to
which Justice Centres will be able to do this or to what extent are they merely
a symbolic palliative—a substitute for reform aimed at sustaining the myth.
which is ’all 'so prevalent a myth in our society, namely, that our lower courts
are able to respond and provide some kind of solution.
Richard Chisholm, Senior Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University of N.S.W.
I wanted to come back, ifrI could, to a point made by John Basten. It
seems to me that a lot of the criticism that we have heard could be put in terms
of warnings about how Community Justice Centres could go wrong if we are not
careful, rather than outright rejection of them. I think there is not all that much
of a gap between people who are supporting them and people who are wary of
*Doreen McBarnet, Conviction: Law, The State and the Construction of Justice.
London, MacMillan, 1981. .
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them. Much of what John Basten was saying, for example, expressed caution
rather than rejection. But it does seem to me that one point he made is a really
fundamental criticism and I would just like to say something about it.
I am thinking of the argument that mediation centres, or Community Justice
Centres, may increase the oppression of people who are oppressed by providing
mechanisms whereby their grievances will be “atomized", personalized and dis-
solved and so they will never in a collective way confront the society that
oppresses them. It seems to me that that is a very important argument and one
that we need to think about. I would like to make three comments about it.
The ﬁrst comment is this—that the argument applies much more plausibly
to some kinds of disputes than others. It applies quite plausibly, for example, in
relation to a battered wife. There does seem to be a real choice between going
to mediation on the one hand, or on the other, helping to get up a women’s
refuge or seeking reform of relevant laws or something like that. Again in a
landlord and tenant situation one can fairly readily see a choice that faces the
oppressed tenant between getting the best deal he or she can, or setting up or
joining a Tenants’ Union. In other disputes, especially between neighbours, it
seems less obvious how the nature of the dispute could have been channelled
into some collective action that would reduce oppression. I think that John
would perhaps agree with this limitation—he distinguishes between equal and
unequal situations.
The second comment is that even in those cases where the argument does
seem plausible, there isn’t any hard evidence for it. We can’t point to any
empirical evidence that shows that when you have a mediation alternative, people
stop setting up Rape Crisis Centres and so on. Now they might or they might
not. It is untested. Perhaps there is an analogy with prisoners‘ right to complain
to the ombudsman. Now, as I understand it those people who work for prisoners'
rights support very strongly the redress available for prisoners by appealing to
an ombudsman. But you could similarly argue that such a remedy personalizes,
or "atomizes" the issue, and that if prisoners solve their individual problems
that way they would be less inclined to take collective action through organiza-
tions like the Prisoners’ Action Group. Yet as I understand it the people working
for prisoners, and prisoners themselves, wouldn‘t dream of rejecting that mech-
anism of grievance through the ombudsman. Now I am not sure if that is a
fair analogy or not. I put it to John as something he might like to respond to.
The last comment is a rather different one. That is, even assuming that it is
true that by setting up mediation mechanisms people would be less inclined to
act in a collective way to enforce their rights, it bothers me for us as a society
to say therefore we shouldn’t make mediation available. If people choose to
treat their dispute as an individual one, and to get the best deal they can, it
seems unfair to say to them, in effect, that the only thing you can do to solve
their problem is to form a collective group, a rape crisis group or whatever.
I might wish, with John Basten, that more people who are oppressed did those
things rather than compromised their own disputes. However, it seems to me
that it is an elitist and worrying position to oppose mediation for this reason.
In effect, we would be saying to them: “We are deciding that the way you
ought to solve your problems is in a collective way, and we are therefore not
going to give you a mechanism which alloWs you to do it in a personal atomized
way". I ﬁnd this position hard to accept.
 102
Judy Gictlxred, Director, Wollongong Community Justice Centre
There has been a lot of speculation about how Community Justice Centres
either will or will not assist the revolution, and the last speaker had difficulty
in seeing how disputants in a neighbour dispute could be affected in their ability
to pursue their rights as a group within that community. It seems to me that
is one of the areas where it is very clear how the elfect of Community Justice
Centres can do two things. It can resolve. disputes for people in terms of their
interpersonal relationships as individuals, and, having done that the people can
then act as a group. For example, people in a new housing estate settle in fairly
uneasily, they are inclined to fall out, they are not particularly happy, they are
disturbed. Their circumstances are such that they are much more likely to get
too close to each other originally and then because of that very closeness to
start falling out over a whole range of trivial matters. That has the capacity to
destroy the ability of that community to act collectively. Committees are then set
up by community workers and the committees fail because those people are on
such bad terms with each other because of a whole range of other issues. They
are unable as a body to pursue the issue that is important to all of them such as
the child care centre, the swimming pool, etc. Now by Community Justice
Centres enabling those people to resolve their interpersonal disputes it can serve
to consolidate that community to the point where it can collectively go after its
entitlement. That would be my answer to a number of comments made at this
seminar.-
Audrey Marshall, Court Counsellor, Family'Court of Australia
I ﬁnd myself astonished listening to so much energy being put into the
proposition that somehow or other the resolution of disputes, which are often
essentially personal or social, can be found through the legal system. Six years
experience in the Family Court makes me question daily what is justice? What is
justice between parents who have diﬁerent perceptions about the needs of their
children .following separation? What is justice in the situation between two
neighbours where there are hurt feelings and misunderstandings? Why do we
think there is a legal solution to these problems? They are not legal problems.
they are social and personal problems. Arguments have been put forward that
in a legal setting people get a fair deal with two lawyers but my experience shows
me that this is not so. The imbalance occurs in relation to the practical skills
and the guile of the lawyers, and so I am just impatient and astonished with so
much wasted energy. After all, what is being offered is an option. Why is there
this paranoia resistance to an option which is just an option that people can
take advantage of or not? They still have recourse to a court system if they
want to. I have to ask myself what kind of forces are. at work, that are not
really being faced, that are behind this resistance? I agree with John Basten‘s
comment about palliatives, I am concerned about that too. But in regard to his
cynical comment about the danger of proliferation of self-interested kind of
professionals or semi-professionals, I have to wonder about the self-interest of
. establishedjlegal professionals in their resistance to Community Justice Centres.
Penny Wobdhouse, Ethnic Affairs Commission, and Surry Hills—Redfern Com-
munity Justice Centre
After three years of interpreting for migrants in courts, and coming away
from assault matters and from Metropolitan Children’s Court matters, very
stressed, sad, and very depressed, I was so happy when I heard about Community
Justice Centres. What used to happen with the assault matters was that there
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would always be two charges of assault, whoever was accused of assault 'would go
straight to the police and accuse the other person of the assault. The judge
would try to ﬁnd out nearest whose car the actual scufﬂe had taken place and
the other person would have to pay the expenses, the medical bills and so on.
The result would be that the two people and their families, and friends, would
say “Well, that is ﬁne we will never talk to each other again. My children won‘t
play with his children, maybe we will move house" and a family feud would
generally ensue.
With the Metropolitan Children’s Court there would be a similar situation.
The husband would very reluctantly agree to make some payments which he
would then not pay, he would reluctantly agree to an access situation, then he
would either turn up late or the wife would be at church when he was there
coming to pick up the child just to generally harass and provoke. Those situations
are very stressful. There was a lot of hostility and discord after them. I have
mediated for similar cases particularly an access matter and it is a very happy
satisfying experience to come away from mediations of that sort. The access
mediation was one in which I had ﬁrst seen the wife when I had taken her to a
women’s refuge. A year later she saw her husband for the ﬁrst time at the
Community Justice Centre. I was interpreting. She was afraid because the only
contact she had had with her husband in the intervening year was from second-
hand threats that he was going to kill her if he ever caught sight of her again.
The last time I saw her she was very happy, the payments were coming through
regularly, the husband was picking up the child every Sunday afternoon. It was
the only happy access settlement that I have ever seen so I am particularly
5 happy with Community Justice Centres and mediation.
Jerry Holmes, Probation and Parole Ofﬁcer
I address my remarks to Dr Tomasic.
First of all I think two of his assumptions should be challenged. The latter
one which he made “Every person enjoys their day at court” in my experience
is very, very limited. Very few people in my experience enjoy their day in
court.
The second one which he made in the presentation of his paper was to
assume that the majority of people here are lawyers. I am not suggesting that
the Chief Justice carries out a straw poll, but looking around at the faces that
I know would suggest to Dr Tomasic that the minority of people here are
lawyers. The vast majority of lawyers given their professional interest, their legal
training (which he would know a lot more about than I would) and their
mercenary interests would not be very predisposed to the origins and development
of Community Justice Centres.
From our experience we all know that given the development of the family
structure which we have in a capitalist society not all these problems can be
mediated successfully within the framework of relationships. In some cases,
both for the beneﬁt of the community and for the individuals involved. it would
be beneﬁcial to have these problems solved. If you had time to go around any
prison in New South Wales, I would guarantee you that for practically every
prisoner there would be at least one backyard dispute which developed into a
dispute with much more serious consequences.
The courts have certain priorities and those priorities are not towards
settling what are basically emotional problems. They are towards protection of
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propeny interests within the society. The tension which seems to preoccupy
Dr Tomasic in terms of legality and informality is basically tension between
trying to solve emotional and day-to-day problems outside a system which has
been developed to protect property interests. The vast majority of the disputes
which the chamber magistrates are faced with would never be solved within the
adversary system which he supports.
Bill Johnson, Deputy Registrar, Family Court of Australia
My day-to-day bread and butter work is as a conciliator in ﬁnancial matters.
and almost every litigant who sat in the chair in my chambers last year indicated
to me that they were very keen to settle the matters, 64 per cent of them did so,
notwithstanding the fact that they had actually passed into the court system and
had not been able successfully to settle those matters through their solicitors
before they even went to court.
Barry Leadbeater, Mediator, Redfern Community Justice Centre
I am not a good mediator yet, but if we keep at it long enough I think we
all will be. I am very guilty that we have spoilt some nice days at court! The
main thing that made me understand my deﬁnition of the word “community“
is our training class. I think such a mixture of social, ﬁnancial, and ethnic
backgrounds is what community is all about. If you imagine that there is going
to be any very rigid doctrine put through by just a few people, I suggest you
spend a weekend with us at one of our workshops. Those workshops are
exhausting but very thorough. In no way can anybody except as part of the
community survive there, so I think we are just running around in circles in
this discussion forgetting the real word “mediation".
Allen Cullen, Chamber Magistrate, Court of Petty'Sessions, Bankstown
I refer a lot of people to the Community Justice Centre. I have found that
I refer people where the relevant legislation is out of date and inadequate. Take
for example the Dividing Fences Act (I951 ). the Crimes Act (1900) as amended,
(which largely has not been amended in relation to problem areas) and the
classical examples of the Infants Custody and Settlement Act (1899), and the
Landlord and Tenant Act (1899). The problem with the justice system is that
these Acts have to be administered, and they are not framed for today‘s society
whereby you can administer them properly. I would like to support the statements
of Morahan, also a Chamber Magistrate, and say that Community Justice Centres
are vital. We do need them and we refer to them all the time, but I would
also say that we have to modernize the legislation, and by modernizing the
legislation and working together with the Community Justice Centres then we
will arrive at a proper solution.
Peter Maiden, Solicitor, Supreme Court of N.S.W.
In my experience, as a private solicitor, I have to deal with a number of
backyard cases. There was never any great satisfaction for me at the end of the
day when having to face my clients after the case. say a week or two later
after the emotion had died down, and seek to justify the whole, process. I think
particularly in backyard cases it is emotion that takes over. It is the frustration
that a number of the speakers have alluded to, and I do not think. as a private  
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member of the legal profession, that we take any great delight in having to go
to court and run backyard cases, neither do the magistrates, the court otﬁcials,
and the Chamber Magistrates who are also involved in the procedures.
"Daryl Gunter, Deputy Ombudsman, N.S.W.
I would like to raise a matter that has not been raised, and that is the
involvement of local government ofﬁcials in dispute settlements. We all think
of the backyard dispute in regard to C.J.C’s, but very many people'go to the
council asking the council ofﬁcers to issue an order about noise control, about
the fences, about the dog, about the canaries, about the neighbours habits of
hosing the front steps at bad times, of playing radios, etc., of building additions
to their houses, and all the other rather unneighbourly things that go on in
society. They call on the councils to act, and the councils send out their ofﬁcers
who are not skilled in mediation matters but who are skilled in examining matters
under the terms of their own legislation. They then make decisions whether
to issue orders, whether to prosecute or not. When people are not satisﬁed
with the council’s action (and that is in very many cases) they come to organiza-
tions such as the Ombudsman‘s Ofﬁce saying that the council ofﬁcers were
unreasonable. We then proceed to apply our minds and our legislation to look at
the problem. All very ﬁne and sometimes very helpful, but one muSt bear
in mind and I would emphasize this, that whatever we say about the council
ofﬁcers we are usually not resolving the unresolved problem that was first raised
with the council. I would also like to give a plea for those people who live outside
the Community Justice Centre areas, i.e., on the North Shore and in the Western
Suburbs, that they might soon have access to those mediation facilities.
I spent one day this week at a children’s institution, a remand centre.
Amongst others, I spoke to four girls, aged between 12 and 14, who were all
charged with being uncontrollable, and all were facing three months or so in
one of our institutions. They were all there because of family disputes that
they had not been able to resolve. I am sure that the disputes were such that
even the most well meaning district ofﬁcer would not be able to resolve, that
the magistrate would not be able to resolve, and probably the institution to which
they were going to be sent would not be able to contribute towards that resolu-
tion either. I sat there listening to their stories and their family backgrounds
and wondered just what alternatives might be added, how our system might be
altered, in order to provide some sort of solution to that really never ending
undcrtow of a problem that we have in our society. The C.J.C. could assist in
this area. '
Janice Williams, Mediator, Community Justice Centre, Bankstown
I would like to make comment following. Dr Tomasic’s statementthat dis-
putes are not resolved—they are processed. My comment stems from my own
experience of mediation. I am thinking particularly of cases that would not be
litigated, the sort of cases where people have been bad neighbours for about
30 years and have lived with it, and intend to continue to live with it. I am
thinking also of cases where within community groups there has been a com-
munication breakdown, and they have used the Community Justice Centre as a
neutral ground where they can resolve their problems. The comment I would
like to make regarding such cases is that I have seen people go away genuinely
happy and genuinely understanding each other for the ﬁrst time. That has been
my experience. I am sure this is the experience of other mediators, that there
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has been a range of improvements in the relationship and I am particularly
thinking of those areas which would never be litigated. The improvement in
those relationships cannot be reﬂected in the cold, hard statistics.
David Nelson, Barrister-at-Law
If you will have a look at the statute as set out in Mr Anderson’s paper
it is possible for mediation to ﬁnd jurisdiction in a difference of opinion between
a captain of a Qantas aircraft and an extortioner who wants to put a bomb on
board. I think that created an instantaneous reaction amongst lawyers to reading
the Statute and they might not be here because of that reaction.
Might I say that all of us have a horror of backyard disputes, and others
have a horror of Family Courts, and any reasonable barrister tries to stay out
of that area and leave it to people who have more expertise than he has. It’s
almost a “non-win" situation all the time, you are conscious of it all the time,
you have a duty to perform in the circumstances of the client applying to you.
Mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and decision at law, seem to me to be all
inextricably mixed up together. I ﬁnd myself in negotiation in circumstances of
urgency and compulsion, and of great emotional impact upon the parties, yet
something has to be done by a particular time. It seems to me, therefore, that all
well-versed lawyers would welcome any attempt whatever to alleviate that pro-
cess. No lawyer, properly instructed, as We say, would ever think that the law
can solve everything. Law simply cannot do it.
John Basten
I must say Jerry Holmes, as usual, is absolutely right. I do feel confronted
by a sea of mediators, and I was rather relieved to hear that there was a good
bevy of police here until they told us that they supported the mediators, too!
Secondly, Audrey Marshall will no doubt be pleased to know how grateful
I am to her. It is so long since I have been accused of supporting the legal
profession that it. is a very nice change.
For my friend the psychologist’s beneﬁt I think it is quite seriously true
that we should not draw a distinction, as Ricth Chisholm pointed out, between
revolution and counter revolution. I was trying to outline some of what I saw
as the dangers, and I think they are to be taken seriously. It does not mean that
I am opposed to the C.J.C’s as an institution, and indeed I concluded my paper
by stating that I hoped they would continue long beyond the sunset clause so
that they could be properly and empirically evaluated.
I did mention in my paper a point that Richard Chisholm again raised.
One of the alternatives to C.J.C’s is not the adversary system but crisis support
for people in need. Of course, that does not apply to all the cases but to many
of the people who really do need rape crisis centres and refuges. We should
be careful to make sure that adequate funding is provided for them if that is
an alternative.
Finally, 1 would like to comment on Richard Chisholm‘s example of the
Ombudsman in relation to prisoner complaints. In my view the Ombudsman‘s'
Ofﬁce is a weapon to be used by prisoners who are being unfairly and illegally
treated by the Department. The Ombudsman‘s Ofﬁce becomes an active agent
to investigate such complaints, and it is, of course, signiﬁcant that Mr Jackson‘s
response when told to obey the law as the Minister responsible is to defame
the Ombudsman‘s Ofﬁce. C.J.C’s do not have any power to tell a Minister what  
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to do. The power which the Ombudsman has, even though it has no teeth, is not
comparable to that of the C.J.C’s. I do not believe we will ever find a Minister
saying, “Abolish C.J.C‘s—they have been telling me what to dol".
Dr Roman Tomasic
There are some points that I would like to make, as I think I have been
misunderstood.
Firstly, let me put on record the fact that l by no means would like to be
seen arguing for the adversary system as being something that ought to be
applied in all cases, and as being an inevitable part of any processing through
the legal system. I think inevitably the legal system has and always will have to
use mediation, compromise, negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, as well as legal
rules. The point I am making, however, is that there is a real danger once you
take these informal mechanisms outside of a context where legal rules and legal
institutions and the authority they provide are a backdrop. The rules are a
necessary means of enforcing these informal mechanisms once they fail and
they do fail in many cases. Unless access to legal rules and procedures remains
a credible alternative for disputants informal mechanisms may well become.
meaningless. This is because of the importance that many scholars attach to the
idea of bargaining or dispute processing “within the shadow of the law". This
shadow of the law helps to preserve and sustain the tension between legality
and informality which is essential to any ﬂexible and reliable system of justice.
It may not, however, be needed in systems of social control or bureaucratic
administration in which mediation is increasingly being resorted to.
Another general point is that I would by no means argue that the adversary
system characterizes the lower courts or that it should be our ideal. In fact, I
would argue that we have never had an adversary system to any real extent in
the lower courts despite what some people tend to perceive when they seek to
justify Justice Centres. There has always been a very informal process model
used there whereby very little real investigation goes on, certainly not of the
kind found in the ideal adversary system. What I am suggesting, however, is that
it is important to build in, in a somewhat slightly more formal way, some of
these informal procedures that we have in the upper courts. We are all prepared
to acknowledge negotiation and settlements existing in the higher courts, but yet
we are not prepared to see these as being a legitimate and an essential part
of the operation of the lower courts. I am suggesting that if we are going to be
concerned with court reform in that area we need to somehow blend these much
more, rather than throw out the baby with the bathwater as seems to be suggested
here. _
I should stress that I am not opposed to mediation as such. I think mediation
is a very important mechanism in the dispute processing armoury. However, one
of the problems that one can immediately highlight in talking about this is that,
despite the points that Clive Grahame has made about the enormous variety of
' mediation centres, there has been a fairly narrow model of Justice Centres
imposed upon our society. All these centres are different to some degree, but the
degree of difference is really not all that signiﬁcant. For example, we have very
few Justice Centres of the kind similar to, say, the Community Board Programme
in San Francisco where Mediation Centres are in fact part of the actual natural
community and do not depend upon the justice system and the State as such.
I am somewhat alarmed by talk coming from a number of quarters for a
considerable expansion of Justice Centres based on the model that we have here
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which is essentially a Justice Centre that is very closely related to State institutions.
They are very closely dependant upon referrals from police, from the chamber
magistrates, and from other justice or bureaucratic agencies, such as Ombudsman
or Privacy Committee. There is. I think, a real question of concern about bureau-
cratic interdependency, nicely illustrated by the idea of the “Chiﬂey Square
dance", a danger of the citizen becoming caught up in this chain of agencies
which does not necessarily offer any solution apart from justifying their own
existence.
The point was made that many matters are not litigated, and that they could
be dealt with much more effectively in mediation centres. It should also be noted
there there are other ways of responding to disputes. “Lumping it" is of course
a very tried and traditional way of dealing with disputes in our society. Another
way, of course, is avoidance—just forget about it, move to another job or move
to another neighbourhood. These are fairly tried and true methods and ones well
suited to our mobile, complex society. Mediation it should be stressed was plucked
from static relatively simpler societies. I do not think the legal profession is at all
concerned about Justice Centres. Quite the contrary. It is probably delighted to
see Justice Centres emerging. One of the leading organizations supporting the
emergence of Justice Centres in the United States has been the American Bar
Association. Lawyers want to get rid of these particular cases as much as the
magistracy wants to get rid of them. There seems to be a clear concensus within
the legal profession that having to deal with these kinds of disputes is an unwanted
preoccupation. There are more proﬁtable ways to spend one‘s time. Yet the
State insists upon some degree of control of these disputes and has collaborated
with the legal profession in seeking to delegalize these kinds of disputes and so
effectively undermining the already limited power that disputants now have when
they seek to litigate their grievances.
Finally, 1 can do no more than refer you again to some of the arguments
that I have made in the paper, and also to the more detailed and considered
opinions that you will ﬁnd in the American literature referred to in books such
as Neighborhood Justice, as well as in the Collection that Richard Abel has just
put out on the Politics of Informal Justice. These look in considerable detail into
the kinds of arguments that we have tried to present at this seminar and I think
that any fair and ﬁnal consideration of this issue must look at these in much
greater detail than the kind of emotional way a lot of the issues have been dealt
with at this seminar.  
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